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Abstract 
The debate about the United Nations Security Council and Walzer’s ethical approach 
to humanitarian intervention from a legal perspective has been ongoing. The research 
upon which this study is based, centres its attention on the intervention of the United 
Nations (UN) in northern Iraq (1991) and Kosovo (1999). It investigates Walzer’s 
ethical approach to humanitarian intervention against the background of the existing 
international law prohibition on the use of force, and the principle of non-intervention 
in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. The promising trend of humanitarian 
intervention and the current emphasis on human security are also investigated in 
order to determine whether the intervention in Iraq and Kosovo fits this paradigm. 
While acknowledging the importance of states in international relations, this study 
queries the possibility of an ethical international strategy to solve internal problems or 
conflicts. This study makes a case for sustained efforts in the area of intervention on 
humanitarian and ethical grounds. It further argues for the adoption of an 
international organisation that should have a pre-emptive right to intervene in 
conflicts that affect their regions of influence. The study intends to provide a standard 
for conducting future interventions.  
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INTRODUCTION AND PROPOSAL 
 
 
1.1 Contextualisation 
 
Given the increase in humanitarian emergencies that have lead to numerous 
interventions in the Post-cold War Era, many observers have considered the 
legalisation of humanitarian intervention as one of the most pressing issues of the 
1990s. It is not a new concept; actions that are reminiscent of humanitarian 
intervention can be found in the Book of Genesis (Chapter 14).1 The Noble Koran 
also says something about it when Muslims are instructed as follows: 
                                                
… if two parties (or groups) among the believers fall to fighting, then 
make peace between them both, but if one of them outrages against the 
other, then fight you (all) against the one which outrages till it complies 
with the command of Allah.2  
As will be noted later, this Koranic verse may accord with the second condition of 
Walzer’s approach.  
 
1 Garfinkle, A. Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty: A Realist View: pp 1-4 (2004) 
available at http://www.ncuscr.org/articlesandspeeches/garfinkel%20final%203-11.pdf  Visited on July 
21, 2006.  
2  The Noble Koran, the Chapter (sura) of Hujorat, Verse No 9, Part No 26.   
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In the Far East, intervention and the rules pertaining to it were important issues for 
Chinese leaders almost since their history was first recorded. A number of vassals of 
the Chou dynasty basically operated as independent entities for five centuries before 
the birth of Christ. In these states certain commonly accepted laws for regulating their 
relations were in place. Certain aspects of that system show pertinent similarities with 
International Law that was later to appear from the multi-state system at the end of 
the Middle Ages in Europe. The stipulations in connection with intervention are 
prime examples of this.3 
Humanitarian intervention played a small part in all of the interventions mentioned 
below, but humanitarian considerations were by no means the main reason in these 
cases. For example, during the Cold War some interventions were termed 
humanitarian such as India’s intervention into East Pakistan in 1971 in the war that 
created Bangladesh; the Tanzanian intervention into Uganda in 1979 and the 
Vietnamese intervention into Cambodia also in 1979. In recent years however, much 
political controversy has arisen over the question of humanitarian intervention and its 
supposed impact on the concept of state sovereignty. There are several dimensions to 
this controversy that may be political, ethical or legal.4 
At the end of the Cold War, international relations became more amiable and non-
competitive on many issues. Previously such a feat had been barred by political, 
moral and military rivalry. Thus, humanitarian intervention by the international 
community became a greater political possibility after 1989.5 
                                                 
3 Cohen, J.A. China and Intervention: Theory and Practice. University of Pennsylvanian Law Review. 
Vol. 121:471, p 474 (1973). Cohen states: “In pre-imperial China it was generally accepted that each 
of the feudal States had a right to manage its own affairs and had a corresponding duty not to interfere 
in the affairs of other feudal States. Nevertheless, this general principle was frequently honoured in the 
breach, and there developed a variety of rationalizations for departures from the norm.”         
4  Op cit note 1    
5 The Political and Moral Aspects of Humanitarian Intervention. Report of the Danish Institute of 
International Affairs (DUPI): p 36 (1999).    
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However, few concepts in the social sciences elicit greater controversy than the 
concept of intervention. A major reason for this has been the particularly complex 
problem of defining the concept of intervention since it covers several terms, 
including political, economic and humanitarian intervention.6 
Walzer’s definition of humanitarian intervention is used provisionally in this study. 
He defines it as a means that aims or intends to help oppressed people, and it is 
sufficient if the process is merely started: the action does not have to be completed, 
just started.7 In accordance with Walzer’s conceptualisation, this means that 
intervention is not an arbitrary action, but is initiated in response to the suffering of 
any specific group of people. Walzer’s principles for humanitarian intervention state 
furthermore, that it is not acceptable, unless internal problems occur in a state or 
between different nations or sects, or when there is no fit between a ruler and his 
people. 
This dissertation examines whether the UN and foreign powers have a right to 
intervene in internal conflicts of sovereign states, and if this is indeed the case, what 
conditions justify such interventions. These matters are considered with particular 
reference to Iraq (1991) and Kosovo (1999). 
The new context of humanitarian intervention then, consists of three factors:8 
* The increased regularity in the occurrence of humanitarian catastrophes in the 
world 
                                                 
6 International Commission on Intervention and States Sovereignty. The Responsibility to Protect. 
Published by the International Development Research Centre: pp 1-9 (2001). 
7 Walzer, M. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. Cambridge: 
Penguin Books: pp 86-109 (1977). 
8  Op cit note 1  
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* A stronger international sense of responsibility to solve these crises and a 
greater political ability of western governments to initiate steps to avert or 
alleviate them 
* The central importance of the issue in the basic foreign policy of the reigning 
international power. Governments that invoke humanitarian claims when in 
fact they are acting in accordance with certain narrow-minded policies may 
nevertheless still be suspect. 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, as one of the institutions of the 
UN, held in 1970 that the obligations of states towards the international community 
as a whole include the protection of the individual against the crime of ‘genocide’ as 
well as the protection of “the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of 
human persons”.9 
The UN has found itself in the middle of the debate about humanitarian intervention. 
During the period 1991-1999, it issued some of its most controversial resolutions 
concerning the use of force in northern Iraq and Kosovo in order to halt gross abuses 
of human rights, although its actions contradicted some of its Charter articles on 
sovereignty, non-intervention and political independence.10 
A codified right of humanitarian intervention is offered as a solution that 
‘resolves’ the tension between legality and legitimacy as well as the tension 
between HR and sovereignty principles contained in the UN Charter.11 
                                                 
9  Op cit note 5. 
10 For example, Resolution 746 March 17, 1992 about Somali; Resolution 912 April 21, 1994 about 
Rwanda; Resolution 1080 October 1996 about Eastern Zaire; Resolution 1101 March 28, 1997 about 
Albania and so on.   
11 Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention, Magaine: p 6 (2002). Also available at http:// 
WWW.law.georgetown.edu/alumni/publications/2002/magazine/stromseth.html . Last visited August 
6, 2005. 
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Indeed, it is the dialectic between intervention to protect human rights and non- 
intervention under the pretext of territorial sovereignty that is important. The focus of 
this study is therefore on two important humanitarian interventions in the Post-cold 
War Era, namely northern Iraq (1991) and Kosovo (1999). Unfortunately, the UN 
Charter has not resolved the tension between sovereignty and human rights. It is 
noted that the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against any states, while 
the matter of human rights is in fact given limited attention. 
The many humanitarian interventions of the previous decade have caused political 
analysts to realize that the long-held notion that sovereignty is absolute is no longer 
valid. Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary-General, stated that: “National 
sovereignty can be set aside if it stands in the way of the United Nations Security 
Council’s (UNSC) overriding duty to preserve international peace and security”. He 
maintained that the UN’s stance of non-intervention in domestic affairs was not ever 
meant to be absolute. In support of this view, he said that the Charter of the UN was 
not issued in the name of any specific government, but in the name of the ‘people’. In 
connection with this, he stated that the UN’s aim was not only to maintain 
international peace and security but also to “reaffirm faith in fundamental HR, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person”.12 The UN Charter thus respects the 
sovereignty of any state, but never at the expense of international peace or a respect 
for fundamental human rights. 
In addition to this, the widening of the power of international justice in the 1990s can 
be demonstrated by the establishment of The Hague tribunals dealing with crimes 
committed during the Bosnian war and the civil conflict in Rwanda, as well as in the 
judgment of the House of Lords against Pinochet. These have all shown a clear will 
                                                 
12  See generally, Kofi A. Annan. The Question of Intervention: Statements by the Secretary-General. 
New York: United Nations (1999).         
 5
to reduce legal weight concerning sovereignty as a pretext against external 
intervention in a state’s domestic affairs.13 
In fact, recent experience suggests the opposite. The United Nations War 
International Crimes Tribunal (UNWICT) for the former Yugoslavia is an 
attempt to deal with radical evil through the Nuremberg model.14    
Walzer’s ethical approach with regard to humanitarian intervention is used from a 
legal perspective in a comparative analysis of the cases of northern Iraq and Kosovo. 
His essential idea is that the state is the theatre; it is ruled by a government, and 
interference by foreign armies must be excluded from it. Walzer believes that 
intervention is not an option unless there is a lack of governmental legitimacy. He 
suggests three conditions under which sovereignty may be disregarded. These 
conditions are:15 
* When a particular state includes more than one political community, is an 
empire or multinational state and when one of its communities or nations is in 
active revolt, foreign powers can come to the assistance of the rebels. Walzer 
argues that this is the case because there is no fit between government and 
community. 
* In the case of a single community disrupted by civil war where a foreign 
power has already intervened on the side of one party, other foreign powers 
may rightfully intervene in support of the other party. 
                                                 
13 Chandler, D. From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention. London: Pluto 
Press: p 120 (2002). 
14 Nino, C. S. Radical Evil on Trial. London: Yale University Press: p 120 (1996). 
15 Op cit note 7 
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* In cases where a government is engaged in massacre or enslavement of its 
own citizens intervention is supported. Again, this is based on the assumption 
that there is no fit between government and community. 
These above-mentioned conditions, as they are adopted by Michael Walzer, 
constitute the cornerstone of this dissertation. In the case of northern Iraq, the Iraqi 
government killed and practiced ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity of 
thousands of the Kurdish population. The Kurds, who were in revolt against the Iraqi 
government, had requested autonomy for the Kurdish people in northern Iraq. In the 
case of Kosovo, the former Republic of Yugoslavia also committed acts of ethnic 
cleansing against hundreds of thousands of the majority of the Kosovo Albanian 
population who were affected by the actions of the Yugoslav security forces. Forced 
displacements, internal and external, occurred in both cases. 
Various approaches attempt to explain humanitarian intervention. The normative 
approach, which focuses on legal perspectives of intervention and covers “all political 
theorizing of a prescriptive or recommendation kind: that is to say all theory-making 
concerned with what ought to be”,16 is rigid. Here, consideration of the international 
circumstances and the actors’ policies are not priorities because the normative 
approach depends on legal basics.17 
On the other hand, the behaviouralist approach, which emphasises interventionary 
conduct by studying the changes in the behaviour of states and organisational 
behaviour governed by social and cultural forces, regards the actors’ behaviour as an 
essential element. The ‘actors’ are the existing state, those who govern it, as well as 
those who wish to intervene. These elements are variable because of international 
circumstances (which are unstable) and the international actors (who are also 
                                                 
16 Stoker, G. & King, D. “Introduction: Normative Theories of Local Government and Democracy”. In 
Rethinking Local Democracy. London: Macmillan: pp 1-27 (1996). (The normative approach as 
developed by David Hume and Kant, behaviouralist approach of Pavlov, Watson and Skinner). 
17  See generally, Alchourron, C. The Normative System. Vienna: Springer Verlag (1971).  
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unstable).18 Neither the normative approach nor the behaviouralist approach explains 
humanitarian intervention adequately. 
Two other approaches should also be mentioned, namely those that can be qualified 
in terms of positivism or naturalism. Positivism is considered a category of 
jurisprudence proposed by Vattel, Zouch, Kelson and Hart, and focuses on legal 
basics and agreement regarding the relations between nations. Rights and obligations 
vis-à-vis principles are dependent on the context of agreements. The alternative 
approach to positivism, naturalism, is in the style of jurisprudence taken from 
Grotius, Pufendorf, Radbruch, and Dworkin. Its supporters hold that natural law 
seeks justice as the basis for law, and therefore also for International Law. A 
naturalist approach holds that human dignity and justice are of primary importance 
and should be considered above all other principles and agreements among states.19 
1.2 Aims and rationale 
The aim of this study is to examine the UN intervention policy and Walzer’s ethical 
approach to humanitarian intervention from a legal perspective, specifically by 
comparing the cases of humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq (1991) and Kosovo 
(1999). Moreover, this dissertation focuses on research on the nature of the 
humanitarian intervention in Iraq and Kosovo. It also aims to provide a basis for new 
approaches to humanitarian intervention that could assist policy-makers, corporate 
decision-makers and activists. The study furthermore points to the need of 
international role-players to adopt certain measures for ethically-based interventions, 
and also measures against the threats inherent in the lack of doing so. 
                                                 
18  See generally, Florin, A. The Evolution of International Norms, International Studies Quarterly 40:  
pp 363-389 (1996). 
19 Henry, F. Carey Naturalism vs Positivism: Debates over Coercive Protection of Human Rights in 
Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo.  Civil War. Vol. 5(2): pp 25-76 (Summer 2002). 
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1.3 Justification for this study 
From the discussion thus far, it is evident that the debate on humanitarian intervention 
has become important within the context of International Law. Clearly therefore, 
there is a need for greater clarity on the ‘rules’ pertaining to humanitarian 
intervention. 
The Resolutions of UNSC concerning the two cases discussed in this study are 
different. In the case of Iraq, the UNSC adopted Resolution 688, issued on April 5, 
1991. It called for the Iraqi regime to halt the repression of its population and to 
facilitate the arrival of the international humanitarian assistance for the Kurds.20 On 
the other hand, the UNSC Resolution 1244 was adopted after the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) military attacks on Kosovo placed Kosovo under 
international management and requested the former Republic of Yugoslavia to 
respect the autonomy of the Kosovo people. 
This dissertation’s relevance arises from the fact that it seeks to address the UN 
intervention policy and has as focus Walzer’s ethical approach to humanitarian 
intervention from a legal perspective. Two matters justify the study: 
* The first has already been alluded to, namely the need to examine scholarly 
studies focusing on Walzer’s ethical approach to humanitarian intervention 
from a legal perspective. 
* Second, the need to investigate the two approaches that dominated the 
interpretation of humanitarian intervention in the 1990s, namely, as 
mentioned previously, the normative and behaviouralist approaches. 
The cases of northern Iraq and Kosovo were chosen for a number of reasons, 
including: 
                                                 
20 The UNSC Resolutions 688 on  April 5, 1991. 
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* First, the aim of the UNSC Resolution 688, issued on April 5, 1991, to 
condemn the repression of the Iraqi civilian population, particularly the 
Kurds, was limited and was not issued under Chapter VII, the only chapter of 
the UN Charter that authorises the UNSC to use or sanction the use of force. 
On the other hand, the UNSC Resolution 1244 established an interim 
international administration for the Kosovo people under the UN auspices of 
effective international civil and security presences, acting as might be decided 
in terms of Chapter VII of the Charter, and capable of guaranteeing the 
achievement of common objectives.21 
* Second, the justification provided for intervention, tasks undertaken, means 
used, and outcomes of the two cases differed. 
* Third, the two cases, which on the surface appear to have little in common, 
share structural similarities. They both exhibit the characteristics of 
international intervention in which the UN played a vital role. 
* Finally, the fact that they took place in geographically diverse areas broadens 
the applicability of the conclusions. The Iraqi case involved Third World 
states, while the Kosovo case involved developed states. 
These reasons are regarded as the most important for this study since it is believed 
that they will contribute to effectively addressing the stated research problem and also 
broaden the applicability of the conclusions. 
The two cases are important because they were highly contested within the UN and 
controversial resolutions were passed concerning them. The data obtained from the 
literature survey and interviews are compared. This research study focuses on ethical 
                                                 
21  Ibid and The UNSC Resolutions 1244 on June 10, 1999.  
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and legal aspects of intervention and problems associated with this process, as well as 
the impacting factors as they relate to Iraq and Kosovo. 
Additional justification for the study is the fact that it was the inhabitants who 
suffered most during the conflicts, both in northern Iraq and in Kosovo, even though 
it is common knowledge that during armed conflicts, civilians suffer more than 
fighters. The two cases also involved direct or indirect attacks on the civilian 
populations by those who were party to the conflicts. These attacks on the civilian 
population necessitated humanitarian intervention in both instances. 
1.4 Research questions 
The research raises four fundamental research questions:  
* Was Walzer’s ethical approach applied as the norm concerning humanitarian 
intervention in the Post-cold War Era in Iraq (1991) and Kosovo (1999)? 
* How do the UN and the international community deal with such interventions, 
and how did they deal with the Iraqi and Kosovo cases respectively? 
* What was the impact of the humanitarian intervention on the sovereignty of 
Iraq (1991) and Kosovo (1999)?  
* What are the views of the actors involved in the cases of Iraq and Kosovo on 
humanitarian intervention? 
1.5 Conceptual framework 
This study moves away from the predominantly normative, behaviouralist, positivist 
and naturalist approaches to humanitarian intervention and focuses on Walzer’s 
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ethical approach to humanitarian intervention, when and where it is employed or 
authorised by international organisations. There are fundamental reasons for applying 
Walzer’s approach, but primarily because it provides a socially relevant analysis 
based on norms as social phenomena. Norms can be shared only if the international 
community accepts them and consents to their rules, even when they are not 
recognised by all states. Individuals who formulate foreign policy feel obliged to 
comply with the opinion of the majority of states on the basis of their ideas about the 
newly developed UN and international public opinion. With varying degrees of 
success, international norms introduced by the UN have reshaped the nature and 
intensity of both international relations and internal policies alike. Analysts of 
international relations have traditionally emphasised state inter-governmental 
organisations and legal regulations of international interaction. 
Walzer explains that every government has rights. Governments should accept and 
respect the rule of other states without invasion or objection. He believes that 
sovereignty and a separate governor can co-exist in a single state. If necessary, a 
sovereign leader may be respected, but not necessarily obeyed.22 Thus, he sets rules 
for non-intervention as well as for intervention. The key concepts within the 
framework of this study will be determined by Walzer’s approach, and the notions of 
humanitarian intervention and sovereignty. 
Walzer’s approach allows for the use of force in certain cases. This is possible when 
internal arrangements prohibit the enjoyment of individual rights or when a particular 
territory is inhabited by different communities which together comprise a nation state, 
but there are fundamental problems between them and government. This approach is 
crucial in measuring the legitimacy of interventions in Iraq and Kosovo. 
In terms of Walzer’s rules, foreign powers have the right to intervene in internal 
conflicts of sovereign states provided that consensus exists on the rules that should 
                                                 
22  Op cit note 7.                                                 
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apply and that they be applied consistently. Interventions in states where internal 
conflicts were or are perpetuated may become possible targets of political, economic, 
legal or military interests of foreign powers. Thus, this study will contribute towards 
policy development that addresses human rights violations. To improve humanitarian 
practices, international efforts are necessary by governments to create ethical rules 
and to adopt appropriate policies towards human beings through specialised 
international organisations that positively contribute to peace, prosperity and stability. 
Walzer argues that the emphasis of his ideas falls not actually on the state, but on the 
community that justifies it.23 
The term ‘humanitarian’ is used in the contemporary world to explain a broad series 
of actions, either by governments or non-government organisations which aim to 
develop the lives and well-being of human beings.24 
Intervention is a concept which, for many analysts, presupposes military activity and 
the movement of forces from one state to others, or from certain states to other states. 
The UN Charter prohibits the use or threat of force other than for self-defence or the 
enforcements of a Chapter VII Security Council mandate. Intervention often appears 
to violate these prohibitions and appears negative.25 “Intervention by states and the 
UN should be dealt with separately, since the notion of ‘intervention’ is narrower 
under customary law applicable to acts of states than with regard to Article 2(7) of the 
UN Charter applicable to acts of the UN”.26 
The seemingly most appropriate definition of humanitarian intervention is found in 
the report of the Danish Institute of International Affairs. It represents a kind of 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 Murphy, S. Humanitarian Intervention: The UN in Evolving World Order. Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press: pp 4-9 (1996).  
25 Thomashausen, S.  Humanitarian Intervention in an Evolving World Order: The Cases of Iraq, 
Somalia, Kosovo and East Timor. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa: pp 1-2 (2002).   
26 Op cit note 5:46.  
 13
synthesis of the numerous definitions available in the literature dedicated to 
humanitarian intervention. According to this report, humanitarian intervention is: 
coercive action by states involving the use of armed force in another 
state without the consent of its government, with or without the 
authorization from the United Nations Security Council, for the purpose 
of preventing or putting to a halt gross and massive violations of human 
rights or international humanitarian law.27 
This definition must be amended slightly to include interventions that are embarked 
upon with the authority of the government of the targeted state. For purposes of this 
study, a preliminary definition of humanitarian intervention would thus include 
intervention to stop gross human rights violations or to provide desperately needed 
humanitarian aid.28 
It should be remembered that sovereignty in today’s world is no longer a deterrent to 
intervention for human rights and humanitarian fundamentals. The distinguishing 
factor is the political will of other states based on national welfare, together with a 
level of humanitarian concern. Absolute sovereignty is clearly no longer a barrier. In 
the past, sovereignty was not a controversial subject but now it has become so. 
Conditions within the international community are allowed to dominate decisions as 
to whether a state is sovereign or not and whether the international community may 
come to the defense of dispossessed societies within the territories of states.29 
                                                 
27 Op cite note 5. p11.  
28 Gordon, R. Humanitarian Intervention by the United Nations: Iraq, Somalia and Haiti, Texas 
International Law Journal. Vol. 31(43) (1996). 
29 Deng, F.M. “Reconciling Sovereignty with Responsibility: A Basis for International Humanitarian 
Action in Africa”. In World Politics: The African State System in Flux. Edited by Harbeson, J.W. & 
Rothchild, D. Colorado: Westview Press: pp 359-361 (2000).  
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Sovereignty is an essential institution of relations between states because it is a 
crucial element in the birth, maintenance and death of states.30 
1.6 Literature review 
Researchers of international relations contribute to particular issues by adding 
relevant facts emerging from their research. Some such facts are included in this 
study in areas where they contribute meaningfully to the discussion. Studies on the 
subject of the UN and humanitarian intervention are included in different writings 
with sometimes opposing opinions. Some of these were consulted for this study and 
despite opposing opinions, they may in fact expand the reader’s understanding and 
views of the issues being discussed. 
This report is presented thematically to ensure a balanced approach. It must however, 
be stated at the outset that because issues that are discussed sometimes overlap, there 
might be situations where the literature reviewed for one theme is also be relevant to 
another one. In such cases the review of the relevant literature relates to the other 
theme as well. In this study, the order of presentation is as follows: first, the 
background of the conflicts in the two selected areas is given. Thereafter follows a 
review of the UN intervention in both cases. Finally the principle of non-intervention, 
which incorporates the doctrine of sovereignty, the emerging doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention as well as Walzer’s ethical opinion on intervention, are 
discussed. 
Many writers explain different ethical aspects of intervention. Writers who have 
maintained Walzer’s opinions and have studied Walzer’s moral critique of the foreign 
policy of the United States of America (USA) include Frost (1996), Holzgrefe (2003), 
and Kupfer (2003). Beitz (1999) has written about treatment of normative and ethical 
                                                 
30 Holsti, K. Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press: p 112 (2004).  
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problems of humanitarian intervention in international relations and proposes a 
principle of state autonomy based on the justice of a state's domestic institutions. 
Elshtain (1998) has confirmed that ethics and politics are mutually constitutive and he 
suggests the continued primacy of national sovereignty, as well as the ideas contained 
in Walzer’s books and articles. These are included as vital sources in this dissertation. 
Elements of Walzer’s book, Arguing about War, are also dealt with in this 
dissertation. His responses to particular wars, including the first Gulf War (1991) and 
the wars in Kosovo and Iraq (2003), receive specific attention. 
Nonetheless, these are mostly normative and behaviouralist studies and very few 
writers follow a comparative approach when considering Walzer’s ethical approach 
to humanitarian intervention from a legal perspective. Some writers who have studied 
normative and behaviouralist approaches are Frank (2005), Davis (2004), Yamashita 
(2004), and Welsh (2004). The works of all the writers mentioned above constitute 
essential sources for this dissertation. 
There is a profusion of scholarly analyses of humanitarian intervention. Relevant 
publications and dissertations include works such as those of Harriss (1995), Du 
Plessis (2000), Wheeler (2000), Chesterman (2001), Chandler (2002), Davis (2004), 
and Welsh (2004). 
This dissertation also includes references to Schachter’s study on sovereignty, Laski 
(1917), Deng (2000), and Keren (2002). Other sources such as Henkin (1991) and 
Hosti (2004) are also referred to since both writers studied the use of force in 
connection with intervention. Authors focusing on the topic of intervention into Iraq 
in particular, include Abiew (1999), Sinha (2002), and Yamashita (2004), while 
publications that concern Kosovo on the same theme include the studies of Stoan 
(1999), Minear (2000), and Morton (1999). 
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1.7 Methodology 
Information used in this study was acquired from primary and secondary sources. 
Qualitative methodology was applied during the research as opposed to quantitative 
methods, thus the focus of this study does not involve statistical data collection and 
analyses, but rather qualitative data that were generated through interviews. 
Interviews were conducted with officials in Iraq and Kosovo, and of the UN. The 
content data for the respective interviews were sourced from the literature survey. 
Interviews that addressed the two interventions (1991 and 1999) provided 
information that was used for purposes of comparison and validation.  
The ideas and opinions of political leaders such as Massoud Barzani of the Kurdish 
Democratic Party (KDP), the current President of the Iraqi Kurdistan territory, the 
Secretary Generals of UN in the Post-cold War Era, and the Secretary General of 
NATO, Javier Solana, have significance for this research. Although interviews were 
an important part of the primary data-generating procedure, it was not possible to 
conduct personal interviews with these leaders. Published interviews constitute an 
important component of the secondary data. An example is an interview that took 
place in 1993 between Massoud Barzani and the Harvard International Review. In 
this interview many issues which revolve around the central theme of this study were 
discussed, although the opinions of leaders recorded in other secondary sources are 
also important. The purpose of consulting recorded interviews and opinions is to shed 
light on the claims for humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq in 1991 and Kosovo 
in 1999. 
The comparative analysis thus also relied on secondary sources. Secondary data were 
obtained from the existing literature on the conflicts being discussion. Besides 
published interviews, these includes books, journal articles, reports by investigative 
panels set up by groups working in the areas of conflict, and books on the subject of 
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third party intervention. Policy documents and official statements of agencies 
involved in the intervention such as the UN were also consulted. 
The libraries of the University of Witwatersrand, the South African Institute of 
International Affairs, as well as of the University of Pretoria were the main centers 
from which relevant literary information was sourced. The libraries of the University 
of South Africa in Pretoria and the Centre for Policy Studies were also used. Inter-
library loan facilities at the various libraries were helpful in acquiring materials that 
were not available from their collections. Internet materials were researched as well. 
Critical analysis of the relevant data was the first step in interpretation. Information 
that was obtained from the literature and interviews was analysed and compared, and 
then integrated with data generated though the interviews. From this the conclusion to 
the study was eventually reached. 
1.8 Outline of chapters 
1.8.1 Chapter 1: Introduction and proposal 
The first chapter provides a framework for the dissertation. Explanations for the 
choice of Walzer’s ethical approach are given and why other approaches, namely 
normative and behaviouralist approaches, are regarded as less relevant. 
1.8.2 Chapter 2: Michael Walzer’s ethical approach to 
humanitarian intervention from a legal perspective 
The focus is on Walzer’s ethical approach from a legal perspective as applicable to 
the two cases selected for this study, as well as the essential reasons that rendered 
them interventions in terms of Walzer’s views. The chapter explains the key term of 
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humanitarian intervention. It aims to develop a framework for the analysis of the 
differences between the two cases and changes that have occurred. The relation 
between international relations and humanitarian intervention receive attention. The 
role of the UN as well as the principle of sovereignty are highlighted. 
1.8.3 Chapter 3:  Intervention into northern Iraq 
Northern Iraq experienced the first humanitarian intervention in the Post-cold War 
Era in a newly-emerged world dominated by a uni-polar system. Resolution 688 
condemned Iraq’s treatment of its civilian population, which included its Kurdish 
inhabitants31. The apparent reason was that abuses of human rights were rife in 
northern Iraq. This chapter explores the reasons that prompted the international 
community to intervene on behalf of the Iraqi Kurds in the north of the state. It 
suggests that the first point of Walzer’s approach has been achieved, namely that 
when a particular state includes more than one political community, is an empire or 
multinational state, and when one of its communities or nations is in active revolt, 
foreign powers can aid the rebels (1.1 above). The essential role that the UN played 
both in northern Iraq and Kosovo, as well as the international resolutions taken with 
regard to these states are analysed. The central questions in this and the next chapter 
are important, and are known to make specialists in the field of international relations 
wonder whether these interventions fall within the three conditions which are stressed 
by Walzer, and what the legal perspectives for these interventions might be. 
1.8.4 Chapter 4:  Intervention into Kosovo 
The Kosovo scenario was even more complicated than that of Iraq. The Iraqi regime 
committed abuses against a particular group of people, the Kurds, but the case of 
Kosovo was different. After the collapse of the former Republic of Yugoslavia into a 
number of separate states, the Kosovo people asked for separation. The former 
                                                 
31 Op cit note 29. 
 19
Republic of Yugoslavia refused to accede to the request which led to the development 
of civil war. The intervention of NATO and the UN resolution were intended to 
protect the Kosovo people from persecution by the former Republic of Yugoslavia. 
This matter is discussed in this fourth chapter, together with the reasons why 
intervention was considered. In terms of Walzer’s views, the second point of his 
approach has been achieved. 
1.8.5 Chapter 5: Conclusion 
The objective of this final chapter is to assess the framework for the analysis of 
Walzer’s ethical approach to humanitarian intervention from a legal perspective as 
illustrated by the comparative study of northern Iraq and Kosovo. This chapter 
explains the results of the actual comparison between the two cases, and also seeks to 
provide answers to the research questions. Finally, a summary of key issues emerging 
from the research and some recommendations are provided. The fundamental 
question in this chapter concerns whether specialists in the field of international 
relations would consider a possible need to establish an international organisation that 
would be binding on the international community, and would be positioned to take 
upon itself the task of intervention with due regard for ethical considerations. 
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CHAPTER II 
MICHAEL WALZER’S ETHICAL APPROACH TO 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION FROM A LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
2.1 Introductory remarks 
This chapter sets the scene for Walzer’s principles of humanitarian intervention. To 
contextualise his views, attention is paid first, to the concept of humanitarian 
intervention, its background and the problematic nature of defining it, as well as how 
it will be operationalised in this study. Second, the relation between International 
Law and humanitarian intervention receives attention. 
The position of the UN is of particular importance in this chapter because from a 
positivist legal perspective, the approval of the UN is a requirement for intervention 
and most of the humanitarian interventions in the Post-cold War Era were based on 
UN resolutions. The role of the UN is therefore also highlighted. The principle of 
sovereignty as an issue in humanitarian intervention is also discussed here since an 
understanding of intervention in the internal affairs of a particular state is unattainable 
without also studying sovereignty. 
Walzer’s ethical approach is fundamental to this study because he provides a socially 
relevant analysis and suggests applications in the field that could benefit the 
communities involved. His approach to humanitarian intervention and his 
contribution to the ongoing debate on ‘setting rules’ for humanitarian intervention are 
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analysed in the final part of this chapter. This is done with due regard for the fact that 
there is as yet no agreement in the international community on the circumstances and 
conditions that would justify humanitarian intervention, or on the procedures that 
should be followed if intervention were to take place. Hopefully, Walzer’s approach 
will contribute to reaching consensus and the subsequent development of applicable 
action plans for optimal humanitarian intervention. 
2.2 The concept of humanitarian intervention 
First, it should be born in mind that there is no agreement or consensus among 
scholars of International Law and theorists of International Relations or Political 
Science regarding the concept of humanitarian intervention. Thus, for the purpose of 
this study, attention is given to various attempts to define the concept and to actions 
that can be regarded as humanitarian intervention. An overview of the development 
of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is also given. These issues determine 
how the term is used in this study. 
2.2.1 Defining the concept of humanitarian intervention 
Definitions are problematic by nature and the concept of humanitarian intervention is 
no exception. To complicate matters, the literature draws attention to the fact that the 
notion of intervention can be distinguished in terms of intervention per se and 
humanitarian intervention. There is both a wider and a narrower understanding of 
both concepts: the wider definition includes non-military forms of intervention while 
the narrower definition refers to military intervention only. In order to define the 
concepts, attention is paid first to the wider meaning of the concept of intervention. 
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The concept of intervention per se is ambiguous, and its precise description and 
definition are unclear, but at least an attempt should be made to clarify it.32 The root 
of the term is derived from the Latin verb intervenere which describes the general 
content of the concept of intervention. It can have the meaning of ‘stepping between’, 
‘to disrupt’ or ‘to interfere’. Emmerich de Vattel first defined the concept of 
intervention in 1758 as a “breach of the sovereignty of a target state”.33 This was the 
first recorded definition of intervention in International Law. 
Thus, intervention was regarded as a specific action aimed at the authority structure 
of a state. The purpose of intervention though, is not to conquer a state, to annex it to 
another state, or to integrate it into an empire. Instead, intervention is political or 
diplomatic in nature. The party that intervenes attempts to change the actions and 
policies of the authority structure, that is, of the government or the state. Some would 
deny the political nature of intervention, like many contemporary advocates of 
intervention, but this is incorrect because the target of the intervention is a 
government, and by the very act of intervention, the intervening agent takes sides 
against the government or state concerned.34 Intervention is thus partisan. It occurs to 
change the status quo. 
Another element of the concept of intervention is that it is not apolitical. This view 
can be dangerous because an apolitical interpretation of any specific intervention 
might ignore the fact that the reason for human rights abuses in a particular state 
could be a ferocious and sectarian struggle between two member factions. 
Intervention may furthermore also unleash a humanitarian disaster. Before NATO’s 
                                                 
32 Du Plessis, L.A. (ed) Military Intervention: Nature and Scope in Managing Africa Conflicts: The 
Challenge of Military Intervention. Pretoria: HSRC Publisher: p 4 (2000).  
33 Ibid.  
34 Havercroft, J.J.E. Beyond Sovereignty and Anarchy: Ontological Foundations of Political Order. 
University of Minnesota: pp 224-260 (2006) (Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate 
School of the University of Minnesota). 
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bombing campaign against the former Republic of Yugoslavia, approximately half a 
million people were killed and displaced.35 
I don’t know what the expectations of NATO commanders were last 
March; ordinary citizens in the United States and Europe were certainly 
led to expect that the bombing would solve the problem fairly quickly.36  
The concept of humanitarian intervention is likewise controversial and seemingly 
also more complex as regards International Law and international relations. As with 
intervention, there is no generally-accepted definition of the term humanitarian 
intervention. Holzgrefe for instance, describes the very perplexing situation 
surrounding the differences of opinion on the precise definition for humanitarian 
intervention, when he states aptly that: 
Saying ‘humanitarian intervention’ in a room full of philosophers, legal 
scholars, and political scientists is a little bit like crying ‘fire’ in a 
crowded theatre: it can create a clear and present danger to everyone 
within earshot.37 
Be that as it may, an understanding of its real meaning is important for purposes 
of this study. 
The issue of humanitarian intervention has been unclear since the beginning of 
the twentieth century and also interpreted in various ways. Then a ‘right of 
humanitarian intervention’ was acknowledged, although at the time this was an 
incorrect representation of the actual state affairs. Earlier too, ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ often referred to forcible interventions that aimed at stopping large-
scale human rights crises as occurred in Lebanon in 1982. Currently and in the 
                                                 
35 Ibid.   
36 Walzer, M. Arguing About War. London: Yale University Press: pp 99-103 (2004). 
37 Holzgrefe, J.L. & Keohane, R.O. (eds) Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political 
Dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: p 1 (2003).  
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wider sense, the concept includes interventions that aim to offer humanitarian 
assistance to extremely deprived peoples.38 
Various other definitions of the term are also proposed, such as “it is an act 
performed for the purpose of forcing a sovereign to respect fundamental human 
rights in the exercise of its sovereign prerogatives”.39 “Most philosophers have 
concluded that humanitarian intervention in cases of extreme human rights abuse 
is at the very least morally permissible, and some thinkers have gone so far as to 
say that some cases of extreme human rights abuse create a moral duty to 
intervene to stop the abuse”.40 Brownlie (in Chesterman 2001) notes that the 
doctrine was ‘inherently vague’ and was expressed in a variety of forms. Apart 
from the different contents that are attributed to the ‘right’ of humanitarian 
intervention, further differences that are essential are evident when the normative 
status of human intervention is considered. The evaluation of this status is made 
especially difficult by the fact that engaging in itself was not condemned by 
International Law. 41 
Humanitarian intervention is also defined as “the threat of use of force by a state, 
group of states, or international organisations for the purpose of protecting the 
nationals of the target state from widespread deprivation of internationally 
recognised human rights”.42 Another definition states: “the theory of intervention 
on the ground of humanity recognises the right of one state to exercise 
international control over the acts of another in regard to its internal sovereignty 
                                                 
38 Op cit note 28. 
39 Sinha, M Humanitarian Intervention by the United Nations. New Delhi: Nice Printing Press: p 13 
(2002).  
40 Crovelli, Mark R. Humanitarian Intervention and the State Available at  
http://www.mises.org/journals/scholar/crovelli2.pdf. Last visited July 17, 2007.  
41 Chesterman, S. Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press: p 35 (2001). 
42 Op cite note 25. See also Op cit note 24. 
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when contrary to the laws of humanity”.43 In his account, Richard Lillich (in 
Sinha), on the other hand, points to the conditions of imminent danger and the 
occurrence or threat to substantial human values,44 and adding a further 
component to the definition of humanitarian intervention, Ternando R Teson 
describes it as proportional state assistance to citizens in another nation whose 
basic human rights are infringed upon and who themselves are willing to rise up 
against their government.45 Thus, although a generally accepted definition of 
humanitarian interventions is lacking, the foregoing definitions reflect upon wider 
understandings of the concept in comparison with narrower definitions that refer 
to military intervention only. 
An example of a narrower definition of the concept that emphasises the armed nature 
of intervention is that humanitarian intervention is coercive action by states, 
involving the use of armed force in another state without the permission of its 
government, with or without sanction from the UNSC with the purpose of preventing 
or stopping terrible and massive violations of human rights or International 
Humanitarian Law.46 The use of military force by a government against another 
government was traditionally included in the narrow understanding of the concept, if 
the aim was to protect the freedom and the life of the citizens of a state when they 
were unable or unwilling to do so themselves.47 Baxter (in Sinha 2002) defines the 
concept of humanitarian intervention as a “short-term use of armed force by a 
government, in what would otherwise be a violation of the sovereignty of a foreign 
state, for the protection from death or grave injury of citizens of the acting state and 
                                                 
43 Ryniker, A. The ICRC’s Position on “Humanitarian Intervention” 83 (842): pp 527-532 (2001). 
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44 Op cit note 39.  
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47 See generally, Sinha, M Humanitarian Intervention by the United Nations. New Delhi: Nice Printing 
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incidentally, perhaps, nationals of other states by their removal from the territory of 
the foreign state”.48 
An important aspect of the concept of humanitarian intervention is that UN 
humanitarian intervention usually occurs without the consent of the specific target 
government. In UN practice, if permission of the target state is sought, this very fact 
would render the particular action as not being an intervention.49 Thus, in the UN 
frame of operating, intervention is only considered intervention in the true sense of 
the word when it occurs without the permission of the target state. 
A second important aspect of the concept concerns the aims and objectives pursued 
with such action. The parameters of humanitarian intervention limit the actions taken 
to stopping the human rights violations that necessitate intervention in the first place. 
Pursuing other political aims and objectives thus removes an intervention from the 
humanitarian sphere. If the UN consequently embarks upon an intervention, and if 
force is used, it must focus upon the issue of human rights. A UN intervention would 
thus not be considered to be ‘humanitarian’ if its main goals are to pursue other 
political aims, even if these aims are considered to be legal and in accordance with its 
Charter.50 In an interview between Massoud Barzani, of the KDP and current 
president of the Iraqi Kurdistan territory, and the Harvard International Review, 
Massoud Barzani said that:51 
We understand humanitarian intervention to be the right of the 
international community to act militarily upon verified and well-
documented evidence of massive human rights violations by a 
sovereign member of the UN against its people, especially when the 
level of such atrocities reaches a point of humanitarian crisis that 
                                                 
48 Op cit note 45.   
49 Op cit note 28. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Interview with Massoud Barzani published by the Harvard International Review 16(1) o7391854, 
(Fall 1993).      
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endangers peace and stability beyond the boundaries of the given 
nation. 
Clearly, Barzani favours military intervention by the UN when serious violations of 
human rights occur in any member state because these events may threaten peace and 
security beyond that specific state’s borders. Walzer shares this idea, but he does not 
indicate what his position is on intervention by the UN. He would invite foreign 
parties to assume their ethical responsibility to prevent serious violations of human 
rights in the state.52 In a critique of Walzer’s views, the following is stated: 
If we follow Walzer and his left-leaning critics, the solution to this 
problem lies in vigilant and perpetual intervention by the world’s ‘good’ 
states or international organizations like the UN to stop abuses in and by 
other states.  … however, [that] this advocated solution is nothing more 
than a post hoc and superficial solution to a problem that ultimately stems 
from the state’s monopolistic position vis á vis defense services and its 
astounding power and wealth vis á vis its own people in the modern world 
(both of which derive, of course, from its ability to tax).53 
A third issue pertaining to the concept of humanitarian intervention is when 
and under what conditions would intervention be regarded as ‘humanitarian’. 
Humanitarian intervention assumes in itself that governments have an 
international duty in their relations with their own citizens to afford them 
certain basic or fundamental rights. These rights are viewed to be essential for 
the citizens’ everyday lives, and for upholding amicable relations among states. 
It is further assumed that these rights are so important and of such benefit to 
people that contraventions by any government may not be slighted by other 
states. Acting from this premise, any government can intervene in a case of 
                                                 
52  Op cit note 7.  
53  Op cit note 40. 
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deliberate contradiction of these rights by any other government to its own 
people.54 This has historically been a valid form of intervention. While Walzer 
admits that intervention is an ‘imperfect duty’, he acknowledges that gross 
infringements of basic human rights continue and that states that could in fact 
intervene find that intervention would not serve their interests. 
The massacres go on, and every state that is able to stop them decides that 
it has more urgent tasks.55 
Difficult as it may be to indicate a precise general definition of humanitarian 
intervention, some commentators of International Relations nevertheless define it as 
relying upon armed force in the final instance with the valid aim of defending the 
citizens of another state from continuous and capricious exploitation that exceeds the 
parameters of the power within which the ruler is supposed to act with equity and 
justice. Another definition states that the theory of intervention based on a common 
humanity recognises the right of one government to exert international control over 
the actions of another as it relates to its domestic sovereignty when in contradiction 
with the laws of humankind. According to Teson’s definition, when people are denied 
basic human rights and are themselves also willing to overthrow or resist the tyranny 
of their oppressive government, and are afforded transnational help that might also 
include the use of force by governments of other states, then one may rightfully speak 
of ‘humanitarian intervention’.56 Humanitarian intervention is thus basically an act 
executed with the aim of forcing a sovereign to adhere to basic human rights when 
acting as the entity of a state vis-à-vis the people within the jurisdiction of the state. 
As regards the permissibility of humanitarian intervention, in various cases law and 
morality contradict each other. This emphasises the urgency of finding a way to 
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55 Op cit note 7.   
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integrate these two fields into a coherent doctrine in order to find a common solution 
for the question on the permissibility of humanitarian intervention. Dispelling the 
notion that legal principles are merely technical or ethically neutral postulates, 
Fernando Tesón quotes HLA Hart by arguing that legal principles in fact “speak to 
some of our most basic moral principles, convictions and institutions”.57 
 The definitions given above have many essential aspects in common and they 
provide a basic understanding of the use of the term by different scholars and 
academics. The definitions also set the scene for closer analysis of Walzer’s 
definition, ideas and thoughts in several sections of this dissertation. Through this 
research, it will be shown whether his arguments or conditions as mentioned in 
Chapter One, are consistent with humanitarian intervention in the cases being 
investigated. 
2.2.2 Development of the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention  
The origin of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention goes back to ancient times, 
and to the inter-religious wars that followed the Renaissance and Protestant 
Reformation. The norm of dignity was the greatest influence on the concept and dates 
back to the nineteenth century, but before that time the idea of humanitarian 
intervention was largely based on Christian beliefs and convictions. It was also based 
on the religious concept of the dignity of man who was believed to have been made in 
the image of God. During the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas held the view that, 
based on religious solidarity, a ruler has the right to intervene in the domestic affairs 
of another state when the state greatly oppresses its citizens.58 
                                                 
57 Heinze, E.A. “In Extreme Cases Only”: Humanitarian Intervention in Theory, Law and Practice, 
presented to the Faculty of The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska in Partial Fulfillment 
of Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy ,  Lincoln, Nebraska: pp 8-113 (May, 2005).       
58 Op cit note 54. (Thomas Aquinas was born in or around 1225 at his father, Count Landulf's, castle of 
Roccasecca in the Kingdom of Naples. The philosophy of Aquinas has exerted enormous influence on 
subsequent Christian theology, especially that of the Roman Catholic Church, extending to western 
 30
Thus, if Christian groups that lived among ‘non-civilized’ or ‘pagan’ nations were 
persecuted or harassed, it was considered right to intervene. Intervention in cases of 
human sacrifice and by European states during their imperialistic endeavours was 
also justified on religious grounds. 
The Spanish scholar, Vitoria, believed that if any people (from Indians who live in 
Latin America) convert to Christianity and as a result, are persecuted by their 
superiors with the purpose of forcing them to return to their former religion, Spain 
would be justified to militarily enforce those involved to cease their mistreatment of 
the new converts. Furthermore, Spain would also be justified to remove the rulers, as 
is the case with other so-called ‘just wars’. The Pope of Rome would also have the 
right to remove offensive rulers and to place a sovereign with Roman Catholic 
persuasions over the new converts.59 
Vitoria maintained too that the struggle of the heathen rulers and the Roman Catholic 
missionaries against efforts to compel converted locals to revert to their previous 
religion would justify the Pope of Rome replacing the local rulers and to wage a just 
war. The latter justification and explanation formed the philosophical foundation for 
many interventions that were undertaken by so-called ‘civilized nations’ in the affairs 
of other so-called ‘non-civilized’ nations.60 
However, intervention was not always underpinned by religion. Justification for 
intervention became increasingly secularised after the French Revolution and more so 
following the First World War. Eventually it was described as “the principle of 
                                                                                                                                           
philosophy in general, where he stands as a vehicle and modifier of Aristotelianism. Philosophically, 
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59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid.  
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lending lawful assistance to peoples struggling against tyranny”. Many international 
scholars and academics subsequently supported this definition.61 
Traditionally, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention acknowledged the right of a 
state to use military force against another state in order to protect the citizens of the 
intervening state from brutal or inhuman treatment, thus recognising a state’s right to 
interfere in another state’s internal affairs when the latter violated the laws of 
humanity. The doctrine of humanitarian intervention was based on fundamental 
human drives, such as self-preservation which in fact can be described as the most 
basic human drive. 
Like other philosophers of the Enlightenment, Walzer maintains that human rights are 
of greater value than state sovereignty. Walzer does not encourage the legitimate use 
of military force, nor does he endorse action to be taken with strict legal paradigms. 
He holds that humanitarian intervention is justified when it is a response – with 
reasonable expectations of success – to acts “that shock the moral conscience of 
mankind”.62 
Political events during the twentieth century brought about important changes to the 
international humanitarian order, particularly after the Second World War (WW II). 
Three important stages can be identified in this regard, namely the foundational stage 
that followed WW II, the second stage that corresponded with the rise of the 
international human rights movement, and the third and current stage that 
commenced in the early 1980s. 
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2.2.2.1 The foundational stage of change to the international 
humanitarian order  
The first stage of change to the international humanitarian order, which can be 
described as ‘foundational’, corresponded with the years following WW II. An 
international order that was based on humanitarian views and convictions was slowly 
but surely being restored. It consisted of three foundation blocks:63 
i) International Human Rights Law (IHRL), defined as: “It codifies legal 
provisions governing human rights in various international human rights 
instruments. It is related to, but not the same as International Humanitarian Law 
and Refugee Law”.64 
ii) International Humanitarian Law, which is “known as the law of war, [that is] 
the laws and customs, or the law of armed conflict”. It is the legal corpus 
“comprised of the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Conventions, as well as 
subsequent treaties, case law, and customary International Law. It defines the 
conduct and responsibilities of belligerent nations, neutral nations and individuals 
engaged in warfare, in relation to each other and to protected persons, usually 
meaning civilians”65. International Humanitarian Law seeks to accomplish the 
following:66 namely to 
a) help with the specific needs for protection that arise in times of war  
b) minimise the effects of armed clashes and skirmishes, and 
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c) to protect against maltreatment of people who are in the hands of the 
enemy. It specifically focuses on protecting people in situations that give 
rise to specific needs. These usually include armed conflicts and war-like 
situations. It can thus be said to be much more focused and specific in its 
scope than International Human Rights Law. 
iii) The International Law of Refugees (ILR) “is the branch of International Law 
which deals with the rights and protection of, related to, but distinct from, 
International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law, which deal 
respectively with human rights in general, and the conduct of war in particular”.67  
Clearly, the central focus of International Human Rights Law and International 
Humanitarian Law is the protection of people. International human rights protection 
is a phenomenon that came into being after WW II. Consequently, the propagation 
and protection of human rights has become one of the most important purposes of 
states worldwide. The UN Charter binds the UN and all its member states to the legal 
obligation of promoting and propagating respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedom.68 
At the centre of the international system for the promotion and protection of human 
rights are the human rights treaties of the UN. There are seven major human rights 
treaties, and every member of the UN is a signatory of one or more of them. This 
legal system, which promotes the protection of human rights, appears to apply to 
almost every child, woman or man on earth. 69 
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It is true that broad interpretation is given to the idea of a threat to international peace 
and security, if one considers the recent conclusions drawn by the UNSC. It seems 
nevertheless unlikely that the concept of international peace and security will soon be 
extended cover the specific features that are proper and unique to pro-human rights 
intervention.70 
2.2.2.2 The International Human Rights Movement 
What could be described as the second stage in the development of the international 
humanitarian order, began to take shape in the second half of the twentieth century 
with the rise of the International Human Rights Movement. It grew into an 
international phenomenon. Leading international actors in this movement 
documented and opposed oppressive regimes, combining their efforts to put an end to 
the abuses perpetrated in these states. This occurred when the Cold War between the 
Soviet Union and the west was at its fiercest, and numerous groups found themselves 
subjected to authoritarian regimes.71 
This was also a time in which a number of states experienced strife associated with 
civil wars, internal military uprisings and factional conflicts. This eventually led to 
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the approval and enactment of new international human rights norms, and interstate 
means of security. Two protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 were 
subsequently signed in 1977.72 This marked an important improvement in the sphere 
of International Humanitarian Law. 
2.2.2.3 The current stage of change to the international 
humanitarian order  
The early 1980s marked the development of what might be termed the third and 
current stage of the international humanitarian order. The ideals of the human rights 
movement had reached a level of extreme popularity and legitimacy all over the 
world. 
After the fall of the Berlin wall and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
international humanitarian order that was set in place after WW II entered an 
important phase. Many new states came into being and many oppressive regimes 
began to move in the direction of making the transition to democracy and the 
implementation of human rights. On the other hand, ethnic, national or religious 
uprisings broke out in numerous states in the 1990s. In these conflicts, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes, which included genocide, were perpetrated. Because of the 
aforementioned developments, specific elements have appeared on the agenda of the 
international humanitarian system and movement.73 
It is important to remember that human rights, and peace and security are mutually 
inclusive. Early in the nineties, the UNSC began to spread and propagate human 
rights in the already existing peace and security instruments. UN peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement operations are examples of this. The Nuremberg Tribunal is called 
“the mother of all international criminal tribunals”. Based on this Tribunal the UNSC 
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decided to reintroduce ad hoc tribunals of international criminal justice for the former 
Republic of Yugoslavia in 1993, and also for Rwanda in 1994.74 
Human right has become, along with peace, development, and democracy, a 
defining normative theme of Post-cold War Era international society … 
making it a ‘natural’ subject for a volume on international ethics.75 
Three elements are important in this regard. First, a number of issues and aspects 
were combined together under the words: “truth, justice and reconciliation”. These 
phrases point to the importance and need for establishing a democratic system after 
the collapse of a period of dictatorial or despotic rule and internal unrest in a state. 
During this process the enshrined ethos of human rights violations or war crimes 
committed were to be addressed.76 
Second, aspects relating to international criminal justice make out a further element. 
The UN formed new ad-hoc tribunals for the prosecution of criminals. One was 
termed the ‘International Criminal Court (ICC) (for the former Republic of 
Yugoslavia)’, and the other the ‘Intenational Criminal Tribunal (ICT) for Rwanda’. In 
the late 1990s, the Statute of the permanent International Criminal Court was 
eventually approved and accepted. The case against Chile’s former dictator, President 
Pinochet, stimulated numerous other projects that resort under what might be called 
universal or international jurisdiction.77 
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Third, aspects concerning humanitarian action became important in the agenda of the 
international humanitarian system and movement. These aspects include 
investigations relating to humanitarian aid as well as the discussion about the 
legitimacy and place of military intervention in foreign states for humanitarian 
reasons. 
What the aforementioned three elements have in common is that they all developed 
out of a common concern by the international community to be more pro-actively 
involved in fighting for the realisation and implementation of human rights across the 
world. Obviously this also involved opposition to oppressive regimes and bringing 
the perpetrators of war crimes to justice. These actions were taken to prevent similar 
atrocities in future. The most difficult of these issues to deal with concerns the 
question of armed humanitarian intervention.78 
2.3 International Law pertaining to humanitarian intervention 
International Law has a history that dates back over centuries. It includes an extensive 
range of international treaties, agreements and conventions. The norm of non-
intervention in the domestic affairs of a state is one of the fundamental principles of 
International Law. It is therefore impossible to study intervention and issues 
pertaining to it without prior knowledge of what International Law stipulates in this 
regard, and in particular the standards set by International Humanitarian Law in terms 
of which it must be decided whether intervention is justified or not. 
However, the issue of a state being held accountable to the international community 
for its conduct of domestic affairs, including the treatment of its citizens, remains 
controversial and is fundamental to the legal debate concerning the right and/or duty 
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to intervene.79 In the Leviathan, Hobbes stressed the rights of a sovereign state 
against being held legally accountable for certain actions. With regard to the position 
of one sovereign to another, the Law of Nations applies which is the same as the Law 
of Nature: “There being no Court of Naturall Justice, but in the Conscience only 
where not Man, but God reigneth”.80 
                                                
The idea of protecting human rights during the scourge of war or civil war has been 
in existence amongst people to some or other extent since early times.81 During the 
nineteenth century, armed conflicts increased tremendously. A decisive event at the 
time was the establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1863 
and the signing of an agreement "to improve the fate of the soldiers wounded in the 
armed forces in the field" in August 1864.82 
Jean Bethke Elshtain83 comments on Hobbes’s war and Walzer’s hopes: 
The hard fact of the matter is that many alternatives to the use of force 
cannot be implemented or even initiated until coercive force is deployed 
to stabilize a situation. You cannot use “soft power” effectively in the 
thick of a situation akin to Hobbes’s war of all against all. Although I do 
not share Walzer’s overall hopefulness where “indirection” is concerned, I 
join hands with him in a commitment to minimal justice for all 
beleaguered peoples, tormented by the brutal, that we too readily ignore or 
forget. 
 
79 Chesterman, S. Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press: p 16 (2001).  
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The state derives legitimacy from “the fit of government and community, that is, the 
degree to which the government actually represents the political life of its people”.84 
Walzer lends his support to actions preventing governments from committing abuses 
against its own citizens. 
Like other philosophers of the Enlightenment, Walzer maintains that human rights are 
of greater value than state sovereignty. Walzer does not encourage the legitimate use 
of military force, nor does he endorse action to be taken with strict legal paradigms. 
He holds that humanitarian intervention is justified when it is a response – with 
reasonable expectations of success - to acts “that shock the moral conscience of 
mankind”.85 
I want to begin with the second of these innovations – the product of an 
extraordinary speedup in both travel and communication. It may be 
possible to kill people on a very large scale more efficiently than ever 
before, but it is much harder to kill them in secret. In the contemporary 
world there is very little that happens far away, out of sight, or behind the 
scenes; the camera crews arrive faster than rigor mortis.86 
States are the most important actors in the international legal system. The latter 
provides the framework of rules and regulations that determines the principle actors, 
and regulates their conduct within the international domain.87 International Law thus 
deals with the legal rights and responsibilities of international actors, and in particular 
states, territory, immunity, and their interactions with other actors.88 It also includes 
keeping international peace and security, controlling arms, the peaceful settlement of 
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disputes, as well as the use of force in the international domain. These include for 
example, the conduct of war and the treatment of prisoners of war.89 Even though a 
state is an individual entity and therefore, has certain rights over its territory and 
people, International Law is also concerned with the treatment of people within a 
state’s territorial boundaries, including citizens, foreigners, refugees and diplomatic 
personnel, as well as with issues of nationality and human rights in general.90 
Two important sources of International Law are customary International Law and the 
opinion juris.91 Customary International Law consists of an unwritten corpus of rules 
that is the outflow of the common practice of governments. This also includes the 
opinion juris, which can be defined as a deep-seated conviction held by states that 
any specific practice or custom is demanded by law or that law is at least important 
for its continued development. The majority of precepts of customary International 
Law are internationally recognised. This means that all governments play a part in 
establishing, monitoring or adjusting these rules. The way in which a rule is added to 
establish customary International Law is as follows:92 
i) Governments pro-actively endorse it through their day-to-day practice and 
their attitude towards it as expressed in media statements and elsewhere 
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ii) Governments passively or silently support it by simply doing nothing. In this 
case, the specific government’s silence would be interpreted as acquiescence 
regarding the rule concerned. 
Governments in turn, also have the opportunity to actively oppose any new rule by 
enacting laws contrary to it. They are also free to stage certain forms of 
demonstrations or protests against it. A proposed new rule can only become fixed and 
binding when the majority of governments are in favour of it. If any governments do 
oppose it, the number must be very small.93 
Not all theorists share this opinion though, and a small but significant group of 
authors concur with Humphrey that a great number, if not all humanitarian 
interventions in the nineteenth century, were motivated by political considerations 
rather than by a concern for human rights. They further hold that it is doubtful 
whether what was then termed ‘humanitarian intervention’ was ever acknowledged as 
an institution of the law of nations in any true sense of the word.94 
Walzer would presumably insist that this conflicts with the right of individuals to live 
in an historic community with a way of life that sees the roles of men and women 
quite differently. Actual interventions challenge governments rather than whole 
communities, and Walzer’s position is that outsiders should start with the 
presumption that there is a ‘fit’ between the community and the government. The line 
Walzer draws depends not only on the degree of oppression but on who the oppressor 
is.95 
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Treaties are another source of International Law and are comparable to written 
contracts agreed upon by two or more states and are recorded with a separate third 
party, in most cases the UN Secretary-General. They are understood on the grounds 
of regulations that are set out in a special treaty concerning other treaties, namely the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. It has generally been viewed as a 
precise set of rules concerning the International Law of Treaties96. The most crucial 
rule with regard to understanding treaties is explained in Article 31(1) where it is 
stated that “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context”, as well as “in the light 
of its object and purpose”. 
Matters are complicated by the fact that some non-treaty regulations that are 
dictatorial in nature and which have power over incompatible, non-dictatorial 
regulations exist. These regulations, which can be compared with the ‘public policy’ 
regulations of some state authorised structures, deal with matters such as the 
preventive measures on genocide and torture, as well as the violent implementation of 
force. Known as jus cogens, such regulations are seen by a large majority of 
intercontinental lawyers as the norm and therefore, the end result of progress 
comparable with that of conventional International Law. It is thus crucial that they are 
upheld by as many states as possible, either through active or inactive support, along 
with the notion of legal responsibility. Due to the publicity guidelines and peremptory 
nature of these regulations, the level of development for these regulations is 
unavoidably elevated above that of other regulations.97 
At different points in history, the strongest states in the world have come together to 
prevent international order from falling apart. At Westphalia in 1648, Vienna in 1814 
and 1815, Versailles in 1919 and at San Francisco in 1945, strong states attempted to 
provide guidelines for the new order and proposed laws with which world order in the 
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future could be maintained. One essential rule that was generally agreed upon was 
that fairness must prevail between states concerning sovereignty and the prevention 
of aggressive force, except when used to protect the state. The code of sovereignty 
states that there is a basis of no intervention in a state’s domestic matters, regardless 
of whether the intervention is aggressive or not.98 
This standard of not intervening is widely accepted and is regarded as a legal duty, 
and not just an act of courtesy. It has a long history and has been incorporated into 
many international implementations that are also of a provincial and mutual kind. The 
1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States emphasises that no 
state is entitled to intrude in the affairs of any other.99 
The principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of another sovereign nation 
that is a member of the UN, including the important value of sovereign equality, 
constitutes the very foundation of inter-state relations and International Relations.  
This is one of the reasons why the generally accepted consensus in International Law 
holds that member states of the UN are prohibited from meddling or interfering in the 
internal affairs of other states. The Charter of the UN does allow the UNSC to ratify 
interventions though, but only in situations that threaten international peace and 
security.100 
More than once the security of a particular group of people was maintained by means 
of treaties, for example, the Treaty of Osnabruck in 1648 and the Treaty of Berlin in 
1878. More examples include the treaties that came into effect at the end of WW1 
between those who were victorious and those that had been defeated. Ensuring 
security by such means was seen as permissible in terms of customary law.101 In the 
Charter of the Organization of American States this same standard is articulated.  The 
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preceding regulation prevents any form of interference or attempt at interference in a 
state or its political, financial or cultural foundation. 
The association of the two main sources of International Law is comparable with the 
association of domestic statute law and common law. A stipulation of a treaty can 
overrule conflicting customary International Law. One specific treaty, the UN 
Charter, states that it has power over all other treaties102. This treaty which was 
accepted in 1945, has been acceded to by 189 states, or almost all the states in the 
world.103 
The basic framework set by the Charter has been given substance by the UN General 
Assembly by means of a number of declarations. In 1965, the Declaration on the 
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of 
their Independence and Sovereignty (known as the Declaration on Intervention) was 
adopted.104 The Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the UN (known as the 
Friendly Relations Declaration) was accepted in 1970. This Declaration has a legal 
character and refers to ‘violations of International Law’. It states the following with 
regard to such violations:105 
No state may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other 
type of measures to coercer coerce another state in order to obtain from it 
the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights [or] and to secure 
from it advantages of any kind.  Also, no state shall organize, assist, 
foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities 
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directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another state, or 
interfere in civil strife in another state. 
Article 38(1) (a) of the Statutes of the ICJ states that, if valid, ‘international 
conventions’ will at all times be an appropriate source for International Law. When 
the UN was established, it generally favoured the prohibition on the use of force 
between states. The Charter, therefore, placed many constraints on the jus ad bellum 
as a lawful right to conflict held by sovereign states.106 
However, forceful intrusions have occurred on the basis of ‘compassionate 
intervention’.  Since 1945, examples of such ‘compassionate intrusions’ include the 
armed efforts of Belgium in the Congo in 1960 and 1964, the intrusion by the USA in 
the Dominican Republic in 1965, and Indonesia’s intrusion in East Timor in 1975.107 
While international lawyers have tried to justify such interventions in terms of 
International Law, scholars of International Relations have not placed the same 
emphasis on the legal principles involved. They focus on realist principles and the 
historical background of the relations between states in a particular intervention. 
According to experts of International Relations, planned, political, financial and 
societal concerns currently determine whether intervention in another state’s affairs 
can be allowed108. Politically-warranted aims for intervention that have been looked at 
include bringing together separated populations and stabilising unsound communities, 
enabling national emancipation (self-determination), trying to fix atrocities 
committed in other states and encouraging the implementation of social equality. 
Issues of International Relations, morality in politics, and intervention now merge, 
and the issue thus becomes complex. 
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The perspective identified above is evident in the USA’s actions, and in particular 
when it took it upon itself the right to intervene in states in the west and by regarding 
itself as an international policing force. A typical example in this regard is Theodore 
Roosevelt’s addition of a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in the USA’s relations 
with Latin America from 1901 to 1909. This ‘doctrine’ was used in the justification 
of thirty-one interventions in Latin America. However, the USA officially agreed to 
the notion of non-intervention in 1935. The Truman Doctrine was followed in the 
time of the Cold War. It stated that where the ideas of a small group are forced onto 
the larger populace and done so by means of tyranny, the USA would aid those who 
oppose such tyranny by means of armed force and pressure from outside the borders 
of the affected state.109 
Again issues such as power and morality become enmeshed and this begs the 
question of guidelines on ethical behaviour and this is where Walzer’s work can play 
a role (as will be discussed in the last section of this chapter). 
The acceptability of the justification for an intervention is currently influenced by the 
distinction made between unilateral and collective intervention. Intervention by a 
single state has become ‘socially’ intolerable and borders on ‘illegality’. Collective 
intervention on the other hand, is regarded as more legal and particularly in the Post-
cold War Era where divisions have become less pronounced.110 
The Cold War paralysis of the UNSC due to rivalry among the permanent members 
has also come to an end. The NATO invasion of the former Republic of Yugoslavia 
following the disaster in Kosovo is a good example of collective action in this regard. 
The UNSC, however, still looks at itself as the only true legitimator of persuasive 
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intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In contrast, it seems that the 
USA’s actions in Afghanistan and Iraq have caused problems.111 
Different states and different international organisations have different views on 
intervention, and the way in which they regard one particular intervention also shifts 
over time. No general viewpoint regarding the ‘doctrine’ of armed intervention has 
been proposed by the different humanitarian organisations. Over the past ten years 
however, some groups of organisations have made certain thoughts clear concerning 
when intervention is acceptable. Some organisations have done the same on an 
individual basis. For instance, in 1995, Oxfam created five important points for the 
suitable use of UN armed force under Chapter VII of the Charter to ensure the 
security of a state’s inhabitants. The general thoughts from humanitarian 
organisations as a whole, however, differ from efforts by academics, politicians and 
the UN to determine guidelines for lawful international armed intervention.112 
International Law, specifically in the way it has been changed by the UN Charter, is 
based on genuine or theoretical agreements between sovereign states. Accepted by 
the UN General Assembly in 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), as well as linked declarations, allowed for a benchmark of human rights to 
be created and to which sovereign states must adhere. No details are given in either 
the Charter or the Declaration stating when it is acceptable for an intervention to 
occur and thus to go against the law of sovereignty.113 
Even though there are threats of possible clashes between the two standards 
pertaining to international conduct, there is a general feeling that a range of human 
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rights are founded on International Law, and that this law in turn, is founded on 
‘universally recognized principles of morality’.114 
Moral politic, which is a foreign policy based on morals, does not have to be the end 
result of international agreements, or only reliant on a western legalist point of view. 
If there is to be any real worth to it, moral politic must be founded in the moral 
agreement of the political society. Not all groups of people will accept moral 
structures that are universal, legalistic and based on human resourses. The ideological 
prevalence of moral dialogue based on human rights has, however, almost entirely 
prohibited the deliberation of different political moralities, but without making 
provision for a hierarchical arrangement of rival standards based on HR.115 
The Vienna Convention does provide for the nullification of a treaty in the 
progression of customary International Law. A peremptory standard is important in 
this regard and is defined by the Convention (Article 53) as: 
A norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states 
as whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can 
be modified only by a subsequent norm of general International Law 
having the same character. 
Article 64 states explicitly that if a new peremptory standard of customary  
International Law emerges, any other conflicting treaty is terminated. This must 
however be read together with Article 53, which states that a treaty will be void if, at 
the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory standard.116 
Article 53 also gives the explanation that, for the functions of the Vienna Convention, 
a peremptory standard can be described as a standard established and accepted by the 
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international society. Currently, there is general agreement about the notion that the 
prevention of the use of force is already of such a high standard. 
International Law on its own does not seem to establish the legitimacy of any specific 
intervention; therefore it is important to consider factors that might do just that. The 
UNSC’s influence as well as the UN’s role in maintaining peace will be weakened if 
law is not legitimate117. It will also aggravate the problems faced by individual states 
and groups when requested to intervene. The international community needs to look 
at the various issues which make intervention justifiable, with the aim in mind of 
reaching agreement about it and making it part of International Law.118 
Humanitarian intervention also needs to be enshrined in International Law before it 
will acquire what is called the ‘normative credence of law’. This in turn, will increase 
the sense of responsibility and urgency to take practical and decisive steps against 
extreme human oppression and other abuses.119 
Humanitarian intervention undoubtedly contradicts certain of aspects of International 
Law. The most pertinent such aspect is the law on provisions for the use of force as 
stipulated in the Charter of the UN. It should be stated though, that it is not beyond 
dispute that the UN Charter framework does indeed constitute an adequately 
structured legal framework that stipulates clear-cut principles for implementing 
military force to increase human well-being.120 
International Law, as it relates to jurisprudence, should determine a policy response 
to the societal needs of the international community by enacting a legal constraint. 
Morality touches on humanitarian intervention especially as regards helping people in 
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disaster-stricken areas and how to rescue or protect them. Morality is a necessary 
requirement if governments and members of the international community are to act 
with a certain sense of regularity and stability when considering the use of military 
action for humanitarian purposes. It is essential for it to be accompanied by an 
awareness of legal responsibility.121 
Morality cannot be divorced from law as a purposive human endeavour. Law would 
thus also imply a moral duty, which in turn also leads, or should lead, to further moral 
duty. Instead of arbitrarily enacting laws for its own sake, it is also important for all 
to be convinced that each law is just and moral. Mere adherence to the ‘letter’ of the 
law is thus not the only aim, but even more so the conviction that it is in accordance 
with what is morally accepted and considered to be right. Those putting moral 
precepts into law should therefore aim to be prescriptive since it relates to how people 
conduct themselves. In International Law, this would require states to adhere to these 
principles when determining their international policy strategies.122 
2.4 The United Nations 
It was the large scale human suffering experienced during WW I and WW II that led 
to the establishment of the UN. Besides the enormous economic losses that resulted 
from these wars, the incidence of millions of victims and displaced persons 
demonstrated the complexities involved in international peace and security. In its 
preamble (which is also the first stated principle), the UN aims to keep international 
peace and security. The importance of this principle occurs more than thirty-two 
times in the UN Charter which contains 111 articles. Unfortunately, however, rules to 
resolve internal conflicts in states are lacking. 
                                                 
121 Ibid.      
122 Ibid.  
 51
The responsibility of maintaining international peace and security is a crucial element 
in Article 39 of the UN Charter.123 The establishment of the UN did not end or affect 
the normal tradition of humanitarian intervention. Consequently, a fresh foundation 
for humanitarian intervention came into being after the UN was created. 
Fundamental issues such as international peace and security and equality of 
sovereignty between states are dealt with in the UN Charter. The important purposes 
and principles of the UN Charter are stipulated in Articles 1 and 2 respectively, and 
its purposes (as stipulated in Article 1) and can be summarised as follows: To 
i) maintain international peace and security 
ii) develop friendly relations among states based on adherence to the 
principles of ‘equal rights and self-determination of peoples’ 
 iii) facilitate international cooperation on international issues of a financial, 
cultural, humanitarian and societal nature, while also promoting respect for 
the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all people, irrespective of race, 
gender, language or religion, and  
iv) be a centre “for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of 
these common goals”. 
These purposes should however, be read together with the stipulations of Article 2 of 
the Charter which include the following: 
i) sovereign equality of all members is recognised by the organisation 
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 ii) every member must follow the rules set forth in the Charter with sincerity 
iii) members must settle all international disputes non-violently, ensuring that 
international justice, peace and security are not jeopardised 
iv) members should avoid using force or the threat of force against other states 
v) support must be provided by members to the UN in agreement with what is 
stated in the Charter, and no state is allowed to support a state against which 
the UN is taking action, and 
vi) subject to the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter, UN intervention is 
not allowed in issues which essentially involve the domestic affairs of a state.    
Crucial to the intentions of this study is the agreement among states that, as stipulated 
in the Charter, war should be banned and diplomatic resolutions that do not involve 
the military should be strived for by states in disagreement. The only exclusion from 
this rule concerns self-protection and the means of enforcement as ordered by the 
UNSC. The crucial nature of this framework is undisputed, even in present times, and 
therefore it was restored to the UN Charter. Some observers argue that joint security 
might be unrealistic and simply be a way of keeping anger between states hidden, 
which in fact, is an issue that cannot be ignored.124 
However, the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the General 
Assembly in 1948 stressed that the respect for human rights is vital for international 
peace and security – “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, 
justice and peace in the world”. 
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The Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of 
States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty was accepted by the 
General Assembly in 1965. It reaffirmed the importance of the principle of 
sovereignty. Only one member abstained and everyone else voted in favour of the 
declaration. This declaration pronounced that no state may intervene, directly or 
indirectly, for any reason, in the affairs of any other state. Therefore, armed 
intervention as well as any other type of intrusion are proscribed. Strict compliance 
with these stipulations was essential for securing peace, and any infringement would 
be seen as contravention of the letter and spirit of the UN Charter.125 To illustrate: 
Article 1(2) reinforces the principles of equal rights for all as well as self-
determination. Article 2(1) states that the UN is founded on the principle that the 
right to sovereignty applies equally to all members. Article 2(4) in particular, requires 
states to refrain from using force, or the threat of force, in their international dealings 
against the territorial integrity or political self-determination of any other state.126 
The stipulation “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state” 
is a significant prerequisite for the use of force, and in the event of force being used 
without affecting the sovereignty of the state, it can be considered as legal. Bowett 
states that “the phrase [having been included], it must be given its plain meaning”. In 
other words, if those who drafted the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States adopted on December 21, 1965 
intended to prevent the use of force or to make the threat of force non-negotiable, 
they would have made it completely illegal. It is possible therefore, that humanitarian 
intervention can be seen as legal since “it seeks neither territorial change nor a 
challenge to the political independence”.127 This is an issue that cannot be ignored.128 
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Most states, and important entities that are not states, as well as scholars seem to have 
come to the conclusion that humanitarian intervention may occur if it is given 
authorisation by the UNSC. It is true that the drafters of Chapter VII of the Charter 
most probably anticipated an international threat to peace of some kind before 
Security Council action. The Chapter requires that the Security Council should be 
informed of any action taken (Article 51). Furthermore, it does not exclude the 
possibility that the international anxiety that develops when people are deprived of 
their human rights in a state constitutes a ‘threat to the peace’. The way in which 
Chapter VII has been interpreted since 1945, especially when considering the 
interventions into Haiti, Rwanda and Somalia, makes it obvious that the abuse of 
human rights can be a foundation for allowing the use of armed force under Chapter 
VII.129 
Interpreted both teleologically and historically, the prohibition enacted in Article 2(4) 
is comprehensive. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Articles 53 
and 64) which codifies contemporary International Law, sees Article 2(4) of the 
Charter as part of jus cogens which should henceforth be considered a norm from 
which there can be no diversion until it is modified by a subsequent norm of general 
International Law. 
The relevant sections of the Charter are analysed to determine whether humanitarian 
intervention can be legalised. In defending the right for humanitarian intervention, the 
custom of domestic jurisdiction becomes important, starting with Article 2(4). 
According to some scholars, the requirement of viewing the stipulation in an open 
sense and in plain language must be reiterated. It is the crucial point of a group 
formed to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”. Therefore, it 
should not be viewed in any way that would contradict its real meaning and 
substance. It is also debatable whether the decision reached for complete prevention 
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of use of force in any way is emphasised again by a study of the travaux 
preparatoires which piloted the establishment of Article 2(4).130 
Since there are no universally defined criteria for what constitutes basic human rights, 
agreement on a policy of humanitarian intervention to the satisfaction of all is 
unattainable. This would be the case even if permanent members of the UNSC 
relinquished their veto powers.131 
A deep-rooted principle of International Law is the impermissibility of states or 
intergovernmental organisations to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states. 
The foundation of this standard is the reverence for the territorial integrity and 
political independence of states. It is highlighted in the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, Article10132 and Article 15(8) 133, as well as in the UN Charter in Articles 
2(4) 134 and 2(7).135 
Generally, the use of military force by a member state of the UN is allowed only in 
cases of self-defense. It is important to remember that any campaign by a state to 
defend itself can only be embarked upon once the Security Council has taken the 
necessary measures to secure and maintain global peace, security and stability. 
Moreover, based on the Charter of the UN, the use of military force for purposes of a 
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humanitarian nature by any member state is forbidden in terms of Article 2(4). Not 
only individual states, but also the UN itself is forbidden by Article 2(7) to use 
military force for any kind of intervention or meddling in any matters that are 
basically internal and within the control of a member state.136 
Two exceptions from the prohibition are detailed in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
The first exception entailed in Article 51 of the UN Charter provides for states that 
are victims of aggression. The second, the so-called ‘enemy-state-clauses’ (Articles 
53 and 107), are now considered obsolete137, but these two exceptions apply if 
international peace and security are threatened, and not only in involvement in 
internal affairs. 
These exceptions came about relatively recently and in particular, are related to the 
fact that besides an increasing defence of human rights, the international community 
has acknowledged the importance of maintaining international peace and security. 
States have come to terms with the fact that international human rights 
responsibilities and infringements of those rights are no longer the domestic 
jurisdiction of a particular state.138 
Three fundamental global changes have resulted in the appearance of ‘donor 
governments’ as the main players on the political scene. These major powers assume, 
on principle, the responsibility for both collective security and humanitarian 
assistance.139 
* The first changes occurred as a result of the post-Westphalian order. 
Situations threatening international security and which might require 
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collective intervention, arise from disagreement on what underpins the state 
construct. 
* The second change relates to threats to global security and peace made by 
bodies that are not recognisable states on their own. 
* Third, threats to international peace increasingly seem to come from domestic 
or intra-state friction. This appears to result if governments ignore a threat. 
The standards underlying collective security and humanitarian intervention are not 
necessarily the same, but they are often at odds with one another. Security is 
underpinned by political and therefore, judgmental criteria. Humanitarian 
intervention asks for neutrality, impartiality and independence. Collective security 
changes power relationships and may alter the means of governance. At its core, 
humanitarian intervention has the preservation of life.140 
The UNSC is implicitly and explicitly obligated to adhere to The Hague 
Convention’s Laws of War as well as International Humanitarian Law. All 
signatories to the UN are bound by the same laws. The Security Council and a 
growing number of member states have extended their obligations to the protection of 
inhabitants in armed conflicts and to the protection of refugees.141 
Collective Security offers a useful entry point for discussion of this issue 
because the debate primarily centres on the UNSC’s new-found activism. 
According to recent study, between 1946 and 1989 the UNSC adopted 646 
resolutions (on average fewer than 15 per year). Out of these resolutions, 
six recognised the existence of a threat to international peace and security. 
During the 1990-1999 periods, the UNSC adopted 638 resolutions (on 
average close to 64 per year). Out of these, 19 referred to threats to 
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international peace and security. The decisional context for such activism 
relates to early Post Cold War Era euphoria and the ‘collective response’ 
in the Gulf conflict in 1991.142  
The UN Charter is essentially defective due to the concealed reimplementation of 
some virtual jus ad bellum, an exceptional privilege enjoyed by some of the most 
developed and influential states in the ‘international community’ as a result of their 
status as permanent members of the Security Council.143 
In 1977, the Security Council enforced Resolution 418 under Chapter VII and a ban 
on weapons was placed on South Africa. This suggested that the South African 
government was violating the human rights of its black inhabitants, which in turn, 
posed a threat to international peace and security. The UNSC believed that if South 
Africa obtained more arms “the threat will increase”. A point to remember is that the 
declaration mentioned two foundations for allowing combined action, namely the 
policies of the government concerning the acts of violence committed and the murder 
of its own inhabitants, as well as the growth of its military and its continuous violent 
acts against bordering states.144 
Terry Nardin145 refers to two respective traditions of thought on particular 
humanitarian interventions: 
i) Tradition A soundly proceeded from the UN Charter. Contemporary 
International Law, which in general perceives intervention as inherently 
problematic, granted the relative importance to the preservation of political 
independence and to the territorial integrity of respective states. 
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 ii) Tradition B, dealing with natural law and common morality, considers 
intervention as some extension of the basic outlined moral imperative to grant the 
innocent proper protection against violence. 
 
These two traditions create a certain tension which raises the issue of  how the 
complex institutional duties prescribed by International Law should be reconciled, 
with particular reference to the more primitive and non-institutional duties of 
common morality. 
It would seem that the end of the Cold War, as well as the ever-increasing 
internationalisation of the norms of human rights and economic issues that cross 
boundaries, make the principle of sovereignty less ‘significant’. Consequently, 
sovereignty is no longer seen as a complete but rather as a relative concept which 
lends itself to limitations and exclusions. Not considering whether humanitarian 
intervention is seen as a regulation or an omission, Resolution 688 intends that states 
may not hide behind rules of sovereignty when trying to go against humanitarian 
norms at home. This resolution differs greatly from the idea that human rights 
infringements are a private matter of a state which in turn, is protected by laws of the 
Security Council.146 
The inheritance of politics in the UN Charter seems quite clear from the following 
statement: the ban by the Charter regarding the use of force within human rights (Art 
2 [4]) with reference to unilateral actions of states, or groups of states. Article 2 (7) 
clearly states: this interdict "shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII". All these measures show that the UN does not have a 
right to intervene in the internal affairs of states. If intervention by the UN is 
considered in certain instances, it can be argued that the jurisprudences of the 
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members of the Security Council are the deciding factor, but, perhaps, if it is not 
jurisprudence, it could be their own interests that dominated. 
It can be argued too, that even though they are governed by Article 27(3) of the UN 
Charter, choices made by the Security Council regarding issues that are not 
procedural, “shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the 
concurring votes of the permanent members”. It is clear that, after many years of 
observance, the votes of the permanent members are not necessary, and that an action 
can be allowed even if they do not vote. More theoretically, not many disagree that 
Chapter VII was initially concerned with issues of international peace threats, but 
after the Security Council’s approval of armed intervention in Haiti, Rwanda, and 
Somalia, there is little reservation that the Security Council can busy itself with issues 
pertaining mainly to domestic conflict147. Sometimes, it considers internal conflicts as 
a threat to international peace and security, while at other times this is not the case as 
demonstrated by the events in Chechnya. Thus, it is clear that double standards apply 
in dealing with the internal issues of some states by the UNSC. 
As Walzer suggests, there may still be situations in which autonomous unilateral 
intervention for humanitarian purposes is ethically justified, and, certainly from a 
military point of view, the formidable problems of command and control might be 
simplified when intervention is autonomous and unilateral.148 But, in general, it seems 
that the old norms of sovereignty and non-intervention are still persuasive for states, 
at least in their official and quasi-official pronouncements. 
In view of these complexities, a new approach became necessary which in turn, 
implied new international structures. On March 15, 2006, the UN General Assembly 
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voted to form a new human rights organisation, the UN Human Rights Council. It 
was accepted by 170 members out of the Assembly of 191 states.149 
The UN Human Rights Council is an international organisation within the UN 
system. Its main aim concerns the prevention of human rights infringements. This 
Council is the descendant of the UN Commission on Human Rights which was 
criticised for providing important positions to member states who failed to promise 
that the human rights of their own inhabitants would be protected. In trying to 
eradicate the issues facing the previous Council, including the fact that Libya was 
given chairmanship in 2003, it was stated in the declaration instituting the Council 
that “members elected to the Council shall uphold the highest standards in the 
promotion and protection of human rights” and that episodic evaluations would take 
place.150 
A significant turn in international relations occurred in the 1990s, especially after the 
notion of human rights gained substantial support outside the UN framework and 
regulations. Unfortunately however, there is no specific definition of human rights 
agreed upon by the states or by scholars of International Humanitarian Law, and 
consequently and similar to other concepts in the social sciences, the concept of 
human rights has introduced a controversy among specialists in International 
Relations. The problem faced by human rights is that all international conventions 
and international organisations constitute an agreement between the governments of 
those states and not agreements between peoples. 
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The international community, it seems, recognises the need for intervention on 
humanitarian and ethical grounds, and that suitable instruments for intervention 
should be adopted in the Post-cold War Era. The notion of humanitarian intervention 
has become more important in International Relations now than was the case during 
the Cold War Era. Therefore, it would be beneficial to adopt ethical and humanitarian 
rules for intervention in the future because the UN Charter does not accommodate 
any intervention in internal affairs of states. For this reason, it will become essential 
to ensure an agreement between states in order to establish a new international 
organisation concerned with the subject of intervention in their internal affairs. 
Walzer believes that the UN should in principle, be strengthened and supported to 
establish a global system which respects the rule of law. He maintains that there are 
several procedures of intervention outside the framework of the UN and which can be 
conducted without its consent. These are based on initiatives that have been 
successful and were able to save millions from death and displacement, for example 
during the Indian war against Pakistan that led to the secession of Bangladesh from 
Pakistan, and NATO’s intervention in Kosovo before the 1999 UNSC Resolution 
1244. Thus, Walzer calls for the development of a UN that conforms to the norm of 
human rights with due regard for the principle of sovereignty. During a recent 
interview, he commented as follows: 
It is a good idea to strengthen the UN and to take whatever steps are 
possible to establish a global rule of law. It is a very bad idea to 
pretend that a strong UN and a global rule of law already exist. Most 
of the just uses of military force in the last thirty or forty years have 
not been authorised by the UN: the Vietnamese and Tanzanian 
interventions that I just mentioned; the Indian war against Pakistan 
that resulted in the secession of Bangladesh and the return of 
millions of refugees; the Israeli pre-emptive strike against Egypt in 
1967, after the abject withdrawal of UN forces from the Sinai; the 
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Kosovo war in 1999. So far as justice, that is, moral legitimacy is 
concerned, if the Iraq war was unjust before the Security Council 
voted, it would have been unjust afterwards, however the vote went. 
It can't be the case that when we try to figure out whether a war is 
just or unjust, we are predicting how the Council will vote. Indeed, 
justice would be independent of UN decision-making even if the UN 
were a global government, though then, assuming the democratic 
legitimacy of this government, we would be bound to respect its 
decisions.151 
2.5 The effect of humanitarian intervention on sovereignty 
The concept of sovereignty as part of International Relations as a field of study, is of 
particular importance in International Law pertaining to intervention in general and 
humanitarian intervention in particular. As indicated in Chapter 2, 2.3 above, 
International Law is biased towards sovereignty and non-intervention. The concept is 
however, controversial and has both fervent advocates (eg. Machiavelli, Luther, 
Bodin, Hobbes) and critics (eg. Bertrand de Jouvenel and Jacques Maritain). 
The word sovereignty originates from the Latin word supra, and is often defined as 
‘supreme authority within a territory’. It can thus be said that sovereignty implies 
ultimate power. The concept of sovereignty in International Law usually refers to 
external sovereignty or a state’s freedom from outside interference. In this context 
sovereignty implies non-intervention. 
The sovereign states system that came to dominate Europe after the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648, spread worldwide over the next three centuries. It culminated in 
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the decline of the European colonial empires in the mid-20th century, when the state 
became the only form of polity ever to cover the entire surface of the globe. Today, 
norms of sovereignty are enshrined in the Charter of the UN, whose article 2(4) 
prohibits attacks on ‘political independence and territorial integrity’, and whose 
Article 2(7) sharply restricts intervention. 
Global cultural controversies and rivalry between the political and the intellectual 
elite have resulted in the birth of new concepts and vocabulary such as ‘the new 
world order’, ‘the end of history’ and ‘globalisation’. These concepts have introduced 
new global realities and facts, thus resulting in a major revision of their traditional 
connotations. The concepts of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘humanitarian intervention’ are, 
perhaps, the two key concepts to be reassessed in light of their impact on new global 
realities within the field of International Relations. Hence, Article 2(1) of the UN 
Charter confirms that states have absolute power within their internationally 
recognised boundaries. This seems to imply non-involvement. 
The various concerns surrounding intervention are rooted in the notion of a state’s 
right to sovereignty. This makes the study of it important because of the link between 
sovereignty and the idea of non-intervention. Thus in terms of International Law and 
the UN Charter, the idea of sovereignty would be opposed to any kind of 
intervention, as is evident in the following quotation. 
The discussion of the principle of non-intervention in International Law is 
closely related to the doctrine of sovereignty. For this reason, the two will 
be treated simultaneously. Extensive literature exists on this subject 
matter, and can be classified into two schools of thought, namely; the 
absolutists and the consequentiality.152  
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In this regard, absolute relates to a strict rule-based morality. In contrast, 
consequentiality allows for greater flexibility where the strict adherence to the ‘rule’ 
of rules does not dictate, but the perceived positive outcome of action is valued. 
The ideas and thoughts on sovereignty changed over time. International courts and 
legal scholars have in time suggested a number of different interpretations. Such 
varying interpretations and a general vagueness of the concept in terms of 
International Law allows for pragmatic argumentation on the theme for very different 
purposes. 
The passport does not confer anyone’s right to enter a country. The host 
can exclude anyone it wants. So we travel abroad because governments 
agree to let us enter. Consent is a critical fact of sovereignty. We also take 
for granted that states have the right to exclude or to screen the 
importation of certain types of commodities such as drugs, endangered 
species, tainted foodstuffs, and the like. Every time we show our passport 
to gain entry into a foreign country, exchange currency, purchase postage 
stamps, or accept the laws of a foreign jurisdiction, we are recognising 
and practicing sovereignty.153 
Sovereignty, as notion can be found at the core of customary International Law as 
well as in the UN Charter. It is still an important part of maintaining international 
peace and security, and also a means of protecting weaker states against stronger 
ones.154 Due to its link with humanitarian intervention as well as the UN Charter, it is 
crucial to focus on this notion in this chapter. 
Bodin (in Abiew 1999) defined the concept of sovereignty as “the most high, absolute 
and perpetual power over the citizens and subjects in a Commonwealth … the 
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greatest power to command”. He saw the authority of this absolute power as being 
complete, not restrained by legality, and not subject to any stipulations or limitations. 
Even though he had a very definite idea about the notion of sovereignty, he was 
willing to allow for some restrictions on sovereign power. Sovereign was restricted 
by natural law, as well as by divine law and the law of nations155. Walzer confirms 
that: 
States claimed a right to fight whenever their rulers deemed it necessary, and 
the rulers took sovereignty to mean that no one could judge their decisions.156 
In the traditional sense, sovereignty represents the complete control over all sections 
of a state and all individuals and things that fall within its borders. In relations 
between states, sovereignty means independence, or the ability to perform the tasks of 
a state, both internally and externally without interference from any other state. The 
idea of consent is part of the doctrine of sovereignty concerning binding obligations, 
or the idea that “restrictions upon the sovereignty of a state cannot lightly be 
presumed”, as stated by the Permanent Court of International Justice.157 
With regard to humanitarian intervention, states that are targets for intervention on 
the basis of human rights abuses, usually use the word ‘sovereignty’ to assert a right 
of non-intervention. “States often present their sovereignty as a natural right or an 
inescapable logical feature of their existence”, states Donnelly (in Havercroft 2006). 
When sovereignty is employed as a right, the clash between sovereignty and human 
rights becomes a conflict of rights, with the individuals advocating human rights 
insisting that human rights take precedence over the rights of the state, in contrast 
with those who believe that the state is more important than human rights.158 
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Proponents of both sides of the issue defend their ideas by using the language of 
rights. 
On the other hand, it is not controversial that a task agreed to by means of a treaty, 
custom or general principle of law, is in fact obligatory and cannot be revoked 
unilaterally. If a state has an international task that it must perform, the matter 
regulated by that task is no longer seen as necessitating the argument for exclusivity 
of national control. In the Nationalities Decrees case in Tunis and Morocco, for 
example, the milestone judgment made by the Permanent Court of International 
Justice in 1923 states that although they might closely affect the welfare of more than 
one area, they are not governed by international decree. Each state is therefore 
responsible solely for itself.159 
Some states are supporting the establishment of formal criteria that have 
to be met before intervention can take place, although questions remain 
over who would set out the criteria and who would oversee their 
implementation. Presumably the UN would have a major role in this 
process, but not all its members share the same views. 
Some theorists, academics and practitioners go further. In their views states have the 
right to reprisal in the face of severe and continuous violations of human rights in 
other states160. Reprisals are deeds which are illegal in theory, but which are legally 
justified by the target state’s prior breach of International Law which the act of 
reprisal wishes to end. For example, reprisal may include the unilateral prevention of 
trading agreements. It is even more debatable whether armed force can be taken to 
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stop human rights violations which could pose a threat to international peace and 
security.161 
Walzer’s defence of national sovereignty has been criticised for implying that 
"domestic tyrants are safe," a point Walzer is actually quick to affirm. The line must 
be drawn "to rule out interventions in cases of ‘ordinary’ oppression," and, according 
to Walzer, there is a significant moral difference between oppression by one’s own 
government (however undemocratic) and oppression by a foreign occupying power.162 
In Walzer’s view national sovereignty is not merely something recognised by 
international law, nor is it a relic of a tribal mentality or an obstacle to the 
achievement of international human rights. According to Walzer, any such 
intervention is actually a violation of human rights, the "rights of contemporary men 
and women to live as members of a historic community and to express their inherited 
culture through political forms worked out among themselves [my emphasis]”.163 
The prohibition of the threat or use of force is subject to several restrictions stipulated 
in the UN Charter. Detailed exceptions from Article 2(4) and other international 
instruments barring the use of force do, however, exist. They are measures taken or 
allowed by the UN in some situations such as the use of force in individual or 
combined defense; armed force against earlier enemy states, as well as some 
measures taken according to regional measures or agencies endorsed by the UNSC. It 
is important to recognise that except for the cases mentioned in Chapter 1, 1.3 
(northern Iraq and Kosovo), the understanding of Article 2(4) shows, according to 
some scholars, an absolute ban on the use of force in International Relations. Most 
states wanted a complete interpretation of the Charter prohibition of intervention 
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during UN talks164. In their interpretation it means that interventions do infringe upon 
their perceived rights of sovereignty. 
The predicament between sovereignty and intervention is evident in the UN Charter. 
In it there are “two principles that at times, and perhaps increasingly, conflict”. The 
Charter concurrently forbids “intervention into matters that are within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state”, and “enshrines respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms.” This misinterpretation of the Charter would be viewed as 
less confusing if sovereignty were viewed as relative to state-society dealings as well 
as to interstate relations. From this perspective, it also seems to make more sense why 
Emmerich de Vattel, one of the first observers to mention the idea of non-
intervention, stated during the late 18th century that “if the unjust rule of a sovereign 
led to internal revolt, external powers would have the right to intervene on the side of 
the just party when disorder reached the stage of civil war”. Intervention has long 
been in existence, just like international politics, and sovereignty is a variable rather 
than a constant. It is therefore not incredibly informative to make up a list of volitions 
of sovereignty. Rather, a more appealing agenda is to consider how states have tried 
to create relative sovereignty in the west as well as in “the Rest, both then and 
now”.165 
Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary-General, says that the Charter should be seen 
as ‘a living document’ and its understanding and enforcement should develop as 
times change. In the same train of thought, relative sovereignty is an idea which is 
alive and which has been altered along with the changes in interstate and state-society 
relations. It is important to look at this debate; introduce the idea of relative 
sovereignty; research the historical changes undergone by relative sovereignty 
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besides understanding what the new definition means with regards to the phase of 
humanitarian involvements that occurred after the Cold War.166 
From the history of the doctrine of sovereignty, it is apparent that it is sovereignty, 
and not intervention, that is problematic. Krasner (in Hui 2004) demystifies the 
‘Westphalia order’, and looks at the problems concerning the idea of sovereignty. He 
identifies four dimensions of the idea of sovereignty instead of the single one 
identified by most other analysts. The first, or usual, dimension, which is called 
‘Westphalia sovereignty’, points to excluding forces from outside the borders of a 
state from having any power within it.167 Krasner argues that the concept of 
sovereignty, though ‘historically inaccurate’ could be used due to the fact that “… so 
much [has] entered into common usage”. The second dimension is international legal 
self-rule, and makes reference to “the mutual recognition of states or other entities”. 
Domestic sovereignty, the third dimension, points to the official association of 
political power within the state and the means by which public powers maintain 
efficient control within its borders. The fourth and final dimension, namely 
interdependence sovereignty, is concerned with the ability of public powers “to 
control transformer activities”.168 
Sovereignty is relative to interstate relations because it concerns joint 
acknowledgment with other states and use of joint strategies. In general, the first 
point is not acknowledged as it should be in the readings on sovereignty: state does 
not have ‘international-legal’ or juridical independence unless it is acknowledged by 
other states. Moreover, the description of territorial self-rule also involves 
acknowledgment, either in the form of informal agreements or in formal treaties. JG 
Ruggie (in Hui 2004) states that “any mode of differentiation inherently entails a 
corresponding form of sociality”. If sovereignty makes reference to private control 
over set territories, then that area within which a state has complete control must be 
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distinguished. It is obvious that joint acknowledgment involves inclusion as opposed 
to exclusion of external factors.169 
Sovereignty is moreover relative to state-society dealings since it is concerned with 
the power and control over the people and the territorial area, and here readings tend 
to compare self-rule to territoriality. Due to the fact that self-rule is viewed in terms 
of territoriality, it is also seen as being equivalent to private property rights.170 
One of the most crucial outcomes of the establishment of self-rule as an introduction 
to dominium is that the implementation of this right can then no longer be justified by 
ethical issues of right and wrong. According to Roman property rights, having a 
specific ‘right’ merely enabled the individual who had that right to continue doing the 
wrong thing, as long as he did it within the territorially-restricted area. Even though 
ethical deliberations are not immaterial to a deliberation – of proceedings possibly 
targeted for intervention – the pertinence of these deliberations is clearly restricted by 
the institutional restraint enforced by the concept of an exclusive right.171 If Roman 
property rights are extended, this implies the following for International Relations 
and sovereignty: 
Barzani said that “I believe that sovereignty can no longer be asserted in isolation, but 
rather in a context of greater international integration that guarantees national self-
expression”.172 
It is evident that Barzani adopts differing ideas from those that were agreed upon at 
the Treaty of Westphalia. Moreover, he holds the view that sovereignty must be the 
expression of the national will and not any form of unilateral, oligarchic monopoly 
driven by decision-makers who find themselves the supreme authority of the state. 
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This form of self-rule enforces hidden limitations on its content. Some heads of states 
insist that sovereignty is about that government doing just what it wants to do, at least 
inside its own boundaries. According to them, it is acceptable for the state to 
sometimes take the incorrect action, and it may also choose which incorrect action it 
would like to take without being constrained in any way. However, not even the 
patron saints of this set of principles, which is obviously western in origin, put it 
together in such unqualified conditions, even in its ‘absolutist’ forms. Moreover, in 
the end it became apparent that creating a set of principles for sovereignty with no 
limitations was rather illogical. The two distinct types of grounds, namely historical 
and conceptual, will be focused on momentarily in order to establish that sovereignty 
was not originally meant to be limitless, followed by a more in-depth explanation of a 
startling kind of restriction that minimal ethics necessitates of it.173 
If sovereignty is a right, it is a restricted one. Sovereignty is restricted because the 
obligations that make up that right, and which a lack of would mean no right exists, 
restricts the actions of all sovereignties who are part of the international society. The 
more intrinsic reason why the standard of non-intervention guards the standard of 
sovereignty of states is that each state is protected due to the fact that all states are 
restricted. This is the function of rights – wherever one finds rights, one finds duty-
enforcing rules.174 This is not done to contradict Kratochwil’s argument (Welsh 2004) 
concerning the idea that the right to self-rule is also a right to incorrect action, as any 
right to authentic freedom must be.175 Walzer’s ideas indicate that within liberalism 
there is also a more universalist conception of human rights in which sovereignty is a 
subsidiary and conditional value. 
Even though ethical deliberations should not be overlooked in an assessment of 
dealings which could lead to interventions, the significance of such deliberations is 
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definitely restricted by the institutional limitations enforced by the idea of an 
exclusive right. While not being false, this demands very cautious examination. It is 
most definitely a case of something that is difficult to dispute: the action is wrong, 
and thus no state has a right to do it.176 
The possible significance of the ethical question, namely what a state could be 
expected to do, is prevented, and any measures taken by those from outside to stop 
the wrongful events from occurring, are also prevented. Nonetheless, it can be stated 
that when something is wrongful, no state should perform the action. It depends on 
what ‘this’ is though, and whether it is wrongful for states to be allowed to do things 
that are not allowed for anyone, for example genocide. To come to a decision, one 
must look at ethical and legal debates.177 
The formation of UN Disaster Relief Organisation (UNDRO) in 1972, produced 
hopes of a better reaction to disaster, but nothing more than that was forthcoming. Its 
command largely outweighed what it could handle and it did not have the political 
power to actually get anything done. Much negativity troubled it throughout its 
twenty years in existence, such as issues of an unclear mandate, insufficient staffing 
and financial support, a lack of in-state capability, little help from other UN 
organisations, a long-running disagreement concerning whether or not it should be 
operational, as well as poor integrity within the donor population. At the start of the 
1980s, a report condemning the performance of UNDRO came from the UN Joint 
Inspection Unit.178 Matters improved when UNDP Resident Representatives were 
placed in charge of assistance that was needed. 
Together with the appearance of Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the ‘new world order’ 
rising from the ashes of the Cold War, it was evident that new possibilities prompted 
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the development of new tasks and responsibilities for the UN and that restructuring of 
its disaster relief competence was needed. The performance of the UN groups 
involved in giving and organising aid during the Kurdish action of 1990 and 1991 led 
to some western governments making an extraordinary call at the G7 Heads of 
Government Meeting in London in July 1991 to upgrade the system when they stated 
that:179 
We should like to see moves to strengthen the coordination, and to 
accelerate the effective delivery of all UN relief for major disasters … to 
include … the designation of a high level official, answerable only to 
the UN Secretary-General, who would be responsible for directing a 
prompt and well-integrated international response to emergencies, and 
for coordinating the relevant UN appeals.180 
If one considers International Law from a positivist perspective, an examination of 
NATO intervention would make it clear that the UN Charter disallows the use of 
force (Article 2(4)) without UNSC approval (under Chapters VII or VIII), or when 
acting in self-defense (Article 51). Even though some UNSC declarations were 
passed before the intervention in Kosovo, they definitely did not allow for the use of 
force. Also, although initially there were fears that states such Turkey and Greece 
could be drawn into the conflict in Kosovo, claims followed later that Europe in its 
entirety was threatened by the issue. The claims seemed insubstantial at the time and 
are even more so now. In any event, UNSC was not told about the intervention as was 
required by Article 51. State practice since the Charter was passed has not changed 
the fundamental requirements of the Charter.181 
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The intervention was not condemned by the General Assembly, even though it had 
condemned Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia in 1978, as well as the USA’s 
intervention in Grenada and Panama in 1983 and 1989 respectively. The General 
Assembly did not even create a declaration asking for the forces to be withdrawn, as 
it had done when India intervened in East Pakistan in 1971. While the inaction of the 
General Assembly should not be regarded as total support for the intervention, to the 
degree that positivists formerly regarded General Assembly condemnation of an 
intervention as probative in legal terms, the inaction definitely has some significance 
as well. Also, the UNSC itself, with Russia’s positive vote, showed its agreement 
with the intervention by allowing the actions connected with the cease-fire accord 
forced from Serbia during the Kosovo conflict, which was negotiated with Russian 
participation.182 
In the Post-cold War Era, the role of sovereignty in international politics appears to 
be of little interest to students of international dealings in the USA. It has not been the 
focus of academic writing or conferences, graduate seminars or even of debates in 
undergraduate classes. On the contrary, many conventional scholars of International 
Politics believe that a focus on sovereignty is primarily the domain of specialists in 
International Law and Political History. At the end of last century, Stephen Krasner 
(quoted in Carlson 2007) stated that “sovereignty is a term that makes the eyes of 
most USA political scientists glaze over”, appropriately talking about the frequency 
of this indifference.183 
In the 1990s, the evident increase in levels of economic incorporation as well as the 
growth of new international rules, suggested that thought was already being given to 
the possible flexible nature of the contemporary international system as a whole, 
particularly the role of sovereignty within this system. In this sense, globalisation has 
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impacted on interstate relations and on the debates on sovereignty and humanitarian 
invention. 
Currently there are almost fifty international clashes related to issues of sovereignty. 
Almost all of them have resulted in violence, with the armed forces of the states 
involved fighting armed rebel forces184. In many cases, rebel forces have made use of 
‘terrorist actions’ in the conflicts. It is known that at least a third of the Specially 
Designated International Terrorists programmed by the United States Treasury 
Department are linked to clashes related to sovereignty. Also, there are non-violent 
sovereignty-based clashes that cause regional instability and have a negative impact 
on political and economic growth.185 
2.6 Walzer’s ethical principles for humanitarian intervention 
This dissertation adopts Michael Walzer’s ethical approach to humanitarian 
intervention. He places clear landmarks in his ethical approach to humanitarian 
intervention, as was noted in Chapter I, 1.1 and Chapter 1, 1.8.2 above. In the 
following section, Walzer’s ideas are examined more intensively since they constitute 
an important part of this dissertation. 
Ethics, taken from the Ancient Greek word ēthikos, the adjective of ēthos, meaning 
‘custom, habit’, is a significant component of philosophy. It is the study of principles 
and traditions of an individual or a group on the basis of the use of ideas such as right 
and wrong, good and evil, as well as matters such as responsibility. Three areas in the 
study of ethics can be distinguished, namely: meta-ethics, the study of the notion of 
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ethics; normative ethics, concerned with the study of establishing ethical ideals; and 
lastly applied ethics, which is the study of the application of ethical ideals.186 
Some political theories die and go to heaven; some, I hope, die and go to 
hell. But some have a long life in this world, a history most often of 
service to the powers-that-be, but also, sometimes, an oppositionist 
history. The theory of just war began in the service of the powers.187 
The ethical dilemmas surrounding decisions on whether or not humanitarian 
intervention should be implemented are at the core of the ethical rationalisation of 
any type of armed intervention. However, since the reasons are usually intricate, this 
validation need not be restricted to being the primary one – it only needs to be an 
overriding factor. The definition for ‘ethics’ can be excluded from the foundations of 
creed, ethnicity or regulatory rule; its importance is normative since it addresses how 
things should be, as opposed to what they are like.188 Thus the moral or ethical 
aspects of civic policy should be considered critically and opposition to doing so 
should be investigated. Realism underplays the importance of ethics within the 
international system, but it does fulfil the role of cautioning against the dangers of 
excessive emphasis on the moral viewpoint.189 
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and International Crossing, show the clear relationship between ethics and business 
and the complexities raised by unethical actions, in these instances, in a company.190 
But normative consensus among observers is yet to emerge. Even sociologically, the 
events that may lead to humanitarian intervention are far from clear. Morally and 
substantively, the issues are deeply controversial. Is humanitarian intervention a 
rescue operation, a ‘quick in and quick out’, leaving the basic norms of sovereignty 
intact, or is it rather an attempt to address the underlying causes of the conflict and 
even to create the conditions for democracy? If the latter, the model of ‘going in and 
getting out’ quickly is then obviously inappropriate. Even Michael Walzer, who has 
often been criticised for the ‘statist’ character of his theory in Just and Unjust Wars, 
recently amended his rules for intervention. He now argues that there is an obligation 
to make sure that the conditions that required the intervention in the first place do not 
simply resume once the intervener leaves.191 
In many cases, these actions assume a legal or political form prior to them being 
recognised as mechanisms of normative ethics. Two examples are the UDHR of 1948 
and the International Green Charter of 2001. As warfare and the enhancement of 
weaponry persist however, it is obvious that there is no single non-violent way of 
ending disagreements that everyone might agree upon.192 
Michael Walzer argues that while there are many domineering governments, there is 
no case of an obvious ‘humanitarian intervention’. He states that while a deed can be 
viewed as humanitarian, the motivation for that deed might not be simply 
humanitarian, and that “states don’t send their soldiers into other states it seems, only 
in order to save lives. The lives of foreigners don’t weigh that heavily in the scales of 
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domestic decision-making”.193 He does say however, that the state of affairs changes 
when the well-being of fellow nationals are at risk. As an example he looks at the 
Israeli raid on Entebbe Airport in Uganda in 1976. It can be disputed that the 
countrywide pride of Israel was in the crossfire and that that could have been 
motivation for the intervention.194 
In the way in which he handled the concern in Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer wished 
to steer clear of the severe non- or interventionist stances. Ever since the publication 
of the book in 1977, individuals on either sides of the argument have wanted to take 
him as being on their side due to the fact that his exemplar from a legal point of view 
can be found between the local and international stances.195 
Intervention is a largely normative concept with both proponents and opponents 
making moral, ethical and legal arguments to address the issue. Those opposed to a 
right of intervention, like Michael Walzer, point to the sanctity of political 
communities and their right to non-interference from outside.196 
Humanitarian interventions to stop mass murder and ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ will obviously aim at regime change; since the 
regime’s criminal behavior is the reason for the intervention.197 
A closer look at these arguments reveals an exaggerated preoccupation with the 
custom of non-intervention, which, although undergoing dynamic change, is not 
being abandoned altogether. Responding to critics of Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer 
lays down the foundations for his principle of non-intervention. His argument posits 
that the state is constituted by the union of people and the government: the people 
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comprise a political community and the government is merely their instrument. 
“Communal integrity derives its moral and political force from the rights of 
contemporary men and women to live as members of a historic community and to 
express their inherited culture through political forms worked out among 
themselves”.198 
As such, intervention against such a community constitutes aggression and is a crime. 
States have a right to both internal and external sovereignty and may meet threats to 
that sovereignty with force. Aggressors may be legitimately punished, either in a war 
of self-defence by the victim or in a war of law enforcement by states acting on 
behalf of the international society. 
Because of their moral foundation, states have the right to sovereignty, and non-
intervention is a norm of international society. According to Walzer, intervention can 
only be justified by certain circumstances: when a particular state includes more than 
one political community; when civil war disrupts a single community and a foreign 
power intervenes in support of some party; and finally when the government is 
engaged in the massacre or enslavement of its own citizens.  
In his book, Just and Unjust Wars199, Walzer discusses three cases in which a foreign 
power has the right to intervene in another state where internal problems or conflicts 
occur. These three cases or conditions are: 
*  Self-determination and self-help 
Foreign powers can only intervene to assist rebels when there is a revolt, and 
therefore, there is no longer a fit between the government and community (-ies). The 
sovereignty of a state and its right to self-determination must be acknowledged. The 
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members of a political community must seek their own freedom, even if it struggles 
and fails to establish free institutions; it is the right of a people to gain freedom by 
their own efforts. Non-intervention is the principle that guarantees that their success 
will not be impeded or their failure prevented by the intrusion of an alien power. 
Should the latter occur through the actions of an intrusive neighbour, the 
community’s self-determination has been removed. 
*  Secession 
In the case of a plurality of political communities included in a state, and one 
community wishes to sever itself from the state, intervention can be justified only 
when aid is given for independent – not liberal or democratic – communities to be 
established. Even military action is then considered ‘honourable and virtuous,’ 
although it may not be prudent. The problem with identifying a secessionist 
movement lies in the fact that it must have made some advance in the ‘arduous 
struggle’ for freedom. It is not enough for such a community to merely call upon the 
principle of self-determination; it must provide evidence that it does in fact exist, its 
members desire independence, and are ready and able to construct a self-determined 
existence. 
* Civil War 
Civil war presents severe problems because of its complexity. Various clashing 
parties or factions that claim to represent entire communities, draw other states into 
the struggle, either secretly or in unacknowledged ways. Where a foreign power is 
already involved with one party, another may rightfully counter-intervene. Such 
counter-intervention is supposed to maintain the balance and restore the degree of 
integrity to the local struggle. Humanitarian reasons may be cited as cause for 
intervention, especially where a government enslaves and/or massacres its own 
citizens. There would then also no longer be a fit between citizens and government. 
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The reality, however, is that no foreign power is as concerned with the citizens of 
another state so as to intervene in its affairs for humanitarian reasons, especially 
militarily. 
However, according to Walzer, intervention, as a concept is not arbitrary but depends 
on ethical rules. Walzer suggests these ethical elements, regardless of whether they 
are unlawful or good. It is important to him that people in troubled places live 
peacefully, free from external or internal pressures. 
In the traditional Aristotelian definition, ethics is a practical and not a theoretical 
discipline, according to which moral claims must be validated in historical or 
contingent contexts.200 Despite the political saliency of moral claims, intellectual 
discourse regarding intervention is still dominated by the norms of general 
International Law. These norms, admirably summarised by Michael Walzer as “the 
legalist paradigm,” simply proscribe intervention in the affairs of sovereign states and 
place a heavy burden of justification on those who claim the right or the duty to 
intervene.201 
Walzer’s argument could be problematic if subjugated by those that can generally be 
viewed as perpetrators or enablers of injustice to satisfy their own ends. His argument 
is extremely useful in highlighting arguments of morality in terms of how 
intervention may or may not be justifiable, and the protocol and procedures that 
should be followed in cases of intervention. He also adopts the fundamental ethical 
concerns pertaining to intervention against human rights violations. 
Walzer's legalist paradigm may be summed up as a proposal that the international 
society of independent and sovereign states be governed by a law that establishes the 
rights of all member states. The law defines the use of force or the threat of force 
against other states as a crime of aggression, thereby justifying a war of self-defence, 
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a war of law enforcement by members of the international community, and 
punishment of the aggressor. Only aggression justifies war.202 
Scholars such as Walzer have devised a clear strategy for investigating the moral and 
political obstacles associated with humanitarian intervention. International justice and 
order, the setbacks that may be suffered by the interveners and the possibility of 
failure, plus the negative implications it could have for those meant to be assisted by 
the intervention are some of the complex issues that can arise from international 
military intervention.203 
Walzer’s conditions for intervention involve three main issues. To begin with, 
decision-making that is concerned with international military intervention takes place 
among international statist regulations of non-intervention. Limitations arise from the 
need to respect state sovereignty as laid down in the UN Charter. On the one hand, 
the need to uphold individual human rights is also outlined in the Charter.204 
The ‘static’ character of his theory on Just and Unjust Wars, which has often opened 
Michael Walzer to criticism, recently made him alter his rules for intervention. He 
now reasons that he has an obligation to ascertain that the conditions, which at first 
determined the intervention, do not simply resume when the intervener departs.205 
The next issue is that of finance: intervening states must assess the cost in human life 
and implications to its own citizens of the monetary requirements that will be needed 
to facilitate the intervention. 
Finally, there is the possibility of the intervention being unsuccessful. A state that is 
exploring the option of intervention must examine dangers to itself, but it must also 
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examine the threats that its actions might have for the people it aims to benefit, and 
for all other people who may suffer as a result of it.206 
The notion of humanitarian intervention envisages a regime that 
overcomes limitations of existing International Law and establishes a 
framework for preventing large-scale abuses of human rights, the ideal of 
justice backed by power. Once this regime is in place, International Law 
might be amended.207 
Walzer’s evasive argumentation could be damaging if subjugated by those that can 
generally be viewed as perpetrators or enablers of injustice. It is extremely useful in 
highlighting arguments of morality in terms of how intervention may or may not be 
justifiable and the protocol and procedures that need to be followed in cases of 
intervention. He also adopts the crucial ethical concerns pertaining to intervention 
against human rights violations. 
Academic dialogue pertaining to intervention is still subject to the regulations of 
broad global decree, in spite of the political saliency of ethical obligations. The 
‘legalist paradigm’ was clearly discussed by Walzer and he examines how these laws 
simply forbid intervention and require weighty validation for any such action on the 
part of those who assert the right or obligation to intervene. In summary, the legalist 
paradigm proposes that the international system be governed by the overriding right 
to sovereignty that all member states possess.208 
In general, Walzer presumes that decision-makers have the ability to identify when a 
sovereign state is contradicting its ethics structure. In his view, they should also 
recognise how to utilise the same ethics structure as was the case in rationalisation of 
                                                 
206  Op cit note 7.    
207  CSS Strategic Briefing Papers, Humanitarian Intervention: Definitions and Criteria. Vol 3: Part 1   
208  Op cit note 7. 
 85
the intervention. Walzer also presupposes that a sector of the community in the state 
concerned is compliant with intervention.209 
Walzer examines certain instances of national self-determination and the right to 
oppose an upcoming unjust intervention by a fellow state. The standard of national 
self-determination states that the intervening elements must depart after their mission 
has been accomplished. This is necessary in order to maintain a blameless repertoire. 
However, Walzer recognises no incidents of purely humanitarian intervention, only 
cases of mixed motive.210 
Walzer also emphasises the various principles regarding the exact cause of the 
intervention and the reasonable prospect of being successful. Given the importance 
accorded in policy debates concerning the motives of interveners, this is a 
controversial position. Military intervention that aims to protect citizens from 
deterioration of their conditions to those of a former negative situation was pursued 
by Walzer. He is also one of the primary authors to table an extensive (serious) 
evaluation regarding the effectiveness of intervention across multiple cases.211 
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CHAPTER III 
INTERVENTION IN NORTHERN IRAQ 
Prior to discussing the intervention and circumstances surrounding northern Iraq, it 
serves well to remember that the first international intervention in northern Iraq 
occurred in the Post-cold War Era of the 1990s. Further investigation into the Iraqi 
case is beneficial, but more specifically, also crucial. This chapter attempts to answer 
the questions of whether the intervention in northern Iraq falls within the three 
conditions stressed by Walzer (discussed in Chapter 1, 1.5 above), and what legal 
perspectives are relevant for these interventions. 
The territory of present-day Iraq is approximately equivalent to that of 
ancient Mesopotamia, which fostered a series of early civilizations. 
[The] earliest of these was known as the civilization of Sumer, which 
arose probably in the 4th millennium BC and had its final thrive under 
the 3rd dynasty of Ur at the end of the 3rd millennium BC. Ur of the 
Chaldees was a great and famous Sumerian city, dating from this 
time.212 
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3.1 Background 
The long history of the Kurds in general and of the Kurds in Iraq in particular, renders 
the situation in northern Iraq complicated. To facilitate an understanding of 
intervention in northern Iraq, and thus to achieve an objective of this research, it is 
necessary to delve deeper into the historical background of this area. The 
international and regional circumstances before Resolution 688 are discussed, but 
first the regional and international circumstances of the resolution before it was 
issued, set the scene for the discussion. 
The Kurdish people compose one of the ancient nations of the Middle 
East. Kurdistan, the land of the Kurds, is spread among several modern 
states: north western Iran, northern Iraq, north eastern Syria, south eastern 
Turkey, and small parts of Armenia. There is no exact figure to the 
Kurdish population because each state has tended to downplay the 
number of Kurds within its own borders. Nevertheless, according to 
various estimates, the Kurdish population is estimated to range between 
25 to 30 million. This makes the Kurds the fourth largest ethnic people of 
the Middle East.213 
The Treaty of Sevres (1920) assured the Kurds of their own state, but this was 
revoked under the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. The term ‘Kurdistan’ is used 
extensively throughout Iraq and Iran for the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq and north-
west Iran. For political reasons, Turkey and Syria avoid using this term, although in 
the 16th century under the Ottomans214, who established one of the world’s most 
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powerful Muslim civilisations stretching from the Muslim world across Europe to 
Spain, it was widely used.215 
When a new classification of contemporary defensive states came into being in the 
20th century, the Kurds believed that they finally had the opportunity to acquire their 
own territory. But following and resistance from the Iraqi government, they were 
again disappointed, and former assurances from Iraqi about local sovereignty (Article 
62) and discussions about merging a Kurdish state in future (Article 64) in the Treaty 
of Sevres (1925), were replaced by a decision to incorporate the Kurds into Iraq under 
British rule, but Britain surrendered its directive on June 3, 1930. Britain also failed 
to safeguard the future of marginal groups in the now autonomous Iraq.216 However, 
despite their history, the Kurdish population is neither a small nation nor a nation 
without history. They constitute a significant group that lives dispersed between 
several states. They are therefore, neither autonomous nor integrated. 
The Iraqi government suppressed a mass revolt that involved the Kurds, but shortly 
afterwards during the Iraqi-Iran War of 1980-1988, the Kurds suffered considerably, 
as result of their own actions, it was claimed. The Iraqi government enforced the 
Anfal (booty) operation from February to August 1988. Approximately 200,000 
Kurds were killed with various types of weaponry, including chemical munitions. 
Thousands of Kurdish villages were attacked. Moreover, throughout the 1990s 
between 4 and10 Kurds were injured or killed per month as a result of some ten 
million landmines that had been planted since 1975.217 
At the end of the Gulf War in 1991, smaller political parties in Iraq’s Kurdish 
community assessed that Baghdad’s political weakness at the time might finally offer 
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them the opportunity to achieve real autonomy. Kurdish leaders also anticipated that 
the Iraqi government’s inability to manage the state of affairs in Iraq, in conjunction 
with a strategic political confrontation, would allow them to see the actualisation of 
their demand.218 
The adherence to the philosophy of Realism was apparent amongst those responding 
to the internal armed conflict and humanitarian crises during the Gulf War. 
Humanitarian dimensions of ‘Operation Provide Comfort’, as well as subsequent 
cases of UNSC engagement in Iraq, were not executed under the auspices of 
International Law, but were enacted to benefit the responders. In fact, in several cases 
the enormity of the unfolding humanitarian crisis seemed to reveal particular UNSC 
actions, which at times, had amounted to little more than tenuous references to the 
trans-boundary impact of key ‘New World Order’ indicators, such as the intrusion of 
refugees.219 
While war was raging in Iraq, some governments within the Coalition (the US, 
United Kingdom, [UK] France and other states), pushed to give, at the very least, 
underground or covert support to the Kurds in their rebellion. One such example was 
a message transmitted by means of the ‘Voice of America’ on February 15, 1991, 
during which the President of the USA, George Bush Snr, urged Saddam Hussein to 
relinquish his power so that the violence could be ended. Although this message was 
sent after the start of the rebellion, it gave the Kurds morale support.220 
 In an effort to distance the direct links between the Kurdish rebellion and support 
from certain Coalition members, Barzani stated: “came from the people themselves. 
We did not expect it”. Kurdish leaders involved in the uprising sought approval from 
the destabilised central Iraqi government to allow them sovereignty as opposed to a 
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separate safe zone under the Iraqi regime. Clearly, the issue for the Kurds was 
sovereignty, and not limited separate accommodation.221 This means that the people 
in northern Iraq rejected Saddam Hussein’s regime because he refused to give them 
their main rights as citizens of Iraq. 
The uprising spread quickly. However, the previous year the Iraqi government and its 
military forces had retreated from the largest area in northern Iraq in expectation of a 
war with Iraqi Shi’ites in the south.222 
In spite of UNSC Resolution 686 authorisation for coalition military forces to use 
lethal force against fixed-wing aircraft, the Iraqi forces could use their rotary-wing 
battle helicopters to full advantage in assaults on the rebels. The combat force 
employed by Iraqi military helicopters was not only deadly to the rebels and their 
strongholds, but was equally lethal against innocent civilians. More importantly, 
based on the government’s code concerning collective responsibility, which moves 
“blame to entire families or communities, the disobedience of one or more members 
of that community”, the mass abandonment by Kurds from the military forces 
justified retribution of all Kurds.223 
Many lives were lost as a result of the unsuccessful Kurdish uprising. Approximately 
2 million people escaped to Turkey and Iran, and a massive refugee phenomenon 
developed. This exodus en masse had in fact begun in March, and coincided with the 
beginning of the uprising. People fled since they were afraid that there would be 
violent retribution from Baghdad if the uprising was unsuccessful. The memories of 
the Anfal operations of 1988 were still vivid. A senior Kurdish leader once stated that 
the reason so many people would rather brave hunger and cold in places such as 
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Turkey or Iran, rather than remain in their own state and thereby face the wrath of 
Saddam Hussein, could only be as a result of the effects of the Anfal.224 
The greatest danger that most people in the world today face comes from their own 
states. Many philosophers concur that it is morally permissible to intervene in the 
cases of extreme human rights abuses, while others insist that such abuses create a 
moral duty to intervene in order to stop the abuse and any further transgressions that 
might occur.225 Michael Walzer’s view on the morality of humanitarian intervention 
is specifically relevant in this regard. He believes that certain cases of extreme abuse, 
to the point where the abuse “shocks the conscience of mankind”, justify 
interventions that would otherwise be considered violations of a state’s sovereignty.226 
                                                
This draws attention to the case of Iraq. When reviewing the history of the Kurdish 
issue in northern Iraq, clearly the Kurds suffered greatly as a result of domestic, 
regional, and international circumstances. Therefore, the UN passed Resolution 688. 
It condemned the atrocities of Saddam Hussein's regime against the Iraqis in general, 
and especially against the Kurds. Resolution 688 called on the international 
community to shoulder its responsibility towards the Kurdish people in northern Iraq. 
The withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait because of the military actions of the 
Coalition forces led by the USA in 1991, facilitated the Kurdish request for what they 
believed to be an inalienable right. The period before the passing of Resolution 688 is 
briefly revisited in the following section. 
3.2 Iraq before International Resolution 688 
It is clear from the foregoing arguments that first, large-scale transgressions against 
Kurdish people in the north of Iraq took place. Besides the thousands of people who 
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died (including large numbers of civilians), a massive refugee problem arose. Second, 
the Kurdish people and their leadership felt that their inalienable rights were violently 
encroached upon by repressive acts by Saddam Husseins’s regime. Third, there was a 
definite likelihood of further transgressions by the ruling regime. 
This called into question the need for intervention. Walzer’s argument is relevant 
here. In cases where massive abuses of human rights occur, a need for intervention by 
other states or the international community arises. Moreover, following from this, 
such intervention in all likelihood should come from an internationally recognised 
institution such as the UN. 
The Iraqi troops entered Kuwait in 1990, and regarded it as part of Iraq as a result of 
Saddam Hussein’s and his government’s insistence that historical documents showed 
that Kuwait was legitimately part of Iraq. This was criticised by the majority of states 
in the international community. Soon afterwards, the UNSC condemned the action in 
Resolution 660 (1990), and ordered Iraq to leave Kuwait.227 New circumstances were 
thus imposed on Iraq which, as well as the idea that its presence represented a threat 
to international peace and security, prompted the decision by the international 
community to force Iraqi to withdraw from Kuwait. This issue is significant in that it 
is one factor that changed the internal situation and invited direct foreign intervention. 
Though the blockade required very little military enforcement, it was 
technically and practically an act of war. But the common perception 
during those months (August 1990 - January 1991) was that the Gulf 
peace, while the coalition tried to reverse the Iraq aggression without 
violence and debated, in slow motion and cold blood, whether or not to 
begin the war.228 
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Due to actions and thoughts in the 1990s, issues concerning international 
humanitarian assistance featured more than before. Directly after the end of the Cold 
War, many prospects arose for a new era of international collaboration termed a ‘New 
World Order’ of which the UN was regarded as a crucial pillar. The 1990s saw the 
outbreak of many deadly conflicts previously almost unseen amongst states. The UN 
had to cope with increasing demands since it was expected that it would preserve 
international harmony and security. To a large degree, the extent of these demands 
was impractical, and consequently responses to them or a lack thereof, led to much 
disillusionment.229 
In less than a week, the UNSC enforced Resolution 661 (1990) which included 
several compulsory sanctions against Iraq. These actions incorporated a complete 
prohibition on trade as well as oil restrictions, deferral of international flights, 
weaponry restrictions, freezing Iraqi Government financial assets, and the prevention 
of economic dealings.230 The UNSC asked member states to enforce a sea barricade in 
line with Resolution 665 (1990). A month later, in Resolution 670 (1990), it was 
decided that all aviation relations with Iraq should be terminated. Only days 
afterwards, a large humanitarian emergency developed as third-state nationals, most 
of them Palestinians, escaped from Iraq and Kuwait mainly to Jordan.231 
The blockade was merely one of many alternatives, which included UN 
condemnation of Iraq, its diplomatic and political isolation, various 
degrees of economic sanction, and a negotiated settlement involving 
small or large concessions to the aggressor.232 
As sanctions increased, the USA and some other states, began sending armed forces 
into the area. By the end of 1990, Kuwait had been ruled by Iraq for more than two 
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months. This led to the decision, or at least some minimal consensus between 
America and the Soviet Union, that a type of enforcement action could possibly be 
allowed by the UNSC.233 
During discussions, a high-ranking American State Department representative 
insisted that Article 51 offered adequate foundation for auxiliary acts under 
International Law. Thorough preparation would “provide a firmer political basis” for 
action. There was hardly any dispute regarding the construction of an autonomous 
UN force and the favored plan of action would place the alliance forces under what 
can be described as a UN ‘umbrella’.234 
In November the American Secretary of State, James Baker, visited Moscow. Here he 
advocated such a decision, using the Soviet President, Mikhail Gorbachev’s Pravda 
Article 1987 on bettering the UN’s role, as backing for his argument. Gorbachev 
recommended that the UNSC enforce two resolutions: the first, which was accepted 
in late November, would allow force to be used after a period of six weeks of grace, 
while the second would give the actual sign to go ahead and use force. Baker wanted 
a singular decision with a period of grace before it came into action. The American 
government felt that when Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, 
met in Paris on November 18, they had the backing for the decision to be finalised. 
Moscow, however, objected. As one of the objections, Shevardnadze did not want the 
word ‘force’ to be used. Baker had five different euphemisms, and finally, the term 
‘all necessary means’ was decided upon.235 This suggests that the USA had begun to 
exploit international circumstances after the collapse of the former Soviet Union to 
achieve its goals and advance its interests in the international arena. 
With 12 votes for and 2 against (Cuba and Yemen), the UNSC accepted Resolution 
678 on November 29, 1990. China decided not to vote. In the operational subsection, 
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the UNSC “authorized member states co-operating with the government of Kuwait, 
unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements … the foregoing 
resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660 
(1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and 
security in the area”.236 
As the USA-led alliance began the air operation in January and February 1991, which 
marked the start of ‘Operation Desert Storm’, a few states attempted to organise an 
end to the clash in a non-violent manner. The Soviet Union proposed a plan under 
which trade restrictions enforced on Iraq would be removed once two-thirds of the 
Iraqi forces had left Kuwait. The remaining restrictions would be removed as soon as 
all the troops had left. This plan was not accepted by the USA or the UK. They 
insisted that they could uphold the restrictions for as long as they wished, and would 
continue to do so in an action allowed by the UNSC until it accepted a different 
resolution. As undeviating UNSC members, they kept their right to reject any 
agreement237. In this regard, Walzer argues a different point: 
I do not believe that the bombing of Iraq in 1991 met just war 
standards: shielding civilians would certainly have excluded the 
destruction of electricity networks and water purification plants.238 
But this did not happen. The operation was in full force. While the military operation 
in Iraq were underway in 1991, the USA President, George Bush, stated publicly that 
he hoped the Iraqi people would ‘take matters into their own hands’ and thereby strip 
Saddam Hussein of his might. The seemingly complete conquest of the Iraqi armed 
forces as well as foreign support re-established the need for autonomy among the 
Kurds residing in northern Iraq. Nonetheless, Turkey projected that by April 5, 1991 
approximately one million people would go into exile. 
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Apprehension was evident at an assembly of the UNSC on April 3, 1991 regarding 
the way in which the Kurds in northern Iraq, as well as the Shi’ites and Marsh Arabs 
in the south, were being treated. Resolution 687 (1991) gave the stipulations of the 
truce with Iraq and explained when and how the restrictions placed on the state would 
be removed. It did not however, mention what was to be done about the state of the 
civilian inhabitants of Iraq. This caused disputes concerning the validity of 
procedures under UNSC Resolution 688 (1991), which was decided on two days 
later.239 
After the uprising of the Kurds in the north and the Shi’a Arabs in the south against 
Saddam Hussein’s leadership in April 1991, Iraqi Kurdistan was separated into two 
different areas. According to UNSC Resolution 688, armed forces from eleven 
different states, including the USA and Turkey, enforced ‘Operation Provide 
Comfort’. This was meant to provide security and charitable aid to people in camps 
along the border between Iraq and Turkey. It is in this context that the Kurdish area of 
security and a northern ‘no-fly zone’ was created.240 The ‘no-fly zone’ in Iraq was the 
first imposed in the Post-cold War Era. 
A key example from the recent past was the establishment of ‘no-fly 
zone’. The same happened later for the sake of protecting the Shias of 
Southern Iraq.241 
Even though there was much resistance from both in and outside of Iraq, the Kurdish 
area of security had been ruled for ten years by the Kurds themselves with 
considerable success. The voices of many Iraqi parties had appealed to the 
international community to intervene. However, the UN did not actively do so on 
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their behalf, but only intervened in northern Iraq to protect the Kurds. Other parties 
were ignored. 242 
The Government of Iraq willingly relinquished its power of civil management in 
October 1991, enabling the people living in the Kurdish area of security to rule 
themselves. In May 1992, elections took place and the Kurdistan National Assembly 
(KNA) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) were formed. The KDP as 
well as the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) agreed on equal power sharing. Also, 
five of the total of 105 KNA seats were assigned to members of the Assyrian-
Chaldean Christian community. Representatives of all the racial, cultural and 
religious groups of people in Iraq were included in the process,243 although the 
Turkoman group in the state withdrew from it. 
3.3 International Resolution 688 
International Resolution 688 (1991) was the first in the Post-cold War Era and 
marked one of the most important periods in modern Iraqi history. In summary, it 
called on the international community to intervene to save the Kurds in northern Iraq 
from repression by the Iraqi leadership. Hence, the discussion of this resolution in 
this section is significant to indicate the vital reasons that framed it. 
The old world order, based on the exercise of power, must now give way 
to a new order in which nations respond to the pressing needs of 
humankind. The UN must take a central role if that order is to be 
realized.244 
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Charitable participation by the UN debatably developed as a consequence of the Gulf 
War and as an outcome of the UNSC’s model decision to allow an alliance of UN 
member states led by the USA. These forces were to use ‘all necessary means’ to 
remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait.245 
The Republican Guard, an elite part of Saddam Hussein's forces and which deployed 
approximately half of its military forces in the north of Iraq, remained capable of 
being operational following the war. It seems that the domestic survival of the 
political party (regime) in power was at least for some time, preferred as a lesser evil 
to the carving up of Iraq. An urgent appeal was sent forth from Kurdish leaders 
towards entities such as France, Saudi Arabia, the UK and the USA. They urged for 
immediate intervention by the UN, but by early April 1991, there had not yet been 
any coordinated international response.246 The USA asked for an emergency assembly 
of the UNSC. Since the Soviet Union had been dissolved, this was the first major 
crisis facing the UN, but with great speed and efficiency, the UNSC responded and 
accepted Resolution 688 on April 5, 1991.247 
Opposition to Resolution 688 was apparent from amongst others, China, the Soviet 
Union and the USA, who shared the view that a response would create a precedent 
for the involvement of the UNSC in internal matters. The US administration offered 
excuses such as the unlikely success of insurgents because of their lack of a central 
command; the absence of a mandate from the UN extending the objective of the 
operation beyond the liberation of Kuwait, and the President's reluctance to put the 
lives of American soldiers at risk by involvement in a civil war. This precedent 
however, is an ethical measure designed to help people in need. 
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Gauged by reports in the media, these attitudes prevailed for some time, but 
eventually they changed because of the position assumed by other states and as a 
result of public pressures. Early in April 1991, states such as Turkey, France and Iran 
sent letters to the UNSC in support of the Kurds. Following some persistence by the 
French in particular, the discussion finally resulted in the adoption of Resolution 688 
in 1991. Iraq rejected this resolution because it reflected growing international 
condemnation of Iraq's treatment of the Kurds.248 
This resolution damned the “repression of the Iraqi population in many parts of Iraq, 
the consequences of which threatened international peace and security in the region”. 
It also ordered that “Iraq, as a contributor to involving the threat to international 
peace and security in the region, immediately end this repression …” The UNSC 
wanted an open conversation to take place which would guarantee the human and 
political rights of the inhabitants of Iraq. The resolution also stated that Iraq should 
“allow immediate access by international humanitarian organisations to the 
devastated Kurdish areas”.249 It also requested the Secretary-General to continue his 
charitable assistance in Iraq. 
Thus, UNSC Resolution 688 rejected and condemned the way in which Iraq handled 
her residents, including the Kurds. The suggestion that the outcome of Iraq’s actions 
could be detrimental to issues concerning international peace and security seemed to 
be reflected in the actual state of affairs. The Iraqi government suppressed the 
Kurdish uprising, but the resultant refugee crisis, also in the adjoining states of 
Turkey and Iran, negatively affected the Kurds, not only in Iran but, in particular, 
those in Turkey as well.250 The Iraqi case illustrates a characteristic situation of 
internal human rights infringements which create a ‘threat to international peace’. 
Thus, for potential humanitarian predicaments that could have international 
consequences, it can be seen as a significant example. 
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However, the extent to which UNSC Resolution 688 could be employed was 
restricted:251 
* First, the Resolution does not recognise internal human rights infringements 
as possible threats to international peace and security if no negative effects are 
evident outside of the borders of the state upon which it is imposed. In fact, the 
Resolution reads that it is the negative effects seen outside the Iraqi borders that 
pose a threat to international peace. 
* Second, Resolution 688 makes no allowance for the UNSC to use force in 
order to defend human rights if necessary. 
The Resolution does not mention all of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which is the 
only chapter that makes allowance for the UNSC to employ or sanction the 
employment of force. Additionally, the Resolution does not refer to joint enforcement 
procedures. Since the Resolution does not cover these possibilities (actions 
sanctioned or invoked by Chapter Vll of the Charter), it should not be interpreted as 
sanctioning humanitarian involvement, especially, since by their very nature, these 
involvements require the employment of force.252 
The idea of creating UN 'safe havens', supported by military forces in northern Iraq to 
protect the Kurds from further attacks by the Iraqi Government, was proposed by the 
USA, the UK and France. This idea was quickly underscored by, among other states, 
Austria and Turkey, as well as certain European leaders, who on April 08, 1991 
attended a conference of the European Communities in Luxembourg. The decision 
derived from the summit in Luxembourg was taken with reference to a British 
proposal that considered the inclusion of Kurdish refugees in Iraq close to its borders 
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with Turkey and Iran under the direct supervision and proper management of the UN 
itself.253 
The USA had 'no position' regarding the question of Kurdish 'safe havens', and a 
representative from the State Department was unable to grant the proposal 'particular 
endorsement'. However, the President of the USA did deny reports that there was 
some disunity between the USA and its European counterparts regarding the issue of 
Kurdish refugees on April 11, 1991. The USA took a significant step in protecting the 
Kurds, with a plea to Iraq to cease all military activity north of the 36th parallel on 
April 10, 1991. This may in fact also have included certain parts of Kurdish territory, 
stretching approximately from the Turkish border southwards to the south of Mosul, 
but excluding the oil rich territory of Kirkuk. The USA furthermore warned Iraq that 
with the support of its allies, it would certainly use force to apply these measures 
should any military interference in the international relief efforts regarding the Kurds 
occur.254 
‘Operation Provide Comfort’ followed the resolution as representatives of the French, 
USA and UK military were sent to create ‘safe havens’ in the north of Iraq. Two 
separate but comparable, massive efforts of humanitarian aid were introduced to 
assist displaced people within Iraq. The first effort resulted from decisions taken 
within the UN while the second came about due to the actions of the UK, France and 
the USA. Only the second effort can truly be regarded as an operation of 
compassionate intercession.255 
The actions taken by the UN occurred with the backing of the Secretary General of 
the UN. First he sent Eric Suy as a personal spokesperson, and then Sadruddin Aga 
Khan was sent as an ‘Executive Delegate’ and as head of the UN Inter-Agency 
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Mission for the UN Humanitarian Programme. This was done to discuss an 
agreement with Saddam Hussein, not only for Iraq, but also for the border regions of 
Kuwait, Iran and Turkey. The second important activity involved the actions of the 
UK, France and the USA and their effort to establish a safe area in the north of Iraq 
for the people, mainly Kurds, who had relocated.256 
Iraqi officials approved of the UN effort and signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding on April 18, 1991. This allowed the UN ‘guards’ to enter Iraq and also 
allowed the creation of UN Humanitarian Centers. The UNSC Resolution 688 
reflected a noteworthy human rights orientation with regard to the safeguarding of the 
Kurds.257 
India and China were adamant that the code of non-involvement in internal affairs 
should be adhered to. India wished to reiterate its stance concerning high reverence 
for sovereignty and territorial obligations as preserved in the UN Charter. It joined 
forces with neutral members and requested the UNSC not to enforce sanctions on 
food and other necessary supplies from both states.258 This request was acceded to 
and the UNSC did not enforce sanctions on necessary supplies from either state. 
Chinmaya Gharekhan, the Indian delegate, said that “India has consistently held that 
regional initiatives or arrangements for peace and stability deserve all encouragement, 
provided they are arrived at by the sovereign will of the states of the region as part of 
a genuinely cooperative effort”. Such arrangements can neither be imposed by 
external pressure nor can they be lasting if they are of a discriminatory nature taken in 
the international context. It is also not legitimate to make such arrangements under 
the mandatory provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter.259 
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India impressed on the UNSC the significance of the threat, or the possibility of the 
threat, that could jeopardise international peace and security in the area, rather than 
the issues that led to the creation of the emergency. The Indian representative, 
Gharekhan, said that “the Council should have concentrated on the aspect of peace 
and security, and left other aspects to other, more appropriate organizations of the 
UN”.260 
While the terrible acts of violence in Iraq generated a deep sense of compassion in 
India, it was evident that India would not vote in favor of Resolution 688. It saw the 
Kurdish dilemma falling completely under the authority of Iraq itself. India’s position 
reflected its sense of obligation to the reverence for sovereignty and the territorial 
honour of states, including Iraq. This is a fundamental standard in International 
Relations that India felt should be re-enforced in the UNSC. Others agreed. However, 
the complexity of the Iraq/Kurdish question remained. 
Upon acceptance of Resolution 688, the UNSC planned cautiously in order to avoid a 
possible unwanted or unworkable model for action in the future. Ideas that were 
raised during the discussions surrounding the Resolution revealed that almost all 
states, including those that supported the Resolution, had concerns about matching 
the right of the UNSC to judge the state of affairs with the standard of non-
intervention into the internal matters of a state. Article 2, paragraph 7 of the UN 
Charter and the method in which it could be applied in these particular circumstances 
were argued about a great deal. 
The language used in Resolution 688 mirrors these strains. Unlike Somalia, where 
there was no central government that functioned properly, and Haiti, where there 
were opposing governments, Iraq did in fact have a single, independent government. 
The matter of sovereignty ruled the discussions because many states doubted the right 
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of the UN to become involved in a sovereign state to address human rights 
mistreatments.261 
The UNSC forced Iraq to allow humanitarian aid. This aid was eventually provided 
under UN backing, and according to a number of memoranda of understanding, it was 
done with Iraq’s resentful permission. Nevertheless, forcing a state to allow 
humanitarian aid is a pioneering decision that is roughly in line with advancements 
made in the General Assembly. The General Assembly is slowly coming to the 
conclusion that in some situations, humanitarian aid can be provided without the 
permission of the state.262 
Even though Iraq argued that the areas of security and ‘no-fly zone’s went against 
Article 2(4), western governments interpreted this as if the issues were being 
disputed. They claimed that they were not infringing on Iraq’s right to sovereignty on 
a humanitarian basis. The Legal Counselor’s, Anthony Aust’s arguments concurred 
with the ideas of international lawyers who stated that humanitarian intervention is 
allowed under Article 2(4).263 
The western armed involvement in northern Iraq followed the requirements of the 
Article. It was not permanent; it did not mean a government change or territorial 
alterations, and it was in compliance with the rules put forward in Resolution 688. 
However, Pierre Laberge (in Wheeler 2000) argues that despite unauthorised 
deployment of armed forces by western states within the borders of another state or 
where approval in terms of a supporting resolution was lacking, members of the 
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UNSC who voted for or who abstained from voting for Resolution 688, revealed 
approval through their silence. 264 
Article 2(7) was an issue of concern for UN members. This resulted in the UNSCl not 
passing Resolution 688 under Chapter VII of the Charter. As it became evident when 
Britain, France and the USA tried to obtain UNSC support for the areas of security, 
and later on for a UN police force to control the allied operation, the UNSC did not 
wish to approve the use of threat or force to defend human rights inside the borders of 
Iraq.265 
To some extent formation of the areas of security went against the restrictions set by 
previous actions. It was a first for a number of states to defend the use of force 
concerning the obtainment of an agreement with a UNSC Resolution in public, which 
insisted that inherent value should be placed on human rights. By doing this, the 
western states defied the ruling concepts of sovereignty which prevented 
interventions such as ‘Operation Provide Comfort’. With the justification that the 
areas of security complied with the regulations laid down in Resolution 688 and that 
they were not violating Iraq’s right to sovereignty, the western governments stated 
that new meanings should be provided for the rules and laws of sovereignty 
concerning intervention. The rights concerning intervention were limited to providing 
‘relief and redress in human rights emergencies’ and another UNSC resolution was 
needed to support this.266 
This, however, did not change the fact that these areas of agreement enabled a 
moment of unity to occur between the states. It is an exaggeration to state that the 
way in which the western effort was met, supported a new means of humanitarian 
intervention; as International Law states that it must have the support of opinio juris. 
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Yet, by making new humanitarian declarations, the idea of areas of security became 
part of the discourse of the states involved. With that, as is stated by Jane Stromseth, 
“expectations that similar responses will be forthcoming in other conflicts” 
developed.267 
Sadako Ogata (in Weiss 1999), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
stated that the areas of security were a “case of successful humanitarian 
intervention”.268 This was an appropriate evaluation of the success of the effort to take 
the Kurds into the security areas and later of getting them back to their own homes. It 
was, however, less appropriate when applied to the success of allowing for a political 
framework that would ensure their security on an ongoing basis. Stromseth argues 
that by keeping this intervention in mind “humanitarian relief alone will not solve 
deep-seated problems”.269 Freedman and Boren add that “humanitarian intervention 
which failed to address the underlying dispute which had led to the crisis in the first 
plaice was liable to conclude without guarantees of any recurrence”.270 The idea that 
human rights abuses are always tied to political issues shows a singular idea of 
humanitarian intervention, but the states did not focus on or investigate these causes 
when they responded to the humanitarian crisis in northern Iraq.271 
The maximum effort that the UNSC considered and then suggested was to request the 
involved parties to have a discussion to make sure that human rights were valued. 
The recognition that the Kurds were in danger of future attacks by Iraq as a result of 
the absence of a long-term political resolution meant that the western states intended 
to send in armed forces to provide ongoing protection for the Kurds. This did not 
work since the attempt to get UNSC approval for this force to control the areas of 
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security was resisted by pluralist laws. The UNSC was willing to order humanitarian 
right of entry, but it did not wish to support this by taking any actual form of action 
when it came to force or the threat to use force. One can therefore concur with Weiss 
that “the longer-term benefits of intervention remain fundamentally ambiguous”.272 
Further investigation is certainly justified, particularly as regards the following: 
First, a link between human rights and international security arose following this case 
of intervention. As argued by Wheeler, “it was the first time – other than the case of 
South Africa– that the UNSC had collectively demanded an improvement in the 
human rights situation of a member state as a contribution to the promotion of 
international security”.273 This perhaps, amounted to one positive contribution to a 
complex emergency resolution. 
Subsequently, it should be noted that this link was only established because assertions 
of self-determination were not considered. This was done by separating the ‘causes’ 
of the mass departure, which would involve such assertions, from its ‘consequences’ 
and by seeing the last-mentioned as a threat to international security274. In this sense, 
the advances made remain shrouded in ambiguity which renders future involvements 
problematic. 
Finally, the resolution was not accepted under Chapter VII and it was not clear how it 
should be executed. While it signified the Council’s admittance of the humanitarian 
crisis in Iraq as a threat to international peace and security and therefore, allowed its 
involvement, measures of enforcement were not seriously considered. Since there 
was no clear example of previous UNSC action in a crisis of this kind, the actual 
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implementation of further action needed much interpretation and imagination,275 and 
if it ever had to be repeated, it would offers major challenges. 
From the foregoing is noted that states such as India and China did not support the 
idea to interfere in Iraqi territory because they regarded it as a violation of the Charter 
of the UN. The UK, France and the USA considered international intervention 
necessary to protect Iraqi Kurds in northern Iraq. There was however, uncertainty as 
to why they did not intervene to protect Iraqi citizens when Saddam Hussein’s regime 
committed abusive actions against all Iraqi people in different areas, especially those 
that opposed him. The different approaches by different states because of their 
interpretation of Chapter VII and the UN Charter prevented action at the time – to the 
detriment of the Kurds. 
Looking at this issue from another angle, Resolution 688 and the areas of security 
changed the normal limitations of lawful interventions within the international 
society. The implication of this resolution in creating an example for UN 
humanitarian interventions is that the UNSC acknowledged for the first time that the 
internal oppression in a state could have effects outside the borders, and that these 
effects could threaten ‘international peace and security’.276 (In the case of apartheid 
South Africa and later on the illegal occupation of Namibia and South African 
incursions into Angola, the UN also addressed the issue but direct foreign 
intervention was not seriously contemplated. The case of Iraq seems to point to the 
possibility of such intervention, despite differences by member states). To illustrate: 
in paragraph 6, the resolution petitioned “[to] all Member States and to all 
humanitarian organisations to contribute” to humanitarian activities.  
Arguably, the UN intervention into northern Iraq was politically rather than ethically 
motivated. In 1988, Saddam’s regime prohibited weapons against the Kurds, but 
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international organisations did not lift a finger to help the Kurdish people. One might 
wonder why the UN has never taken any actual steps against Turkey as when Turkey 
failed to recognise rights for the Turkish Kurds, and attacked them repeatedly. 
Furthermore Turkey still regards the Kurdish fighters in its land as terrorists. Hence, 
it seems that international resolution 688 did not come about because of the 
repression of the Kurds by Saddam Hussein’s regime, but because of changing 
international circumstances and conflicting self-interests between states inside, but 
especially also outside, the region. The arguments by India and China versus those of 
the UK, France and the USA provide an example. 
3.4 Walzer and intervention into northern Iraq 
As stated in Chapter 1, 2.6, Walzer places clear landmarks in his ethical approach to 
humanitarian intervention. He wrote about the intervention into northern Iraq, and it 
would seem, justified the acts of the USA and the UK against the Iraqi regime, even 
if these states did not have international authorisation for their actions. 
After the 1991 Gulf War, George Bush said that America “went halfway around the 
world to do what is moral and just and right”. This comment shows how Bush 
employed the language of just war to account for the war led by America to remove 
Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.277 But, unfortunately neither George Bush nor the 
previous American administrations explained why they failed to assist the Palestinian 
people who, since 1948 have suffered under Israeli occupation. The UN declared as 
long ago as 1947 that there should be a ‘Jewish State’ and a ‘Palestinian State’, with 
Jerusalem under a divided international institutional corpus. Yet, only one of these 
states exists. 
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Even though Walzer is doubtful about Bush’s actual objectives, he still agreed with 
the Republican President’s statement that the just war policy legitimised the actions 
taken in Kuwait. In an article in The New Republic, he said that the emancipation of 
Kuwait was a war fought for a just reason.278 
By supporting the 1991 Gulf War in principle, Walzer separated himself from many 
other leftist academics such as Todd Gitlin, Christopher Hitchens and Noam 
Chomsky, who all opposed it. Many of them did not want to support the war because 
they thought that there were other reasons behind it, such as oil supplies that needed 
to be protected.279 
Walzer contested this leftist argument in his 1991 New Republic article. He 
mentioned that the Americans who were most worried about the protection of their 
economic interests in the Gulf simply asked for Saddam Hussein to be captured. 
Some argued that, in fact, Saddam Hussein had not been able to influence the oil 
price when he failed to take over oil-rich Saudi Arabia. In his article and talking to 
the leftist war opposition, Walzer focused on the fact that, from an ethical viewpoint, 
the case was very easy to understand. The failure to resist would possibly mean that 
America supported Saddam Hussein’s acts of violence.280 
As regards the possible results of the war, Walzer certainly did experience the same 
apprehension as felt by the war antagonists. In his New Republic article, he said that 
the Gulf War “might well be politically or militarily unwise [to fight]”. He did, 
however, maintain that in the end it was the role of American military specialists to 
measure the hazards of fighting the war, and then to decide on appropriate action. He 
stated that as a just war truth-seeker, it was not his responsibility to determine 
whether the war should be fought or not. It was more than adequate for him to say 
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that, in principle, removing Saddam Hussein from Kuwait would stay a just cause 
even if America ended up not pursuing this action.281 
The UN took numerous international resolutions against Saddam’s command in 1991, 
including Resolution 688, with prior resolutions being dispatched. This was because 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was seen to endanger international peace and security. 
As indicated previously, Resolution 688 came into being because of internal conflict 
in Iraq. Those who had left Iraq for other states did so because of the way in which 
they had been treated in Iraq. These conditions created a threat to international peace 
and security, and therefore, the UN issued Resolution 688. 
Walzer also focused on the genuine empathetic reservations expressed by optimistic 
war hawks who insisted that America had an ethical duty to free the Iraqi people from 
the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. Responding to them, Walzer reiterated his view 
that a military intervention for humanitarian reasons was only justifiable in very 
specific instances. This meant that although a government was not involved in 
genocidal actions, it should enforce ways to protest against human rights 
infringements in foreign states.282 
Concerning Iraq, Walzer believes that by implementing the ‘no-fly zone’s over the 
north of Iraq, the international society was victorious in stopping Saddam Hussein 
from killing all the Kurds. To make sure that the Kurds, as well as other ethnic and 
religious groups, would continue to be safe, Walzer felt that the ‘no-fly zone’s should 
be extended to cover the entire state. By implementing the ‘no-fly zone’s, the 
inspection of weapons, as well as a ‘smart sanctions’ system, Walzer maintained that 
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America could have managed its security and humanitarian concerns without having 
to engage in a war which would inevitably cost lives and money.283 
It is evident that Walzer agrees to the use of some force in Iraq. What he did oppose 
however, was the idea that America should go into the state with the single purpose 
of removing Saddam Hussein from power. Even though Walzer was aware that the 
implementation of ‘no-fly zone’s and inspection of weapons would cause Saddam’s 
power to weaken and possibly fail altogether, he did not agree with Bush’s military 
aim of ‘regime change’.284 In this sense Walzer found himself in disagreement with 
the rather simplistic approach of enforced-regime change. 
Walzer stated that “change of regime is not commonly accepted as a justification for 
war”. In the article, he states that the concept of ‘regime change’ makes him think of 
“the bad old days of Cold War ‘spheres of influence’ and ideologically driven 
military or clandestine interventions”.285 
I believe that the concept of ‘justice of war’ is applicable to not only the 
methods used in battle but also to the aim and rationale behind it. Should 
one wish to justify war beginning with a description of the reasoning 
behind it, one would need to question the approach as well. The 
management of repression, established after the first Gulf War in the early 
90’s in Iraq, was a valuable arrangement. However, it would have been 
even more successful, had it had the complete backing of European states. 
Notwithstanding the prohibition of weapons, in retrospect, it is clear to see 
that if the no-fly zones had been imposed by the French and German 
planes as well as by US planes and the inspection procedure thereof been 
sustained by European states, it would have been almost impossible for 
the USA to go to battle. Saddam Hussein’s command was basically 
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ineffective after 1991 since the regime was able to deal with political 
rivals on home ground, but it was unable to circumvent Kurdish 
sovereignty, for example. The restriction on arms assisted in putting a stop 
to weaponry of multitude devastation.286 
Walzer believes that just war theorists still have a very important public ‘function’. 
Obviously, just-war theorists continue to serve as independent critics in holding their 
government’s actual policies up against the just-war standards the government is 
claiming to observe. According to Walzer, reasonable war theorists still have a 
crucial public ‘function’. It is obvious that only reasonable war theorists serve as 
independent critics when it comes to actually examining their government’s policies 
against the war principles that the government apparently observes. 
One can argue that a major action to help and save repression of a nation or group 
somewhere from non-humanitarian abuses by forceful power is important. However, 
at the same time it is unacceptable for such actions to apply in one state but not in 
another one. There should, one can argue, be consistent standards that apply equally 
to all nations. 
3.5 The legitimacy of intervention in northern Iraq 
The matter of whether the UN intervention in northern Iraq was legitimate has 
attracted much controversy in the area of International Relations. Intervention in Iraq 
represented a significant change in International Relations at the time. It followed the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the Post-cold War Era. Very 
different views were forthcoming around the adoption of UN resolution 688. 
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The vote on Resolution 688 had been a close one since there were other opinions 
suggesting no action would lead to the weakening of Article 2(7) of the Charter. Also, 
a new motion that permitted protection of the Kurds would have been interpreted by 
numerous members as causing too much damage to the principle of non-
intervention.287 These contrasting viewpoints in the international community 
influenced a complex debate with potentially divergent outcomes. 
If the draft resolution put together on April 5, 1991 contained a stipulation allowing 
the threat or actual employment of force in order to protect humanitarian efforts or 
human rights, a Soviet veto would have stopped it dead in its tracks. The UNSC 
could not be convinced to go beyond Resolution 688 and it was this knowledge that 
made the western governments to withhold any new resolutions which would allow 
the formation of areas of security.288 
On the other hand, China and some other states agreed to action but only within 
specific limitations. Within the UNSC there was much resistance to any notions that 
could damage the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. Western armed 
intervention was only accepted because it was assumed that it would not become a 
permanent political condition since western forces would be cleared from the area 
within months.289 
Resolution 688 is an uncertain model for two possible reasons: 
First, it was the fourteenth resolution of the UNSC concerning the invasion of 
Kuwait. It was however, the first that did not state that the UNSC was acting 
according to Chapter VII of the Charter. The very first resolution which specifically 
recalled Article 2(7) of the UN Charter was set as ipso facto. This was made possible 
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by France’s involvement after it became known that a prior outline resolution which 
did not refer to Chapter VII was not supported by nine members of the Council.290 
Second, whenever the UNSC mentioned the threat to international peace and security, 
it was particularly limited to effects outside Iraqi borders. The introduction referred to 
the Council’s serious apprehension concerning “the repression of the Iraqi civilian 
population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, 
which led to a massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and 
to cross-border incursions, which threaten international peace and security in the 
region”291. The choice of the plural verb form ‘threaten’ clearly indicates that it was 
the two outcomes, namely the mass exit of refugees and the cross-border invasions, 
that were the causes for concern regarding international security. 
The western governments considered how they should go about handing over the 
operation to the UN which would allow their forces to leave northern Iraq. The 
concern over whether the UN’s own humanitarian aid endeavours would be 
negatively affected by the creation of the areas of security was one of the reasons why 
UN officials were wary of the west’s plans.292 Despite the argument that western 
forces would withdraw, the future was unpredictable. 
Because of the collapse of John Major’s, the British Prime Minister’s plans 
concerning a UN police force, the western powers had to deal with the very situation 
that they had been afraid of from the start, viz being forced into a long-term 
obligation to protect the Kurds. However, when Iraq came to the conclusion that a 
UN presence in northern Iraq was the only way of eradicating the allied forces, they 
provided the western powers with a possible escape route by approving the plan 
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originally thought of by Major. The UN guards were only allowed to carry personal 
weapons such as handguns. Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan believed that the guards 
were required to defend human life as well as material belongings.293 
The Iraqi Kurdish leaders, especially Barzani and Jalal Talabani, also hold a 
particular view about International Resolution 688. On his part, Barzani considers it a 
moral duty of the UN international organisation to protect the Kurdish people who 
supported/support its efforts in northern Iraq. 
When the coalition forces started to pull out of Iraqi Kurdistan in July 1991, 
after they had established a security zone and left behind some security 
arrangements on the ground, the Kurdish people sent home the withdrawing 
forces with tears and flowers and demonstration of gratitude and 
appreciation.294 
Furthermore, Barzani states: “I think the use of military force for humanitarian 
purposes is a bone solution to humanitarian crises, but it is difficult to disassociate it 
from morality”295. He added, “It is important that humanitarian intervention be 
conducted under UN auspices. The nature of the mission is the use of collective 
deployment of military force by a number of nations, which requires the authorization 
of the UN”.296 
Barzani approved the use of military force in a state to resolve interior problems and 
according to Barzani’s views, it should be considered in the context of morality or 
ethics. Nevertheless, it is difficult to distinguish between what is moral and any 
specific military resolve when it comes to the violations of human rights. 
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Barzani thus calls for humanitarian intervention under the supervision and control of 
the UN. To him such supervision requires authorisation by the UN. It also requires 
the launching of specific missions with the aim of observing and or evaluating the 
situation. His idea was that this could be a possible reason for additional UN action. It 
was obviously hoped that the mere presence of the guards would prevent attacks on 
the Kurds. Predictably, Kurdish leaders did not believe that the guards, who were 
only allowed to carry limited arms, were reliable for ensuring their security. This lack 
of arms allowed within the parameters of the resolution was a head-ache for some. 
The leader of the PUK, Jalal Talabani, was concerned about the security provided by 
the UN presence and feared that the Kurds might flee to the mountains again. This 
fear was not unfounded since 20,700 skilled troops were being substituted by 500 
lightly armed UN guards whose experience was simply protection of the UN 
buildings in New York and Geneva.297 
The Soviet Union, China, as well as increasing numbers of non-western states that 
formed part of the UNSC were worried about the example being set by the actions of 
the west in Iraq and its future effects. However, none of them wished to be seen as 
being opposed to an operation which was saving many, and they remained quiet. The 
situation was indeed problematic. Each choice had downsides. Compliance, as 
opposed to tacit legalisation, was to encapsulate the criticism of the other 
governments to the intervention by the west. China was also cautious concerning the 
setting of an example which could lead to the erosion of the non-intervention 
principle. Because of these political barriers, the western powers did not launch a new 
resolution within the UNSC.298 
Resolution 688 of 1991 has caused the subject of compassionate involvement in 
domestic dealings to garner international concern and hence it became prominent in 
                                                 
297 Op cit note 292.  
298 Wheeler, N. Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press: pp 153-154 (2000). 
.   
 118
international legal dialogue. Until this stage, movement of humanitarian relief 
agencies had never been guarded by armed troops. Merely weeks after Resolution 
688 was accepted, Javier Perez de Cuellar, then Secretary General of the UN 
commented that “… the perpetual conflict between sovereignty and human rights, in 
questioning the traditionally revered concept of sovereignty, underscored the shift in 
world public opinion towards the belief that support of basic human rights should 
prevail over boundaries arbitrarily drawn upon a map”.299 
When asked whether the existence of a western military force in the north of Iraq 
could be established with the influence of the UN without the permission of Iraq, 
Perez de Cuellar said: “No. No. No. We have to be in touch first of all with the 
Iraqis”.300 
The European states found themselves in disagreement with America since the only 
thing the US was only interested in was leaving Iraq as quickly as possible. However, 
any potential differences concerning the timing of allied departure was prevented by 
all agreeing that a group of people from all the states would remain behind to protect 
the Kurds. Turkey agreed to a speedy response from both air and ground on its 
territory, and this would be supported by American carriers in the eastern 
Mediterranean. By the middle of July 1991, western troops began to leave Iraq, and it 
was made evident to Saddam Hussein that the ‘no-fly zone’ in the north still applied 
and would be patrolled by western air forces. The remaining force was named 
‘Operation Poised Hammer’ and was a definite sign to Iraq that any further attacks 
against the Kurds would create a backlash from the allies.301 
According to General Tommy Franks, the ‘no-fly zone’s were an important measure 
of control and the teams that placed their lives in jeopardy every day played an 
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integral role in the US policy. The ‘no-fly zone’s provided the Iraqis, both in the 
north and south, some security from Saddam Hussein. They continuously served as a 
reminder of alliance resolution and could therefore, be regarded as a key component 
of America’s restriction stance. The competence of Iraq’s armed forces had been 
seriously hampered by the lack of adequate training. At the same time the operations 
provided significant intelligence regarding the Iraqi military and also allowed 
forewarning as regards possible coercion in Kuwait.302 
Further, forewarning also meant that the west is now better equipped to face Iraqi 
coercion in Kuwait in comparison with 1990. The west’s willingness is supported by 
limitations imposed on Iraqi ground exploitation in terms of UNSC Resolution 949 in 
October 1994 and is capability of hastily launching military support in the area.303 
In opposition to Iraqi land-based air defences in the ‘no-fly zone’s, constant actions 
have been the focus of tremendous interest since ‘Operation Desert Fox’ in December 
1998. During this period, aircraft supporting ‘Operation Southern Watch’ reacted to 
approximately 650 Iraqi ‘irritants’ in more than 80 instances, while aircraft 
supporting ‘Operation Northern Watch’ reacted to approximately 110 ‘irritants’ on 
roughly 40 instances. All of these measures were reactions to antagonistic exploits by 
Iraqi air defences and tremendous care was taken to choose the exact weaponry in 
order to diminish any potential damage.304 
It was in fact the western armed intervention that forced Iraq into agreeing to the 
humanitarian right of entry for the UN and other aid organisations insisted upon by 
Resolution 688. The western powers did not want their direct involvement to 
continue for an extended period of time and the Iraqis seemed to share their 
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sentiments, as noted by Freedman and Boren (in Wheeler 2000). They felt that if 
foreign attendance in their territory was needed, UN recruits rather than western 
forces would be preferable.305 
In the view of western governments, Resolution 688 offered adequate authority for 
such a force. However, as with the questioning of the legality of the areas of security, 
the Secretary General’s Special Envoy to Iraq doubted the validity of the idea and its 
lasting value. Eric Suy stated that a new resolution would be needed in order to send 
out UN forces “otherwise it will be an intervention and that will smell like ‘Operation 
Desert Storm’”.306 His observation holds value. 
Sir Brian Urquhart, former under-Secretary General for Special Political Affairs, 
agreed with this. He aired his concerns about ‘a small powerful minority’ of western 
states that were forcing their ideas on the UN. On May 11, however, Perez de Cueller 
stated that he had clearly received an extremely negative reaction from the Iraqi 
regime which adamantly refused to have any UN police in attendance. The greatest 
obstruction to an accord was the persistence of the Iraqis that the UN policemen 
should not be allowed to carry weapons. Without Iraqi authorisation, Perez de Cueller 
stated that any deployment would need to be implicitly approved by the UNSC.307 
During a conference with the USA Secretary of State, the Soviet Foreign Minister 
stressed his government’s apprehension concerning the deployment of armed UN 
police to protect civilians without the approval of the Iraqi government. He believed 
that a fine line could be drawn between the need for compassionate assistance on the 
one hand, and the concerns relating to the independence of a state on the other 
hand.308 
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It is important that international rules and laws apply equally across the world, but, 
unfortunately, the UN does not apply the same measures everywhere it intervenes. As 
stated above, the UN did not intervene in 1988 when Saddam Hussein used 
prohibited weapons against the Kurds and when, in accordance with Resolution 688, 
safe havens were established in the north, but were ignored in the south. As happened 
in Iraq in 1991, the international community, as represented by international powers, 
intervened in northern Iraq for different reasons, one of which was to save the people 
from Saddam Hussein’s aggression. International agreements prohibit violation of 
sovereignty for any reason. However, dealing with transgressions inside a state’s 
borders presents a problem. So does the break-down of security and human rights 
within a state that lead to a refugee crisis. 
Tension exists between sovereignty and the agreed-upon measures of intervention 
when human rights are transgressed by a sovereign state inside its borders. There are 
no easy answers when it comes to resolutions, their extent, implementation and 
universal applications. 
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CHAPTER IV 
INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO 
4.1 Background 
In an ideal and stable world, where no political problems and border quarrels exist, 
but only a general feeling of goodwill between people, topics such as history and 
political intervention would have minor importance. However, in a world where 
politics interfere in all spheres of life, and justify the death of children in the name of 
international legitimacy, a subject such history that deals with human rights abuses, 
retains its importance since it plays a critical part in people’s interest in their 
homeland and the effects of intervention by other international actors. 
Kosovo became an important internal division of Serbia when the region was 
occupied by the Turks in the fifteenth century. In the records of Serbia, it is often 
referred to as Old Serbia. Albanians began arriving in the seventeenth century while 
the Turkish were still actively occupying the area and spreading their influence. Since 
the second decade of the twentieth century, the international society has 
acknowledged Kosovo as an important part of Serbia.309 
When the Croatian Communist dictator Tito came to power in former 
Republic of Yugoslavia in 1945, he refused the Serbian people 
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permission to go back to their homes in Kosovo. By prior arrangement 
with the new Communist dictator of Albania, he also agreed to allow in 
an additional 100,000 Albanian settlers. It seems that the Albanian 
majority in Kosovo can be traced right back to the time of World War 
II.310 
The issue of history and interventions take on a serious dimension when someone 
finds himself expelled from his land, and past sanctities are violated on behalf of a 
history that was written under different conditions. 
Ibrahim Rugova was [in the meanwhile] elected as their first president, 
during a referendum held in Kosovo in 1992, in which the ethnic 
Albanians voted overwhelmingly for independence. While the 
international community did not recognise Kosovo's autonomy, Rugova 
presided over the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, by way of a government 
structured along these parallel lines of thought which did not satisfy 
everybody. 311 
President Milosevic of Serbia, it is argued, laid the foundation for the disaster which 
followed in the 1990s by first removing the sovereignty of the province in 1989, and 
second, by aggravating Serb nationalism. Kosovo was filled with turmoil throughout 
the 1990s, but its case was not incorporated into the Dayton Agreement after the 
Bosnian war ended. The terrible conditions that had developed increased drastically 
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at the beginning of 1998, when many alleged Albanian separatists were killed by 
Serbian police.312 Violence escalated and social tensions rose. 
According to the Statistical Office of Kosovo’s 2005 Population Survey, Kosovo's 
total population was estimated between 1.9 and 2.2 million people who are divided in 
the following ethnic proportions:  92% Albanians, 6.5% Serbs, 0.9% Bosniaks, 1.7% 
Roma,1.1% Turks and 0.5% Gorani.313 
4.2 The role of international organisations 
No one can deny the importance of international peace and security, especially after 
the world witnessed two world wars in the last century. So, the emphasis on the 
concept of international peace and security is clear in charters of international and 
territorial organisations. The UN and NATO are included in these organisations.  
4.2.1 NATO’s intervention in Kosovo 
NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo crisis is an example of organisational 
involvement in international peace and security. Political developments in Kosovo 
seem to have influenced NATO’s views on conflict more than any other case. Part of 
this relates to geo-politics. The violent developments in Kosovo were on NATO’s 
‘doorstep’, with possible destabilising effects for neighbouring regions. One might 
argue that NATO consolidated a more or less consensual view on the issue – perhaps 
more than in any other conflict since the end of the Cold War. It remains a question 
though, whether NATO’s response was not driven by ethical considerations or geo-
politics, and attempts to secure its own interests. 
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By the late 1990s, NATO had been transformed. It had become a tool for organising 
collective diplomacy for the whole of Europe. One might argue that as an 
international institution, NATO’s involvement in security provisions was a liability, 
not an asset. It should also be possible to undertake a relatively dispassionate review 
and analysis of NATO’s war over Kosovo. The post-1990 environment, the perceived 
growth of globalisation, and the move towards a ‘multi-polar world’, instead of a 
Cold War bi-polar world, played a role in the transformation: 
As evidenced by the preamble to the 1949 Washington Treaty, the 
members of NATO have long committed themselves to the defense of a 
common set of principles, namely, “democracy, individual liberty, and 
the rule of law.” Since the end of the Cold War, however, these 
principles have assumed a higher profile in NATO’s mission, largely 
because the “new NATO” has deemed them central to security in a 
globalizing world.314 
The supporters of human rights-based justice often perceive the notion of sovereign 
equality as an essential part of the long-standing principle of state sovereignty. 
However, the notion of sovereign equality is of current origin.315 For the supporters of 
human rights, this optimistic move in International Relations is best drawn attention 
to in the war over Kosovo in the spring of 1999. The Kosovo conflict is often said to 
have established some of the most constructive features of the new era of human 
rights protection and of more specific sovereignty.316 
Defenders of humanitarian intervention justify it primarily in the name of a 
moral imperative: "we should not let people die." This idea is grounded in 
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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, written in 1948.317 
The main western powers allegedly fought a war over the rejection of justice and the 
violation of the human rights of the ethnic-Albanians of Kosovo. This war was not 
validated through a threat to international peace and security, nor was it in self-
defence of a neighbouring state. It was widely hailed as the first war for human rights, 
a reason adopting precedence over the sovereign rights of the former Republic of 
Yugoslavia. It is not insignificant that in this developing conflict, critics confirmed 
that ‘international justice’ and human rights have overridden sovereignty.318 
Slovenia’s representative, who voted against the resolution 1199,319 raised the 
important issue that the UNSC does not control all decision-making concerning the 
use of force. It has “the primary, but not exclusive, responsibility for maintaining 
international peace and security”.320 This suggests or indicates that NATO’s action 
was not seen as obviously illegal, but as an unsuccessful draft resolution which is not 
a good foundation for arguing the legality of military action. This reality was rarely 
mentioned in the reports of NATO leaders.321 
NATO leaders did not wish to agree that they had embarked on a war. This truth may 
have been too uncomfortable to stomach. However, it was a war, even though it was 
of a strange asymmetric type. Undoubtedly, it concerned large-scale and opposed use 
of force against a foreign state and its military forces. Because it was defended for 
being mainly an action to prevent actual and possible Serb killings and removals in 
the Serbian province of Kosovo, the operation was at times, colloquially described as 
                                                 
317  See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humanitarian_intervention . Last visited on August 1, 2007. 
318 Op cit note 316.   
319  See, S/RES/1199 of 1998, September 23, 1998. 
320 UN Press Release UNSC / 6659, March 26. 1999.       
321 UN Press Release UNSC / 6659, March 26, 1999.  
 127
a ‘humanitarian war’,322 but in retrospect there is great difficulty in perceiving the 
actions as ‘humanitarian intervention’. 
Whatever the classification of the war, ‘Operation Allied Force’ was a high point in 
the ongoing struggle for human rights and humanitarian concerns which has been 
very much a part of International Relations since the end of the First World War. For 
theorists of international associations, it showed a further interesting, if not 
problematic, turn of events concerning the long-running connection between the 
apparent hard-nosed and ‘realist’ factor of force, and the apparent flexible and 
‘idealist’ factor of international humanitarian and human rights standards.323 
Kosovo is both a fascinating and relevant case to study since it highlights the 
significance of the extent of human rights infringements in the arguments over 
whether humanitarian intervention can or should be warranted. Before NATO began 
the military operation named ‘Allied Force’, fatalities did not reach similar awful 
totals as in earlier cases. It could be argued that NATO’s actions, human losses and 
destabilisation may not have reached a level that would ‘shock the conscience of 
mankind’.324 
It would appear that President Milosevic was cautiously trying to evade large-scale 
annihilation of Kosovo, and hopefully avoid rousing an instantaneous and strong 
reaction from the international community. Instead, it would seem that he had 
decided instead to create a climate of fear that would cause Kosovo-Albanians to flee. 
In 1998, tens of thousands of people escaped from Kosovo and it was obvious that 
some sort of ethnic purification was taking place, even without many killings. 
Nonetheless, Russia and China regarded the issues as domestic affairs, and they 
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demonstrated strong feelings against intervention into the internal happenings of the 
former Republic of Yugoslavia without its authorisation.325 
The North Atlantic Council made it clear that they interpreted UNSC Resolution 
1199 in a different way and amplified the demands on the former Republic of 
Yugoslavia by deciding that NATO would continue with air attacks if it failed to 
obey the decisions of the UNSC. Clarifying the motives for the intervention, Javier 
Solana stated:326 
We took this decision after a thorough review of the situation in Kosovo. 
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has still not complied fully with 
UNSC Resolution 1199 in a way that can be verified’. 
Even when the number of civilian deaths became more prominent in the autumn of 
1998, Russia and China still disallowed the use of force against the former Republic 
of Yugoslavia. This also explains why UNSC Resolution 1199 did not include any 
threats of intervention. China and Russia constantly emphasised the importance of 
respecting the laws of sovereignty and the importance of this principle for the 
international structural order.327 
It was obvious that to them, Resolution 1199 did not form a strong enough basis to 
allow for the use of force. Their doubts and diplomatic protestations however, did not 
stop NATO from starting its military action, debating in contrario that the legal 
foundation was given by Resolutions 1160 and 1199. The main humanitarian 
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arguments of NATO states were that it was crucial to avoid an imminent 
humanitarian crisis and that ethnic cleansing was still occurring.328 
After diplomatic failure to achieve acceptance by the former Republic of Yugoslavia 
for the Interim Agreement for Peace and Sovereignty on Kosovo, the North Atlantic 
Council allowed air strikes aimed at “disrupting the violent attacks being committed 
by the Serb Army and Special Police Forces and weakening their ability to cause 
further humanitarian catastrophe.” After about ten weeks of the air campaign, 
‘Operation Allied Force,’ Slobodan Milosevic, President of the former Republic of 
Yugoslavia, finally accepted NATO’S demands and the bombing came to an end. 
While the fighting was over, arguments over the significance of it were just 
beginning329. Arguments also proliferated about the human losses incurred by the 
ceaseless bombing and its effects. At first the operation was declared as having been 
founded on the idea that some crimes are so severe that, despite the principle of 
sovereignty, the state responsible for them may be subjected to military intervention, 
thus going beyond the mere threat of force.330 
Besides this, NATO states also insisted that European security was being endangered. 
It is evident that the occurrences in Bosnia leading up to and after the Dayton 
Agreements played a crucial part in what can be seen as fairly early actions of 
NATO. Western states were aware of just how far Milosevic and the Serbs were 
willing to go. The intervention therefore, served both as a way of saving the Kosovo-
Albanian people and as a method of getting rid of the command of Milosevic.331 
UNSC did provide some legal reassurance to the NATO cause, but in a rather odd 
manner. A draft resolution which was backed by Russia and supported by two non-
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Council members, namely India and Belarus, asked for “an immediate cessation of 
the use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”. Only 3 states voted in 
favour of the draft resolution, namely Russia, China and Namibia, while 12 voted 
against it. During the discussions, those who spoke in favour of the resolution failed 
to address the problem of what was to be done with Kosovo.332 
At this writing, the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia continues, and the 
Serbian destruction of Kosovar society also continues. Yes, the 
Serbian campaign must have been planned before the bombing began; 
the logistics of moving forty thousand soldiers are immensely 
complex.333 
These two elements, fighting for human rights and using only airpower, feature 
significantly in existing discussions concerning future use of force. The core of these 
discussions is whether Kosovo should be viewed as an anomaly or as an example for 
the future. For these questions to be answered, one should consider the American 
military’s point of view. Contrary to many reports, the decision taken to fight for less 
than crucial national interests caused divisions within the US Department of Defense. 
Even though the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not informed people as to whether they 
were opposed to the intervention, some hints regarding their position are available. 
General Dennis Reimer, the Army Chief of Staff, stated that he had concerns about 
whether airpower would do it by itself. Others felt that air might do it.”334 
Russia was quick to condemn the aims of America and its desire to increase US 
influence in the Balkans. In other words, Russia said that the US was simply acting in 
its own best interests. Due to the fact that the mass exodus of refugees only began 
after the bombs began to drop, NATO’s intervention was also denounced for 
apparently speeding up the Serbian killings and ethnic cleansing crusade. This view 
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was supported by Russia, amongst others. However, many authors seem to concur 
that an ethnic cleansing plan had already been in place before the NATO bombing 
commenced, sometimes referred to as ‘Operation Horseshoe,’ 335 and was aimed at 
forcing Kosovo-Albanians to leave the province. 
In other words, ethnic cleansing was already occurring before NATO started its 
operation with the long-term goals in place, and the war possibly made the Serbs do 
as much as they could as fast as they could. It is unlikely therefore, that the Serbs 
would have halted ethnic cleansing and killings if NATO had not decided to invade 
the province. Another point of criticism concerned the effectiveness of the air 
campaign which was employed to overpower Milosevic. At the end of the war, the 
civilian infrastructures of what still stood of the former Republic of Yugoslavia were 
more damaged than the armed forces and their military infrastructures.336 
A victory for military action by air led by the USA therefore, had apparently occurred 
at the cost of massive damage to infrastructure, civilian lives, and dislocation of civil 
society. This gains significance against the idea that protection of NATO fighters 
meant that ground intervention was avoided as far as possible. Attempted intervention 
by ground forces would have undoubtedly increased losses for USA and NATO 
troops, and there can be little doubt that this gave rise to the decision to use Allied 
Force primarily by air rather than by ground forces as a military option.337 
In Kosovo, the intervention of NATO invoked many contradictory interpretations 
about its legality and its normative and institutional implications for the Post-cold 
War Era. Between the international moral imperative and the legal norms personified 
in Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter, which were strongly supported by public 
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opinion, NATO members were faced with a legal and moral quandary on how to 
prevent (future) methodical human rights infringements in Europe.338 
Seen from a stringently documented perspective, the NATO intervention entailed the 
illicit threat and use of force against a sovereign state in order to avoid human 
catastrophe. In terms of Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter, this action breached 
the proscription against the use of force that would destroy the honour and political 
autonomy of an independent state. This was the basis for previous objections in the 
UNSC and General Assembly. Even today, Russia and to a degree China and several 
non-aligned states, criticise the military intervention.339 That, in the aftermath of the 
war and extended bombing campaign, Russian observers also criticised the fact that 
mainly Serbian transgressors of human rights were hauled before the international 
court system, seems to confirm this. 
4.2.2 The United Nations and Kosovo 
No other international organisation has the same significance and influence as the 
UN. The UN Charter mentions the term international peace and security 32 times. 
Based on this, it is imperative to discuss the role of the UN Charter and the 
intervention into Kosovo. Since its establishment, the UN has attempted to find 
resolutions to conflicts in various international contexts, viz. the Suez crisis, the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict, apartheid in South Africa and its illegal occupation of 
Namibia (from 1971 onwards), and the Lebanon conflict. Many of these were peace-
keeping missions devoid of forceful interventions, for which the reasons that were 
supplied were - at least up to a point - clear. 
Some analysts of International Relations interpret Article 2(4) of the UN Charter as 
absolutely prohibiting the use of force. But this is actually not completely accurate 
                                                 
338 Thomashausen, S.  Humanitarian Intervention in an Evolving World Order: The Cases of Iraq, 
Somalia, Kosovo and East Timor. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa: pp 106-107 (2002).   
339 Ibid. 
 133
because it would seem, there are other sections in which the use of force is apparent, 
for example in the cases of self-defence (Article 51), collective operations (Chapter 
VII) and measures that are taken against enemy states (Article 53). Other situations 
that also appear to be exceptions to the rule are stated in Article 2(4).340 
Kyrre Grimstad341 comments as follows about this matter: it would seem as if the 
Kosovo intervention has limited precedence for humanitarian intervention because it 
was undertaken only “in conformity with the sense and logic of the stipulations of the 
UNSC”. What about Walzer’s argument about the justification of intervention? 
Grimstad offers another view. He suggests that most writers of International 
Relations believe that the Kosovo case should not be taken as a precedent at all. This 
does not mean though, that no lessons are to be learnt from it, for there certainly are 
lessons for the future, but this case is clearly not to be taken as ‘the future itself’. 
Concluding his argument, Grimstad states that the value of the Kosovo case as a 
precedent for the legality of humanitarian intervention can possibly only be 
ascertained when a similar case occurs. Grimstad’s argument seems to hold value and 
should be cause for serious reflection when future forceful interventions are 
considered or projected by western forces. 
The UNSC responded quickly to humanitarian conditions and Resolution 1160 was 
issued on March 31, 1998 which appealed for a nonviolent solution to the crisis in 
Kosovo to be reached. Circumstances deteriorated, and on September 23, 1998, 
Resolution 1199 was issued by the UNSC which confirmed that there was a threat to 
peace and security in the area. It also stated that there was a need to improve the 
humanitarian situation. Further action was also discussed, but not with any particular 
accuracy.342 
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Diplomatic efforts attempted to find solutions for the disaster. Since there was no 
improvement, measures were taken to begin air actions. Threats of the use of force 
ensured that President Milosevic agreed to a Verification Mission of the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) without arms. Unfortunately, matters 
did not improve and the carnage continued.343 
In particular, Resolution 1199 of September 23, 1998 ordered Yugoslavia to “cease 
all action by the security forces affecting the civilian population”, and also referred to 
potential ‘further action’ if orders made in the resolution were not met.344 In addition, 
Resolution 1203 of October 24, 1998 ordered the Serbs to comply with numerous 
specific provisions of accords reached in Belgrade on October 15 and 16, including 
the NATO Air Verification Mission over Kosovo. The Serbs were required to accept 
that the Alliance had a direct position and interest in Kosovo. It can be said that, even 
if the UNSC could not follow these resolutions with specified authority to use force, 
they did provide some legal foundation for military action.345 
In the 1990s, numerous revisions of international order outlined the decline of state 
sovereignty from the traditional Westphalian form of the seventeenth century, for 
example through the institution of the UN, to the present tendency towards a 
collective system of ‘international justice’, rights-regulation and ‘sophisticated’ 
democracy.346 The increasing acceptance of the moral right of various states to 
unilaterally or collectively employ military force to support ‘international justice’ and 
human rights, signify that sovereignty, or the use of state authority, is changing. 
While, for several states, the notion of sovereignty is restricted to others, the situation 
has become more open in terms of previous customary international limitations. 
Sovereignty as an ‘inalienable right’ is relativised by the possibility of a military 
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humanitarian intervention. In this regard, the Kosovo intervention stands central.347 
The Kosovo conflict draws attention the issue of ‘the noticed end’ of sovereignty. 
With the marginalising of the UN and disagreement over its final authority 
concerning the use of force in international dealings, it is possible that it is 
considering a reorganisation of sovereign authority, or rather, the reception of 
sovereign disparity.348 
Following Kosovo, future actions in relation to perceived sovereignty, protection of 
human rights and internal oppression/transgression of human rights will be more 
complex. A precedent has been set by an action that remains under debate, advocated 
by some and resisted by some. 
In following the UN Charter, military intervention was stated as having to be 
performed by armed forces that would have to follow directives from the UNSC. 
Hypothetically, they were to be commanded by the UN Military Staff Committee. 
But did this really happen? Was the original idea put into practice as was projected? 
In the case of Kosovo for example, NATO intervened and commanded the military 
intervention. 
Since the Kosovo conflict represented a conflict between east and west, such an 
international army or military force was not formed. Although the Cold War was 
over, it was rather unlikely that the UN would deploy its own troops anytime soon. 
Proposals made in the early 1990s that called for the creation of a UN Volunteer 
Military Force or the formation of UN peace enforcement units were very 
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notorious.349 Very little in terms of practical consequences came from these 
discussions. 
Troops are made available to the UN when possible. At times they are placed under 
the command of the UN. Sometimes they are also put under national or even regional 
command. Africa provides several examples of peace-keeping, even peace-
enforcement operations that came into being as regional initiatives. Most peace-
keeping operations, which occur when local people have allowed the deployment of 
international help, fall under UN command.350 
Military interventions, including UN enforcement operations, are mostly subject to 
national command or that of a regional association due to the high risk of casualties. 
In the latter case, as in most cases, there is a lead-state which runs the operation. In 
Europe, it is NATO, and within NATO, the US351; in West Africa it is the Military 
Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), and within ECOMOG, Nigeria is the leading state. In East Timor, 
Australia assumes this responsibility. 
Regardless of whether a state leads or intervenes in ‘a coalition of the willing’, it 
poses a challenge for the international environment and the community of nations, 
including the legal setting, and for national interests, including military capabilities 
and domestic political deliberations. It has been argued that in the case of a large-
scale operation, the USA should run it, even simply because it has the means to do so. 
Moreover, involvement, even partial involvement, of the USA will add a sense of 
seriousness to the effort.352 
                                                 
349 Brian Urquhart, For a UN Volunteer Military Force. The New York Review of Books Vol. XL 
(11): pp 3-4.  
350  Op cit note 309. 
351 See generally, Chesterman, S. Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International 
Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press: (2001). 
352  Op cit note 203.     
 137
In Somalia, America took the lead for four months, but was then removed (forced out, 
some would say), eventually completely. In Haiti, the USA only really acted in 1994, 
three years after Jean Bertrand Aristide, the President, was overthrown in a military 
rebellion. Some have suggested that in 1998 and 1999, the USA did not really wish to 
become involved in Kosovo either.353 
Other states have also decided to be leaders of interventions, but such interventions 
only work if supported by a regional or international power. In 1997, Italy took the 
reigns for ‘Operation Alba’ because it was directly affected by the disaster in Albania 
and it had interests in the area. Italy managed to obtain both UNSC permission and 
NATO support for its operations and it was successful.354 Part of this success rested 
with the support that Italy received internationally and regionally. 
The at times, lack of agreement in the UNSC, has meant that regional groups offer 
good alternatives to states that contemplate military interventions. Such interventions 
(compare ECOWAS) add political authenticity to the actions. This occurred in 
Kosovo where the US made use of NATO. Nonetheless, as stated above, the legal 
reasoning for intervention by these groups was uncertain.355 
Many scholars and policymakers state the importance of growing and maintaining 
domestic support for international efforts. They insist that a state will only lead if it is 
supported. Domestic politics and public opinion can therefore, be viewed as two 
individual means that influence decisions concerning intervention.356 
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Domestic support however, depends on keeping war casualties as low as possible. 
The conservative approach is that the riskier the action, the weaker domestic support 
will be. This explains why policy-makers in America were particularly wary of 
intervening in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. However, public opinion polls 
carried out at the University of Maryland, as well as research done by the Triangle 
Institute for Security Studies, show that the American public will back military 
interventions that are ethically and politically gripping.357 
Another recent resource introduced in support of resolving internal conflicts has been 
the use of private international security companies. Studies in International Relations 
have shown that in certain circumstances, these private forces have helped to stop 
military strife. Many believe that they could be the answer to the problem of the UN’s 
constant lack of military personnel in risky environments, and have shown that the 
international community should involve these companies rather than ban them or 
ignore their existence. Other commentators believe that the actions of these 
companies should be closely monitored.358 Nevertheless, such involvement is 
occurring, and increasingly, such companies complete tasks that governments are 
unwilling to tackle. In Africa, Afghanistan and Iraq such companies act as ‘stand-ins’ 
or proxies for those who initially interfered. Also, most of their activities are enacted 
without thinking about long-term effects, and occur within a domestic and 
international legal vacuum. Here too, an international outline is much needed.359 
Importantly, an obvious difference exists between hiring these firms and entering into 
a partnership with one. The UN might wish to hire the services of such a firm, but it 
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should not be permitted to enter a partnership with one. The current desire for the UN 
to enter into business with them might be innocent, although questions pertaining to 
war and peace, and life and death should not be ruled by money because that would 
go against everything for which the UN stands. 
Since the UN Charter came into being, most states that have taken forcible action 
abroad have rejected the idea that their actions were humanitarian interventions. Even 
when there seemed to be a clear humanitarian rationale, as in India’s intervention in 
East Bengal in 1971 or the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia in 1978, the states 
concerned did not refer to humanitarianism since they were still in favour of the non-
interventionist regime. Numerous authors comment that now many states see 
humanitarian actions as legal, pointing to the fact that voting on two UNSC 
Resolutions can be interpreted as providing legalisation for the Kosovo operation. 
4.3  The International Resolution 1244 
Resolution 1244 is considered to be one of the most important events in 
contemporary Kosovo-Albanian history. It placed the entire province of Kosovo 
under international administration, which meant that Kosovo was faced with new 
circumstances. These led to talks inside and outside the UN around Kosovo becoming 
an independent state. 
With UNSC Resolution 1244 from 10th of June 1999, the province of 
Kosovo came under the control of the UN, with a large NATO force to 
secure it. Most of the refugees returned home within the next two weeks 
and benefited from impressive international humanitarian assistance.360  
A draft resolution drawn up by Russia two days after the start of the NATO strikes in 
the former Republic of Yugoslavia called for an end to the use of force against the 
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former Republic of Yugoslavia, but it was defeated by twelve votes to three, the latter 
being those of Russia, China and Namibia361. Furthermore, Resolution 1244 of June 
10, that permitted “[M]ember states and relevant international organizations to 
establish the international security presence in Kosovo” was adopted although China 
did not vote. This can be seen as sanctioning of NATO’s presence in the Yugoslavian 
area.362 
The terms used in UNSC Resolution 1244, as well as the military-technical 
arrangement between the international security force and the former Republic of 
Yugoslavia and Serbian government that came before it, met both NATO’S demands 
and Milosevic’s urge to show that the former Republic of Yugoslavia had gained 
some allowances during 11 weeks of bombing.363 The agreement was officially 
accepted by Milosevic on June 3, 1999.364 
The UNSC Resolution and military-technical agreement met the 5 conditions needed 
for ending the bombings as laid down by NATO on April 6. These included a 
verifiable termination of combat activities and killings; the withdrawal of the former 
Republic of Yugoslavia and Serb military, police, and paramilitary forces from 
Kosovo; an agreement about the deployment of an international security force; the 
unconditional return of all refugees and unhindered access for humanitarian aid; and 
an agreement to put in place a political framework for Kosovo on the basis of the 
Rambouillet accords. The fifth condition has still not been met, since it requires the 
cooperation of the Belgrade government. NATO obviously triumphed as regards the 
security issues that Milosevic had fought so hard against. The UNSC ordered that all 
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former Republic of Yugoslavia and Serb forces be withdrawn and that an 
international security presence with ‘substantial’ NATO participation “be deployed 
under unified command and control”. 
Resolution 1244 did not mention the areas of ‘competence’ that the former Republic 
of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia would continue to have in Kosovo as had 
the Rambouillet terms. Amongsts other, Rambouillet had accorded the former 
Republic of Yugoslavia ‘competence’ over maintaining a common market within the 
former Republic of Yugoslavia, a monetary policy, defence, foreign policy, customs 
services, federal taxation, and federal elections. From the all-important standpoint of 
the former Republic of Yugoslavia sovereignty, however, Milosevic had reason to 
argue that the terms personified in UNSC Resolution 1244 were an improvement over 
the terms contained in the Rambouillet Agreement.365 This is borne out by the 
following: 
* First, the all-encompassing and embarrassing rights of ‘transit, bivouac, 
maneuver, billet, utilization,’ as well as infrastructural changes throughout the former 
Republic of Yugoslavia linked with NATO forces by the Rambouillet text were now 
excluded366. The full text was initially not made public. The June military-technical 
agreement gave NATO forces access to Kosovo only. 
* Second, Resolution 1244 did not suggest that the final status of Kosovo might 
be determined by a referendum or some other ascertainment ‘of the will of the 
people,’ as had been implied in the article added to the Rambouillet text at the 
Kosovo Liberation Army’s orders.367 
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NATO's decision to actually mediate in Kosovo, was decided upon outside the 
framework of the UN and in violation of its own charter. More disturbing, is the 
question of how precise, ineffective or unjust the relevant laws and institutions must 
be before other states are granted permission to override the non-intervention 
principle or to ignore the UN Charter. It does seem helpful however, to consider this a 
proper question to be asked with reference to deliberation regarding humanitarian 
intervention.368 
Ethical direction can neither be sustained by emphasising existing laws as if their 
authority were indisputable, nor by avowing elementary honourable doctrine as if, by  
conforming to civilised imperatives, consideration need not be given to obeying laws 
and that instead, it could be sustained by giving careful attention to the claims upon 
which the international community calls in delicate situations.369 
Ethical issues are indulged in as separate concerns that can or should be measured, at 
best only after realist political analysis has been fulfilled.370 Hence, it is considered 
that Walzer’s arguments on contextual realist ethics in international dealings are 
seldom qualified in regular security studies, or perhaps it is a matter of less 
consideration being given to them. But even when they are considered, the problems 
raised appear to remain complex. 
Because it was imperative to avert an impending humanitarian catastrophe, NATO 
justified the use of force against the former Republic of Yugoslavia. This action was 
controversial because, since the founding of the UN, it was the first time that a group 
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of states, acting without explicit UNSC influence, secured a violation of the 
sovereignty concept, primarily and solely on humanitarian grounds.371 
The international society in Kosovo was bluntly exposed to massive infringements of 
human and cultural alternative rights, but not acts of genocide in the sense of the 
1948 convention which called for respect to be shown for the human rights and 
dignity of all ethnic groups.372 
The UNSC for example, did not authorise NATO to intervene in the Serbian province 
of Kosovo. This action caused huge disagreement over whether human rights and 
humanitarian concerns can ever be a legitimate cause of war.373 For this reason, the 
then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, realised that the time had arrived to address 
the tension in the UN Charter directly.374 
It remains important to focus on Article 52 of the Vienna Convention, according to 
which: “[a] treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of 
force in violation of the principles of International Law embodied in the Charter of 
the UN”, paramount among these principles being Article 2(4). Since the Charter 
referred to collective self-defence, Article 51 constitutes the legal foundation of the 
Washington Treaty through which NATO was established. Article 5 of the NATO 
Treaty bases itself expressly on Charter Article 51.375 
Article 5 of the NATO Treaty clearly displayed the strictly defensive mission of 
NATO on the basis of Article 51 of the UN Charter, defining the right to individual 
or collective self-defence. In this Article, the NATO states formulate their collective 
defence doctrine in case of “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe 
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or North America”.376 They limit any such action geographically as regards the 
territory covered by NATO membership, as well as legally through provisional 
measures within the context of a global system of collective security: “[S]uch 
measures shall be terminated when the UNSC has taken the measures necessary to 
restore and maintain international peace and security”.377 
Article 1 of the Treaty places NATO within the framework of international legality as 
defined by the UN Charter. The Article confirms in particular, the principle of 
peaceful settlement of international disputes and commits NATO member states, in a 
language resembling the wording of Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, "to refrain in 
their International Relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent 
with the purposes of the UN". No mention is made of democracy or human rights in 
the NATO Treaty.378 
While the ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity’ of the former Republic of Yugoslavia 
was re-established in the preamble and Chapter 7, Article I, (1a) of the Rambouillet 
text, it was not clearly mentioned as a foundation for shaping ‘a mechanism for a 
final settlement for Kosovo'.379 The UNSC formulation would seem to rule out 
Rambouillet providing a path to Kosovo independence. 
* Third, the UNSC resolution specified that the UN would control the execution 
of the international civil presence in Kosovo, while the Rambouillet accords had 
given this function to the OSCE, in collaboration with the European Union (EU). 
Milosevic had pushed hard to make the UN the controlling body of the security and 
civil presence in Kosovo both because he believed the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
had shown that UN officials were vulnerable to Serb manipulation and because he 
thought Russia would be better positioned to protect the former Republic of 
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Yugoslavia’s interests in a body where it enjoyed the veto. While NATO refused to 
agree to former Republic of Yugoslavia and Russian demands that the UN have 
operational control of the security presence, it did agree to UN control of the civil 
presence.380 
4.4  Walzer and intervention in Kosovo 
Walzer’s ideas form a cornerstone of this dissertation. The main thrust of his 
arguments is to demonstrate to specialists of International Relations whether 
intervention is morally acceptable or not. Hence, a discussion of Walzer’s ideas about 
intervention into Kosovo is relevant to the arguments in this dissertation.  
So it seems best that people who have lived together in the past and will 
have to do so in the future should be allowed to work out their 
difficulties without imperial assistance among themselves. The 
resolution won’t be stable unless it is locally grounded; there is little 
chance that it will be consensual unless it is locally produced.381 
To contextualise Walzer’s ideas, comments on the notion of morality are first 
provided and particularly, the thought that common morality is a characteristic (or 
rather should be) of human beings as thinking, deciding beings, that is ‘moral agents’. 
Human agents are also historical agents, not devoid of moral obligations. Morality 
presupposes the liberty that is innate in agency. This presupposition can never be 
proved: if determinism is factual, the belief that human beings are agents making 
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genuine choices gives a false impression. Morality also presupposes that human 
beings have an equal right to enjoy the liberty intrinsic in agency.382 
The first principle of morality, then, is that every person should value the agency of 
every other. This is Kant’s principle of respect. It requires us to distinguish the 
intrinsic capability, and therefore the right, of each person to make his or her own 
choices.383 
In addition to what is written in the previous chapters, it can be said that Walzer has 
confirmed that during the Post-cold War Era, it is sometimes essential to preserve the 
principles of a just war vis-à-vis opponents of official military action abroad. Walzer 
has persistently challenged arguments made by members of the radical left who 
dismiss the principles of a just war or have taken the principle of non-combatant 
resistance to an extreme.384 
Walzer therefore explains: “Just war theory is not an apology for any particular war, 
and it is not a renunciation of war itself. It is designed to sustain a constant scrutiny 
and an immanent critique”.385 Walzer’s effort to apply the principles of just war to 
issues of war and peace in the Post-cold War Era receives further attention below.386 
Walzer wrote a remarkable column in Dissent, in which he dealt with NATO’s 
military action in Kosovo. He commented that the allied military movement was 
intended to prevent Serbian ethnic cleansing in the Muslim province. Although, in 
principle, Walzer agreed with NATO’s decision to intervene on humanitarian 
                                                 
382 Kant, I. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), translated by Lewis White Beck. 
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill: pp 66-67 (1959).  
383 Ibid.  
384 Walzer, M. The Triumph of Just War Theory and the Dangers of Success, Social Research 69: p 
924 (Winter 2002). 
385 Ibid.  
386 Ibid.  
 147
grounds, in the Dissent interview however, he criticised NATO for fighting the war in 
unfair ways.387 
At that time, NATO wished to attain its humanitarian goals by using high-altitude 
aircraft to bomb Serbian military targets. The NATO bombing operation however, 
not only killed Serbians, but also accelerated Serbian ethnic cleansing on the ground, 
a procedure that could only have been stopped by a NATO ground intervention, but 
did not wish to use its own ground troops for fear of putting them at risk.388 
Walzer strongly condemned the thought of ‘risk-free war-making’. In his 1999 
Dissent article, he asked: “Are states with armies whose soldiers cannot be put at risk 
morally or politically qualified to intervene?”  Furthermore, he said that it was “not a 
possible moral position” for NATO to be “ready … to kill Serbian soldiers” and 
thereby cause many civilian fatalities, while concurrently looking for ways to protect 
the lives of its own soldiers.389 
Walzer therefore insisted that the lives of people in Serbia were no less valuable than 
those of the NATO soldiers. His influential moral statement concerning the Kosovo 
war shows how seriously he takes the principles of jus in bellum, particularly with 
regard to non-combatant resistance, even at the risk of having to agree to a larger 
number of American military casualties.390 
In his publication, Arguing about War,391 Walzer fully accepts “the obligation of 
democratically elected leaders to safeguard the lives” of their own people. But he 
adds that is not necessarily a moral position, because it is wrong to kill others if one is 
not prepared to die as well. Referring to NATO, he explains this statement when he 
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says that this organisation cannot launch a campaign that aims at killing Serbian 
soldiers if it is not prepared to risk the lives of its own soldiers. Of course as active 
participants they (NATO and the USA) should try to minimise deaths, but it would be 
wrong for them to kill others if they are not prepared to sacrifice the lives of their 
own troops, which in this case, imply ground troops. Walzer then goes on to compare 
America’s response to the Serbian case with fire fighters trying to extinguish a fire in 
a building that has gone up in flames. Yes, the fire fighters have a responsibility to 
put the fire out but, argues Walzer: “Americans can’t be the world’s fire fighters”. 
Walzer also criticises various interventions in which America took part, describing 
them not only as ‘unilateral military acts’ but also as campaigns ‘authorized by 
regional alliances’. Arguably regional alliances act in geo-political interest, despite 
the fact that they became morally involved. One should keep this reality in mind 
when considering Walzer’s arguments. One should also bear in mind that Walzer’s 
criticism of the USA is levelled against a range of US unilateral interventions that 
have occurred in various parts of the world since the 1960s. 
Many people who are part of the political left would like to see such interventions and 
campaigns conducted by the UN only. But the small size of the group of members of 
the UNSC would make it very difficult for such concerted action to be realised. The 
veto power of members in particular, is what would make it difficult. 
Walzer does not agree with those of the left who want only the UN to act in such 
cases. He suggests that there should/could be more than “only one agent of 
international rescue.” Furthermore, Walzer encourages people of the left to realise 
that although such situations usually have a very “complicated social, political, and 
economic background” these so-called ‘fires’ are nevertheless started deliberately by 
arsonists that aim to kill and who are ‘terribly dangerous’. But more important than 
having a full understanding of such situations, one should still have the will to 
extinguish the fires. 
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4.5 Legitimacy of intervention in Kosovo 
An important aim of this study is to indicate the extent to which such restraints were 
practiced or will be practiced in future interventions – especially if the self interest of 
the appointed agents of interventions in the past, present and in the future is to be 
considered. Walzer however, realistically and critically points out that future 
interventions should be measured against the background of such contextual 
interventions and the broader outlines of his arguments. Walzer is more than aware of 
the complexities of the theory of just war being widened to other interventions, i.e. 
within and against states that transgress human rights within their own borders on a 
large scale. Despite his criticism of the ‘left’, these complexities do not escape his 
reflections. 
The triumph of just war theory is clear enough; it is amazing how 
readily military spokesmen during the Kosovo and Afghanistan wars 
used its categories, telling a casual story that justified the war and 
providing accounts of the battles that emphasized the restraint with 
which they were being fought.392 
The issue of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo illustrates this complex situation. A 
resolve concerning the legal status of NATO’s intervention in the former Republic of 
Yugoslavia in 1999 depends on the deliberation of a number of concerns, namely:393 
i) The degree to which International Law upholds the sovereignty, rights and 
territorial integrity of states 
ii) The legal limitations placed on states to prevent the use of military force 
against other states, and  
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iii) The role of the UNSC in controlling the international use of force. 
While these concerns provide a classic set of criteria upon which a resolve of the 
legal status of NATO’s intervention in the former Republic of Yugoslavia can be 
based, a final judgment of NATO’s action depends on the interpretation of UNSC 
resolutions, core Charter principles, legal principles personified in traditional (pre-
Charter) International Law, and the legal obligations of states. 
The notions of peace, protection and enhancement of human rights globally and 
within states and the right to self-determination to some extent have always been 
internationally recognised. To an extent, wide recognition of these three values has 
been achieved, the problem lies with application and implementation.394 
Legal scholars might agree with Cassese about the three important values supporting 
interstate relations, but there is no agreement about which one is the most important. 
We can assume that when the United Nation Charter was drafted in 1945, the idea of 
peace among nations dominated the process.395 
This plan is further strengthened by the Charter’s restraining position as regards the 
right of states to use force in their international relations, the territorial integrity of 
nation-states, and the UNSC’s rule concerning the allowance of the use of force, 
except in the case of self-defence. Prioritising interstate unity comes at the cost of 
intrastate unity, as is demonstrated by the UNSC’s non-involvement in many internal 
conflicts during the age of the Cold War. Since the introduction of the Charter, 
however, there has been a move towards the codification of Human Rights Law. 
The drafting process of the UDHR, seen by many as having crossed into custom, the 
implementation of the Genocide Convention, and the codification of many human 
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rights gatherings,396 show a jurisprudence confrontation to the idea that the peace-
among-nations value is more highly rated than the human-rights-value.397 
Seeing that the UNSC’s domination of non-defensive uses of force is based on the 
outlook that the peace-among-nations value takes precedence over other values, it can  
be argued that the appearance of international human rights erodes the centrality of 
the UNSC in determining the legitimacy of intrusion in support of human rights.398 
UNHCR was widely criticised by military and humanitarian groups alike for not 
being able to respond to refugee requirements and, by aid groups in particular, for 
ceding much of the aid action to NATO, the agent that enforced and applied the threat 
of force. “Although heavy logistical assistance has been useful”, observed Médecins 
sans Frontières (MSF), Doctors without Borders, at a Skopje press conference on 
April 9, NATO is first and foremost a military organization which is currently 
involved in the conflict and ... not a humanitarian actor”.399 The following comment 
becomes relevant: frequently the enactor of force is less, if at all, interested in 
prioritising humanitarian aid on a large scale since it operates in terms of a different 
priority, namely the coercive act of humanitarian intervention. 
In MSF’s view, “NATO is neither responsible nor able to co-ordinate humanitarian 
relief activities for refugees – nor should it be. Protection and assistance for refugees 
is the responsibility of the UNHCR”. Other non-government organisations and 
consortia soon agreed with MSF’s concerns. Indeed, UNHCR’s performance was 
criticised from many angles. The fact that is was not prepared to respond to the 
refugee problem, many held, was interpreted as making it possible for military actors 
to step into the gap. OSCE head of mission in Albania, Daan Evarts, said in an 
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interview in April that he had stated three days prior to the bombing, that there would 
be 150,000 refugees.400 
During the same month the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Republic 
of Yugoslavia stated that ‘only’ 2108 bodies had been discovered. It was thus 
revealed that the extent of the atrocities had been far less than originally thought or 
rumoured in frenzied media reports. It was also believed that about 500 Kosovars, 
most probably fighters or supporters who were members of the Kosovo Liberation 
Army, lost their lives in the year prior to the bombings.401 
The truth of the matter however, is that another explanation for action was that 
without the intervention many more Albanians could have lost their lives. In April 
1999, the UK government stated that a Serbian offensive had been planned, the so-
called ‘Operation Horseshoe,’ that aimed to drive the Kosovars out of the province. 
Skeptics did not believe this and said that there was no undercover plan, and that it 
was a lie told to justify the method of intervention, which was a failure from a 
humanitarian point of view.402 
The supporters of human rights-based justice frequently perceive the notion of 
sovereign equality as an essential part of the long-standing principle of state 
sovereignty. In fact, the notion of sovereign equality is of current origin. For the 
supporters of human rights, this optimistic move in International Relations is best 
drawn attention to in the war over Kosovo in the spring of 1999. The Kosovo conflict 
is often said to have established some of the most constructive features of the new era 
of human rights protection, and described sovereignty more reasonably.403 
The main western powers allegedly fought a war over the rejection of justice, and 
over violation of the human rights of the ethnic-Albanians of Kosovo. This war was 
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not validated through a threat to international peace and security, nor in self-defence 
of a neighbouring state. It was widely welcomed as ‘the first war for human rights’, a 
reason that acquired adopting precedence over the sovereign rights of the former 
Republic of Yugoslavia. It is an insignificant revelation that in the wake of this 
conflict, critics has confirmed that ‘international justice’ and human rights have 
overridden sovereignty.404 
There is no argument about the fact that signs of ethnic cleansing had been present 
both before and after March 23, 1999. Nonetheless, the overall idea of the cruelty in 
the area appears to be blown out of proportion and inflated by the media and by 
NATO itself. NATO leaders told the world in many statements that the main goal of 
the intervention was to control the unbearable situation in Kosovo.405 
The events that occurred seemed to concur with what was said. This, of course, does 
not mean that there were no other aims. It was made very clear that the credibility of 
NATO was on the line. After all, the conflict in Kosovo was a threat to European 
security, thus NATO action confirmed the perceived indivisibility between European 
and US interests. Some say that intervention helped form the future shape of Europe 
and its geopolitical boundaries.406 Furthermore, as history demonstrated with the 
massacre at Srebrenica, NATO was determined to act and do so decisively before the 
situation deteriorated beyond control and its inactivity was condemned within the 
international community. 
From the beginning, it is important to state that the legality of the intervention is not 
the crucial issue, therefore the remarks that follow only deal with intervention to the 
extent that it coincides with the question of skilled authority. NATO undertook the 
intervention without precise and unqualified UNSC permission. There was nothing in 
the UNSC resolution which pointed to the use of force. The jurists have agreed that 
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Resolutions 1160 and 1199 did not allow for any state to intervene in the affairs of 
former Republic of Yugoslavia, even though it was said that the worsening situation 
in Kosovo did constitute a threat to peace and security in the area.407 
It is clear that the government in Belgrade did very little, or nothing, to meet the 
orders of the Resolution. One must however, remember the difficulty of doing so 
because of the stubborn stance of the Kosovo Liberation Army guerrillas. One NATO 
member, the Netherlands, also a supporter of America, stated at the UNSC meeting 
on March 24 that approval of armed force had always been desired in the case of 
defending human rights. Nevertheless, none of the NATO members made a motion to 
the UNSC for them to gather to discuss the problem of the use of force against the 
former Republic of Yugoslavia just before March 23. This is understandable if the 
very probable vetoes of large non-western powers is taken into account.408 Clearly, in 
the case of Kosovo, the UN was or would have been blocked by Russia in particular 
who did not really want to protect human rights, but was more interested in its own 
influence or future influence in the region. It would, however, not be outlandish to 
say that America tried to remove the UN from the conflict in Kosovo on purpose. 
This proved to be impossible because the UN had played an important role in 
stopping the violence and promoting peace in the former Republic of Yugoslavia.409 
To a limited extent, it seems, the UN played a role in minimising previous and future 
transgressions of human rights, including the US led bombings in Kosovo. 
UNSC Resolution 1244 finally brought an end to the fighting, and therefore, the 
international community along with Russia and China had indirectly legalised the 
intervention, while America acknowledged the important role of the UNSC.410 After 
all, one can say that the international community concurred that the NATO 
intervention in Kosovo was by no means the best example for understanding 
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humanitarian intervention, not only because there was no proper authority, but also 
because the measures applied were inadequate. Considering the issue of legitimate 
authority, the issue of what to do when in a situation of 'overwhelming necessity' 
when the UNSC is unable to respond comes to mind.411 
At the outset one must stress that the lawfulness of the intervention is not the key 
issue, therefore the following remarks deal with intervention only to the extent in 
which it overlaps with the question of competent authority. NATO undertook the 
intervention without explicit, or legally possible, UNSC permission. There was 
nothing in the UNSC resolution that enabled them to use force. 
The international community, with the UN and the Contact Group at the helm, has 
made orderly efforts over a period of 2 years to work against the Belgrade policy in 
Kosovo. An apparent clear lesson from the war in Bosnia was that Milosevic 
negotiated only if he was placed under military strain. Therefore, the international 
community, especially western states, maintained an expressed link between political 
and military steps in the conflict over Kosovo. Acts of violence enforced by the 
Serbian policy, security and paramilitary forces, and by the Kosovo Liberation Army 
have been condemned repeatedly. Typically, no consequences followed the 
condemnations, or at best, they were short-lived.412 
The diplomatic efforts directed at the Contact Group, the OSCE, as well as other 
states such as Russia who intended to protect her influences in the Balkans, were 
unsuccessful. The turning point appeared to be Resolution 1199 accepted on 
September 23, 1998 which, in NATO’S opinion, provided a foundation for the use of 
force.413 
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Due to pressure from the Contact Group and NATO, as well as orders of activation of 
air strikes, Slobodan Milosevic agreed to a cessation of warfare in October. The 
agreement was to be supervised by an OSCE verification mission and NATO 
inspection flights over Kosovo. Unsuccessful implementation of the ‘October 
Agreement’, as well as a rise in violence marked, among other matters, the carnage at 
Racak, which led to last minute negotiations at Rambouillet.414 
The Rambouillet discussions were sponsored by the Contact Group, which set up an 
informal assembly of great powers in 1994 consisting of the USA, UK, France, 
Russia, and Germany, each of which was concerned with terminating the Balkan 
conflicts, and wanted a specific political solution for Kosovo. For the first time, the 
Kosovo Liberation Army was included in the reconciliation process. This angered the 
Serbian delegation since it could lead to legitimisation of the Kosovars’ demands for 
sovereignty.415 
After a number of tough meetings, 416 the parties temporarily agreed that Kosovo 
would receive a sizeable measure of self-sufficiency, and that its future status would 
be determined in a referendum three years after adoption of the accord. Although the 
greatest problem around the discussions (which reflected a fair measure of bargaining 
and negotiation) was the degree of Kosovo independence that would be acceptable to 
Belgrade, it appears that this was not the actual reason why the negotiations turned 
sour. According to Appendix B of the Resolution, the status of multinational military 
force, NATO personnel would have enjoyed “free and unrestricted passage and 
unimpeded access throughout the former Republic of Yugoslavia”.417 
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This was too much for President Milosevic and the Serbian delegation. After the 
collapse of the talks on March 15, the Belgrade government appeared to be resigned 
to the imminent intervention and began a new operation in Kosovo. In these 
conditions, the use of force to protect the Kosovars was essential. Diplomatic efforts 
seemed to have been worn out in the Kosovo case, but some doubt remains.418 
At Rambouillet the Alliance tried to enforce conditions but which the former 
Republic of Yugoslavia as sovereignty political community, could not accept. 
NATO's actions were apparently in contravention with the Charter of NATO itself. 
Proponents of this perspective argue that Article 5 of NATO's Charter restricts its use 
of force to situations where a NATO member has been attacked. Critics of this theory 
dispute that the purpose of Article 5 is to necessitate all NATO members to react 
when any NATO member is attacked, not to limit the circumstances under which 
NATO will choose to use force. NATO itself justified the actions in Kosovo under its 
Article 4, which states:419 
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the 
territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is 
threatened. Because the NATO actions in Kosovo were taken after 
consultation with all members, were approved by a NATO vote, and were 
undertaken by several NATO members, NATO contends that its actions were 
in accordance with its charter. However, opponents of NATO's involvement 
contend that the situation in Serbia and Yugoslavia posed no threat to any of 
the NATO members.420 
It could henceforth be argued that NATO violated international legal norms by acting 
without clear UNSC mandatory authorisation. From a legal perspective, one should 
either resort to the two exceptions to the prohibition of the use or threat of force in the 
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Charter, or to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, as argued by Sophie 
Thomashausen in her account of the legitimacy of NATO's intervention.421 
According to Article 51 of the Charter, this primary exception entails an extension of 
a state's inherent right to collective defence in the case of an armed attack. 
Accordingly it could be reasoned, that as a defence alliance and collective security, 
NATO's intervention in the reaction to the threat to international peace and security in 
the Balkans region was caused by Serbia's repression of the Kosovo Albanians. In 
contrast, such an argument could be based on a weak rationale, since one could argue 
that the intervention of NATO in Kosovo took place as an act in self-defence. 
A further (second) exception centres on the qualification in Article 2(7), which states 
that for an intervention in the internal affairs of a state to be lawful, it should clearly 
represent  an active enforcement of Chapter 7. The intervention in Kosovo can only 
be considered legal when it is authorised by the UNSC supported by 
acknowledgement that NATO is a regional organisation. The UNSC did not explicitly 
authorise ‘Operation Allied Force’. However, a strong case can be made for implicit 
UNSC authorisation. 
We must build on remarkable cooperation between the UN and SFOR in 
Bosnia to further regime the complement of force and diplomacy that is 
the key to peace in the Balkans, as everywhere. The success of the NATO-
led mission operation under a UN Mandate is surely a model for future 
endeavours.422 
To summarise, the position of certain states, such as China, seems to be consistent 
with International Law, while such international intervention has no legitimate basis 
since it is in fact, a clear violation of the UN Charter, and since such mediation is 
conducted for the benefit of the intervening power in particular, rather than the state 
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in consideration. The result is that the problems under consideration are usually 
aggravated in terms of the objectives of the intervening states.423 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
5.1 General 
This study aimed to examine the UN intervention policy, and Walzer’s ethical 
approach to humanitarian intervention from a legal perspective, specifically by 
comparing the cases of humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq (1991) and Kosovo 
(1999). The discussions in the previous chapters revealed that humanitarian 
intervention remains a controversial issue among UN member states, scholars, 
activists and writers on international relations. Likewise, as demonstrated by the cases 
of northern Iraq and Kosovo, the UN’s intervention policy has room for 
improvement. Particularly important in this regard are Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the 
UN Charter and ideas of supporters of human rights. It was found that International 
Law pertaining to humanitarian intervention needs further development and general 
refinement, and that there is a particular need for the establishment of appropriate 
measures that would include legal/ethical principles, processes, procedures, and an 
appropriate organisational structure for its implementation. 
One of the first issues encountered in this study on humanitarian intervention is the 
lack of consensus on the definition of the concept of humanitarian intervention and 
arguably no exact general or specific definition of the concept of humanitarian 
intervention exists. There is however, some general understanding of this among 
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researchers and those interested in the field of International Relations. Most of the 
definitions, if not all, confirm the existence of  two or more conflicts areas within a 
particular state because of political, religious or ethnic factors. 
The prominence of military intervention as in the cases of northern Iraq and Kosovo 
has resulted in humanitarian intervention becoming synonymous with military 
intervention. It is, however, important to distinguish between military and non-
military interventions. 
Walzer’s definition of humanitarian intervention as a means of helping oppressed 
people does not embrace the concept in terms of military action. If a clear distinction 
is made between military and non-military humanitarian intervention, at least some 
concerns about humanitarian intervention could be allayed, for non-military 
intervention does not involve the collateral damage often associated with military 
action and therefore, it is not as open to criticism as military intervention. 
Since humanitarian intervention is not a science but a social action, it remains open to 
several differing interpretations with equally diverse responses. As stated in the case 
of Iraq and of Kosovo, the response was military in nature. However, humanitarian 
intervention could be a combination of military and non-military responses, as was 
applied in other crises during the Cold War. Furthermore, as in other cases, for 
example Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia and Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda 
in 1979, there was no unified international response. 
Thus clarity is needed on what humanitarian intervention should entail, and various 
forms and manifestations of humanitarian intervention should be differentiated. With 
the development of legal principles on humanitarian intervention, it is important to 
pay attention to its various manifestations. Even military intervention could take on 
different forms and for which provision should also be made. 
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A second important issue involved in the practice of humanitarian intervention is that 
International Law is biased towards the sovereignty of the state in question. This is 
specifically stipulated in Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter, which precludes 
all forms of intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of other states. The UN prohibits 
any kind of intervention that will breach the sovereignty of a state. 
To protect the sovereignty of all states, the drafters of the UN Charter prohibited the 
use of force and in Articles 2(4) and 2(7) supported the principle of non-intervention. 
Accordingly, sovereignty is sanctified under International Law. However, the Charter 
recognises the importance of the need for special exemptions, hence provision was 
made for such cases in Chapter VII. 
The implication is that the international community should not intervene in a state’s 
domestic affairs, except when there is a threat to international peace and security. 
When such intervention does occur the actions directly impact on the sovereignty of 
the state in question as originally established under the Treaty of Westphalia. Yet, as 
discussed and indicated in history, interventions do take place. The international 
community for example, intervened in the case of Iraq (1991) after the UN issued 
Resolution 688, which stated that members had to help the Kurdish people in the 
north of the state. Why they refrained from helping the people residing in the south of 
the state in 1991 is unclear. 
The situation in Kosovo was different. Here NATO used force against the former 
Republic of Yugoslavia, and then the UN issued International Resolution 1244, 
which stated that Kosovo would be placed under international jurisdiction. The 
growing field of International Human Rights would probably contribute to the 
realisation that there is an increasing need for humanitarian intervention within the 
international system, in spite of the doctrine of sovereignty. It should be borne in 
mind that the concept of sovereignty is no longer absolute because the 1990s saw 
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considerable changes, especially after the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall.424 
However, there is the real danger that humanitarian interventions could be abused to 
further international agendas, or that humanitarian intervention could infringe on the 
rights of not only the state in question, but of internal ethnic groups and also regional 
neighbours. Thus, it is important that rules and procedures guiding humanitarian 
intervention be established because, as discussed, regardless of the measures taken at 
the time of intervention, there are no standardised rules governing a response from 
the international community. A third issue that emerged from the study therefore, is 
the need for rules pertaining to humanitarian intervention. 
Walzer formulated a set of principles in an attempt to address the issue of 
intervention versus sovereignty. These principles should, in his opinion, be used to 
determine whether intervention – and thus the violation of a particular state’s 
sovereignty – can be justified. 
The first principle endorsed by Walzer is that if a particular state includes a variety of 
ethnic groups and one of them revolts against the central government, intervention is 
justified. This is what happened in northern Iraq when the Kurds rose against Saddam 
Hussein’s leadership in 1991 after the so-called liberation of Kuwait from Iraq’s 
invasion. 
Furthermore, as pointed out in Walzer’s second principle, if a civil war occurs in a 
particular state, intervention is also justified. An example of this principle would be 
NATO’s armed intervention in 1999 to protect Kosovo’s Albanian population after 
they were attacked by Kosovo’s Serbs supported by the predominantly Serb-led 
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government of the former republic of Yugoslavia in response to their calls for an 
independent state. 
Walzer’s final principle addresses the use of intervention by foreign powers if a 
government is involved in massacring its own people. As discussed, this was the 
situation in both northern Iraq and Kosovo where the Iraqi and former Yugoslavia 
regimes horrifically massacred targeted groups within their civilian populations. 
Walzer thus postulates three reasons for humanitarian intervention by a foreign power 
or the international community for it to be acceptable. All three reasons were 
complied with in the case of northern Iraq and Kosovo. While perhaps not 
consciously, authorisation of intervention by the UN General Assembly and the 
Security Council complied with at least some of Walzer’s views in this regard. This 
dissertation argues that, despite some ambiguities in various UN Resolutions and 
divergent opinions within the UNSC, some elements of Walzer’s approach can be 
recognised. Walzer’s argument in favour of intervention in case of mass abuse of 
human rights was a discernable part of the UN intervention (though the UN may have 
arrived at this decision without being familiar with Walzer’s work). 
Walzer criticises the moral critics on the left for their strict rule-based morality that 
prevents intervention. Instead, he introduces a measure of consequential ethics in his 
views, namely that intervention under strict conditions and implicitly abiding by pre-
set timelines is justified when human rights abuses, and in particular genocide, are 
present within a particular state’s borders and are perpetrated by a de facto oppressive 
regime or partisan internal hegemonic forces. The UN opted for such humanitarian 
interventions in Kosovo and Iraq. 
In both cases the sovereignty of the states was undermined by the international 
community. The decisions taken were in line with Walzer’s ethical approach. In both 
cases intervention in order to arrest and at least minimise human rights abuses were 
 165
discussed and some action was taken after hard bargaining. However, there were 
conflicting opinions with regard to the interpretation of the situation in both cases. 
China and Russia opposed intervention in Kosovo, while France favoured minimal 
intervention. The USA however, pushed for aggressive and forceful intervention. 
If norms are to be developed to enable intervention to proceed more amicably, far 
greater effort should be expended to describe and circumscribe such norms. 
Furthermore, guidelines should be set regarding the conditions, for how long, and for 
the attainment of which specified purposes (goals) interventionist actions are to take 
place. 
Again, Walzer’s ideas may be of help, but he does not provide a refined description 
of the exact conditions of the context that could justify interference on moral grounds. 
In this area, the well-known tension around a rule-based morality and 
consequentiality ethics enter the realm of international politics and humanitarian 
rights law. This tension has not yet been solved within the UN but Walzer gives some 
pointers. Nonetheless, he failed to prescribe the exact conditions for intervention. The 
debates regarding real political conditions and approaches to moral-based 
interventions deserve further attention, and the circumstances under which 
humanitarian intervention may take place remain open to debate and interpretation. 
In addition, decisions on the nature, scale and intensity of interventionist actions is 
another controversial issue. One may ask whether the scale of the intervention is 
justified when compared with the threat. It is here that Walzer’s laudable but less 
refined norms for intervention (or ethical guidelines) offer some help. Walzer’s ideas 
are however, not without problems because they require the interpretation of 
conditions within a particular state prior to any form of humanitarian intervention in 
order to justify such action. 
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A further problem is that interventions may have unintended negative consequences. 
An unfortunate outcome could be that the intervention is seen as one-sided. Kosovo 
serves as such an example. The bombing campaign by NATO – led mostly by the 
USA in an aggressive manner – destroyed infrastructure on a large scale and brought 
havoc to the civilian population. A fair amount of civilian bitterness, if not hate, 
remains because of the bombing campaign. The intervention thus had mixed success. 
Not only was it seen as one-sided, outstripping the initial and precarious minimum 
consensus, but it is argued that it caused more harm than good. Even to this day, the 
Russian state and its leaders argue that the intervention’s negative consequences 
outstripped the positive consequences. Likewise, the situation in northern Iraq was/is 
complex. Again minimal consensus was precarious. Arguments were/are made for 
and against intervention, or the need to escalate intervention. 
Thus it is important that proper rules and procedures for the authorisation of 
humanitarian intervention should be in place and that these should be 
institutionalised. This begs the question of whom or what should take responsibility 
for the authorisation of humanitarian intervention and what the rules and procedures 
should be. 
Currently, this is a task of the UN. The main problem with humanitarian intervention 
is that the UN does not make provision for intervention in the internal affairs of states 
in cases of internal conflict unless such conflict poses a threat to international peace 
and security. This led some states such as the USA to interpret the charter of the UN 
differently, particularly, in the Post-cold War Era. However, many specialists of 
international relations doubted the purposes of the USA’s intervention and were 
concerned that the USA used the UN as a forum to achieve its own aims and further 
its own agenda. Allegations such as these were fuelled by the USA’s quest for 
intervention in northern Iraq to help the Iraqi Kurds in 1991, but it disregarded the 
needs of those in the south of Iraq. 
 167
For these reasons, it is possible that the UN’s current policy on humanitarian 
intervention remains arbitrary and only benefits the interests of a few member states, 
in particular those with a veto, for example the USA. Based on the above assessment, 
it would therefore be useful to modify existing provisions in the UN Charter in 
accordance with basic principles of ethics. Such modifications should be able to 
address internal conflicts and establish strict guidelines for the nature and level of the 
intervention (whether it should be military, non-military or a combination of them), 
the extent of such intervention, as well as the appropriate mechanisms for the 
execution and termination of such actions. In the words of Kofi Annan, the former 
Secretary-General of the UN, nations have in fact confirmed the need for such a shift 
as demonstrated by events in northern Iraq and Kosovo. 
Reacting to resolutions, the UNSC struggled to obtain a minimal consensus for 
intervention in both the above-mentioned cases. Despite minimal consensus and the 
ambiguities in the UN General Assembly’s resolutions as pointed out earlier, 
interventions did occur against the wishes of some member states and of members of 
the Security Council. 
The international community still lacks a common vision of the concept of 
international peace and security. There are opposing views among the member states 
of the UN on the standings and ideas surrounding this concept. Not everyone agrees 
on these terms (international peace and security), their specific content, and/or how 
steps should be taken to give body to this terminology. 
This lack of unified vision hampers the modus operandi to be undertaken in each 
conflict, where each case of conflict also reflects a different context – sometimes 
substantially differing from previous circumstances. The foregoing chapters revealed 
that even though International Law and the UN Charter do not permit any 
interference in the internal affairs of states, but call for the support of human rights 
and the protection of religious and/or ethnic minorities, wherever they are. The 
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situation reflects a dialogue that calls for legal and ethical treatment by specialists in 
International Relations and International Law, as well as focused attention from 
decision- and policy-makers. 
A body or international organisation; a high profiled think-tank, or a council of wise 
men should, as a matter of urgency, be established to investigate this subject and base 
it on the standards of legal and ethical implications for outside parties. Therefore, it is 
both the duty of, and a necessity for the international society to adopt new or 
additional rules to further define (and refine) the concept of humanitarian intervention 
and frameworks related thereto. Of great importance are the following issues: 
A high priority should be given to the attention and care of international 
jurisprudence. Internal research centers, states involved and international 
organisations could provide valuable insights. National and international armed 
conflict, or armed conflict with implications outside the state where internal war 
occurs, should receive attention. The ‘fall-out’ or trans-border consequences of 
conflict and the conditions for international intervention and its duration should be 
spelled out clearly. 
The research should be placed in the hands of experts, decision-makers and 
stakeholders with a role in international policy-making in the framework of states or 
international organisations to achieve true interdependence between theoretical ideas 
and reality. In this way stability and prosperity of the international community, which 
is suffering in some parts due to internal conflicts, could be achieved Special 
attention should be paid to appointing or selecting people with a non-partisan profile 
to work at, serve in or be associated with such institutions, at least as humanely as 
possible. 
The world witnessed an unbearable degree of human agony in the 1990s. Some 
authors on international relations, including Walzer, tried to find appropriate 
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solutions for comprehensive humanitarian misery and also to develop useful systems 
for reacting to human catastrophes. Immediately after conflict erupts in an area of 
concern, constructive attempts should be made to alleviate the suffering of the 
victims. Such a body may be able to offer some recommendations for the benefit of 
the international community, which now suffers from the absence of legal 
frameworks and well-prescribed ethical obligations to determine rules of 
humanitarian intervention. 
5.2 Recommendations concerning the work of the United Nations 
in internal conflicts 
As previously indicated, the position of the UN regarding humanitarian intervention 
needs refinement, and the following are recommended: 
i) The need for modification of the provisions of the UN Charter: as imperative, such 
modification(s) should formulate provisions that discriminate between international 
disputes and armed conflict that are international in character; provide distinct rules 
applicable to the conditions, and also suggest/propose appropriate mechanisms to 
deal with each of them to prevent interference or to set clear conditions for 
interference. This would include the timetables and conditions for withdrawal of 
intervening forces, but not only in the case of armed conflict. 
ii) There remains a need to amend the provisions of Article 55 of the UN Charter 
regarding the right to self-determination to prevent foreign forces from using this 
right to achieve their own interests in the face of the legitimate authority. Once such 
amendments are in place, intervening forces should then only intervene with the full 
consent of the UN, and not breach the sovereignty for their own aims. 
iii) There also remains a need to develop a specific definition of the concept of 
international peace and security, and agreement regarding the required conditions for 
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intervention. Once achieved, these measures should block or forestall foreign forces 
working to expand this concept or present their ‘widened’ approach as a pre-text for 
illegal interference in the internal affairs of states and subsequent violation of their 
sovereignty. In addition, it should be mentioned that the UN should set conditions 
that prevent one-sided interference, and that sanctions against one-sided interventions 
should be discussed and put in place. 
iv) There is a need to develop rules that conclusively determine the importance of 
respecting the sovereignty of states by amending the provisions of Article 2 (1) of the 
UN Charter to prevent the violation of the sovereignty of states, especially in the case 
of internal armed conflicts. 
v) The aim of military intervention for humanitarian purposes must be limited in 
order to prevent an increase in humanitarian suffering in parts or the whole of a target 
state. The military intervention must be focused and purposeful without causing 
further suffering, civil strife or civil war. In this study it is argued that unintended 
consequences should be considered as interventions are planned in order to safeguard 
human rights (humanitarian intervention), especially because such military 
interventions may have unexpected or unforeseen ‘fall-outs’ or domino effects 
detrimental to peace in a region, or may even have wider implications within the 
international community. The goals should be precisely honed and consensual to 
enable a move from violence towards civil or peaceful use and application. The 
international community cannot afford another Kosovo or Iraqi-type situation. 
vi) Most importantly, intervening states should set a timetable in advance for the 
withdrawal of their forces from the territory of the targeted state. Should such a 
schedule not be adhered to, the structures and conditions for sanctioning continued 
involvement by the intervening state or states should be worked out clearly for 
purposeful implementation to be possible. 
 171
5.3 Recommendations concerning states with internal conflicts 
States could prevent the need for intervention in their internal affairs and conflicts by 
other states by complying with the following recommendations: 
i) States should avoid internal conflicts through the development of constitutional 
rules that encourage participation of all their nationals to assume responsibility and 
enjoy privileges on an equal footing, without discrimination on racial, religious or 
political grounds. 
ii) The parties responsible for internal conflict in certain states should apply the 
provisions of International Human Rights Law to prevent problems from escalating to 
the extent that they could lead to humanitarian suffering that would require 
intervention by other states. 
iii) The parties to a conflict in a particular state (or states) should cooperate with 
humanitarian organisations and should not be exempted from their humanitarian 
duties to alleviate the suffering of victims. By preventing humanitarian organisations 
from carrying out their legal and ethical duties, a crisis may be exacerbated and 
allowed to escalate. 
5.4 Concluding remarks 
As demonstrated with reference to the case studies of Kosovo and Northern Iraq, 
current practices are far from optimal. In fact, they allow for conflicting perspectives 
that could lead to actions that have unforeseen or unintended consequences, and 
moreover, could exacerbate the suffering and worsen the situation. Refinements of 
UN structures and policies to deal with comparable situations in future are 
recommended. In addition, the establishment of a body, an international think-tank or 
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an organisation dedicated to applied research, may assist in providing solutions by 
foresight, rather than leave people in misery if foresight is neglected. 
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